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A Critical Assessment of the 
Traditional Residential Real Estate 
Broker Commission Rate Structure
(Unabridged)
By Mark S. Nadel*
While real estate brokers have long set their fee as a straight percentage of a home’s sale 
price, this formula is an anomaly and a primary reason why such fees may be inflated 
by more than $30 billion annually. Although competitive pressures ordinarily force an 
industry’s fee structure to reflect its costs, real estate broker commissions are strangely 
unrelated to either the quantity or quality of the service rendered or even to the value 
provided. Rather, this fee has been based solely on the price of the home. (It is as if tax 
preparers set their fee as a flat percentage of a client’s gross income, irrespective of how 
difficult the return was to prepare or how much their efforts saved the taxpayer). Oddly, 
not only is there no evidence that it is any more costly to sell higher-priced homes than 
median-priced properties, but it is possible that the opposite may be true! Furthermore, 
the straight percentage fee formula creates little incentive for real estate agents to 
provide home buyers or sellers with additional value.
The article analyzes five elements of the traditional residential real estate broker rate 
structure, the most important of which are: 1) setting fees as a percentage-of-sale-price, 
2) letting the seller’s broker set the fee received by the buyer’s broker, and 3) refusing 
to unbundle the price of a full package of services. After analyzing the conditions under 
which such rate elements would be justified, this article finds that those conditions do 
not generally exist in the real estate brokerage market. Moreover, it identifies more 
than a half dozen harms that the rate elements cause to home buyers and sellers. For 
example, buyers are often not alerted to attractive homes because the rate structure 
leads traditional agents to intentionally avoid showing them. Meanwhile, many buyers 
do not even consider negotiating the fee paid to their broker because the rate structure 
causes them to believe their brokers’ services cost them nothing.
The article suggests that consumers would benefit most from a fee-for-service approach 
– combining primarily flat fees, hourly rates (for buyers who prefer this), and bonuses 
where practical, including percentages of extra value created – and it identifies currently 
available examples of some of these options. After reviewing eight reasons why 
incumbents are able to protect the current structure, the article proposes four short 
questions for consumers to ask to help defeat the industry’s protectionist practices.
Note: The author seeks constructive criticism of this draft article, which is being submitted 
for publication in a law journal. Please send comments to msnadel@gmail.com
* The author would like to thank Aaron Bennett, Peter Bingham, Norm Hawker, Maureen Glasheen, 
James Hsu, Philip Henderson, Barry Miller, Carolina Nadel, Eugene Nadel, Pat Rioux, Bill Wendel, Larry 
White, Patrick Woodall, and participants at a January 2006 FTC Bureau of Economics seminar for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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I. Introduction
Residential real estate brokers and salespersons (agents of brokers) have long 
quoted their fees as a straight percentage of a home’s sale price. This traditional formula, 
however, ill serves the interests of both home buyers and sellers, and is a primary reason 
why such fees may be inflated by $30 billion annually. Although competitive pressures 
in an industry ordinarily force competitors to adopt fee structures that reflect their costs, 
this has not occurred for real estate broker fees. Despite the intensely competitive local 
real estate brokerage markets, broker fees are usually set without regard to either the 
quantity or quality of service rendered. Rather, fees are based solely on the price of the 
home. It is as if tax preparers set their fee as a flat percentage of a client’s gross income, 
irrespective of how difficult the return was to prepare or how much their efforts saved 
the taxpayer. This occurs although there is no evidence that higher-priced homes are 
any more costly to sell than median-priced properties, and it is possible that the reverse 
is true! Furthermore, the fee formula creates very little incentive for agents to provide 
consumers with the full value-enhancing services that many could offer.3
A traditional seller’s (or listing) broker will typically charge the owner of a $00,000 
residence a six percent commission to provide “full service.” This generally includes 
helping to price the home, to “stage” it effectively, showing it, and negotiating with 
potential buyers, as well as handling the closing. Yet the listing broker usually retains 
only half of that fee (three percent) for providing those services and generally offers 
the other three percent to the broker of the agent who finds a buyer.  Meanwhile, both 
brokers split their fees with their agents and the agents may end up with anywhere from 
about 0 to 00 percent of the commission. With a 70-30 split, the traditional listing 
agent will receive about $,00 of the $,000 commission on a $00,000 home.
Brokers justify using a percentage-of-sale-price formula with the claim that it aligns 
incentives of brokers with those of sellers; yet given the splits just indicated, the listing 
A real estate agent is someone who has passed a state real estate licensing exam and works as an agent 
for a state-licensed real estate “broker.” The latter, who set the fee structure and level, must meet higher 
educational standards or have more experience than a salesperson or both. Government AccountAbility 
office, reAl estAte brokerAGe: fActors thAt mAy Affect Price comPetition 6 (2005) [hereinafter GAO 
2005 Rep.]. Agents are not necessarily legal agents of (and with fiduciary duties to) home buyers and 
sellers. National Assoc. of Realtors, Structure, Conduct, and Performance of the Real Estate Brokerage 
Industry 5-6 (Nov. 2005) http://www.realtor.org /Research.nsf/files/Structure%20Paper%20FINAL%2011-
28-5.pdf/$FILE/Structure%20Paper %20FINAL%2011-28-05.pdf.  Also, the National Association of Real-
tors (NAR) has trademarked the term Realtor® for its members. 
2 See infra note 28. 
 A similar disconnect exists for the fees charged by home mortgage brokers, although that is beyond the 
scope of this article. See Jack Guttentag, “How Much Do Mortgage Brokers Make?” Apr. 9, 200, http://
www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Mortgage%20Brokers/how_much_do_mortgage_brokers_make.htm; 
Jack Guttentag, “Another View of Predatory Lending,” Aug. 21, 2000, http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/pa-
pers/0/02.pdf
 Adverse splits are addressed infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
5 Splits between brokers and agents vary widely. Brokers typically pay new agents 50 percent of the com-
missions on their transactions and successful agents may collect as much as 90 or even 00 percent. See 
inmAn news, the stAte of reAl estAte commissions: 2006 4, 21 (2006) (Inman Commissions 2006); Jamie 
Baylis, The Big Split, wAsh. Post, Dec. 0, 2000, at G.  Under an “agent service bureau” model agents 
retain their full commissions and pay their brokers only a monthly fee for desk costs or other overhead. 
See nAt’l Assoc. of reAltors, the future of reAl estAte brokerAGe 7 (200) [hereinafter 200 NAR 
Report].
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agent will earn only . percent of any additional value he or she can create by increasing 
the sale price of the home. This is a very weak motivator.  For example, if the investment 
of 0 hours of extra effort by the agent would increase the selling price by $0,000, the 
potential for only . percent of that ($0) in additional net commission ($0.0/hour) 
is unlikely to yield a sufficient incentive for the agent. In addition, the formula induces 
buyers’ brokers’ agents to encourage their clients to make higher bids rather than trying 
to negotiate a lower purchase price.
Meanwhile, despite being willing and economically able to provide full service for 
an average $,000 total commission, listing brokers commonly seek and receive many 
times that amount even when they expect to expend significantly less than the average 
level of effort and resources (and have a lower risk of failure). Thus, a seller’s broker 
for a $ million dollar home is apt to charge a five percent fee ($0,000),7 even when a 
hot market suggests that it will be easy to obtain the asking price or more, and the sale 
will require less than ten hours of work. Moreover, such brokers’ agents commonly 
disparage brokers offering to provide full service for only a four percent ($0,000) 
commission, implying that such discount brokers will have to skimp on service because 
it is economically impractical to provide “full service” for only $0,000.
The situation is even odder for the agents who assist buyers. Certainly an agent 
with 30 years of knowledge regarding all aspects of the neighborhoods in a community 
may be worth $00 an hour or more to help buyers find the home best able to satisfy 
all their future desires. Yet in other cases, astronomical fees are paid with little, if any, 
justification. For example, even where buyers did all the searching on their own and 
called the listing broker, clearly stating that they did not want the assistance of a buyer’s 
agent, if the listing agent’s colleague answered their call and provided services normally 
provided by the listing broker, that agent’s broker may demand and receive half of the 
six percent commission. Even when prospective buyers at an open house merely chat 
with the listing broker’s associate (who may be one of the hundreds of thousands of 
novices, who have passed the state licensing exam after only  to 0 hours of study 
in the early 000s), that agent’s broker may be entitled to receive a full three percent 
6 Many scholars have recognized that a six percent commission gives an agent little incentive to invest 
in generating incremental value. See steven D. levitt & stePhen J. Dubner, freAkonomics 8-9, 72-73 
(2005); Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers, 
Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards, 36 J. L. & econ. 503, 506 n.7 (1993).  Furthermore, other data 
indicates that agents splitting their commission with a broker generate the same results as those who keep 
the entire amount. See Henry J. Munneke & Abdullah Yavas, Incentives and Performance in Real Estate 
Brokerage, 22 J. reAl est. fin. & econ. 5 (200).  See also infra note 7.
7 See, Damon Darlin, The 6 Percent Solution: Skip Real Estate Agents, N.Y. times, Sept. 7, 2005, at C 
(To sell their $ million home, “[t]hey tried to negotiate a lower [than 6 percent] commission with prospec-
tive agents . . ., but the best they could get was .5 percent – and 5.5 percent if the agent had to share the 
commission with a buyer’s agent.”).
8 See Blanche Evans, Buyers Mad They Can’t Cut Threshold Agent Out of the Deal, reAlty times.com, 
Aug. 2, 2005 (contending that an agent deserves to receive the standard buyer’s agent portion of the com-
mission even after the buyer called the listing agent to view a home and the buyers expressly stated that 
they did not want to pay for, i.e., employ, a buyer’s agent, but the listing agent’s colleague still enabled the 
buyers to view the home and provided additional information).
9 See Tracy McNamara, A Hot Housing Market Leads to Agent Burnout, reAlestAteJournAl.com, July , 
2005,  http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/200507-mcnamara.html (most states 
require only 30 to 60 hours of classroom instruction to earn a general real-estate sales license); James R. 
Hagerty, Feet in the Door: As Home Sales Cool, Ranks of Realtors Grow Crowded, wAll st. J., Jan. 20, 
200, at A. See also Julie GArton-GooD, reAl estAte A lA cArte: selectinG the services you neeD, PAy-
inG whAt they’re worth  (200) (“entry level education requirements to obtain a real estate license 
“Meanwhile, despite 
being willing and 
economically 
able to provide 
full service for an 
average $2,000 
total commission, 
listing brokers 
commonly seek and 
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when they expect to 
expend	significantly	
less than the 
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risk of failure).” 
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commission.0 Finally, although a buyer discharged her Nantucket buyer’s broker after 
he refused to accept a $00,000 cap on his fee, and then used her lawyers to purchase a 
$. million home, the broker (who had introduced the property to her) still sued the 
listing broker for his half of the $0,000 commission.
In many ways, the residential real estate brokerage industry resembles the American 
funeral industry that Jessica Mitford expertly exposed in 3 in The American Way of 
Death: Families arranging for funerals were regularly asked to pay a single price for 
a bundle of services, many of which they did not need or want.3 The words of the 
3 Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s multi-year study of the residential real estate 
brokerage industry still stand: “the market for real estate brokerage service does not 
accord with the customary model of competitively functioning markets.”
The strange nature of the fee structure has also led the industry and press to report 
that average commission rates have “fallen” from about  percent to . percent between 
 and 00. Those figures, however, are somewhat suspect and misleading.  Even 
accepting them, the average commission has still increased in dollars over that period, 
even after adjusting for inflation. Furthermore, any decrease in the rate appears 
in most states are only a fraction of the hours demanded of barbers and cosmetologists.”). It is important 
to note, however, that the industry has strongly resisted the entry of banks into real estate brokerage. See 
Lew Sichelman, Bill Would Allow Banks in Real Estate, reAlty times, June 8, 2005; Patrick Barta, Real-
tors Organize to Stop a Threat from Banks, wAll st. J., Jan. 25, 200, at A2.  See also infra note 70, on 
support for such entry.
0 See James R. Hagerty, When Realtors Fight About Commissions, Things Can Get Ugly, wAll st. J., Dec. 
20, 2005, at A.
 See Hagerty, supra note 0  (discussing the sale of a home on Nantucket in 2005). But see Roger Slade, 
Protecting and Avoiding Brokerage Commissions, reAl est. fin., Dec. 2006, at , 2 (“it is not enough for 
the broker to just have brought the buyer and seller together”).
2 See JessicA mitforD, the AmericAn wAy of DeAth revisiteD (998) (updating original 96 version).
 Id.  In response, the FTC adopted its “Funeral Rule,” which required funeral homes to provide consumers 
with itemized price lists and other data to help them to purchase only the specific services they desired.  See 
Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260 (1982).
 From 1978 through 1981 the Los Angeles Regional Office of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
working in conjunction with the Seattle Regional Office and the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, conducted 
a nationwide investigation of the residential real estate brokerage industry. The investigation was coor-
dinated with the FTC’s Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection, under their general sponsor-
ship.  feDerAl trADe commission stAff rePort, the resiDentiAl reAl estAte brokerAGe inDustry (98) 
Vol. I (hereinafter FTC 1983 Report), at 11, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/realestate/workshop/index.
htm#ftcstaffreport98.
5 See John C. Weicher, The Price of Residential Real Estate Brokerage Services: A Review of the Evi-
dence, Such As It Is, 5 reAl est. L.J. 119, 122-24 (2006), questioning whether the 5.1% figure may be 
too low.  The data may also include the commissions paid on new homes, which include the fee paid to 
buyers’ agents, but not any amounts that builders pay to their own marketing departments, which serve as 
listing agents. Then again, those data do not appear to take into account commission rebates, closing cost 
assistance, and other in-kind rebates, like free moving truck services. See Lawrence Yun, Real Estate Bro-
kerage Industry: Structure-Conduct-Performance, Oct. 25, 2005, at , http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/
comprealestate/yun.pdf (Yun NAR report). It would also likely omit rebates that agents prefer to hide.  See 
Glenn Roberts, Jr., ‘Secret Agents’ Quietly Offer Real Estate Rebates, inmAn news, Mar. 7, 2006.  See also 
Realogy 2007 Annual Report 5 (reporting average effective commission rates of between 5.06 and .69 
percent from 2002 to 2006). 
6 Net increase in fees appears to be somewhat greater than inflation, See U.S. DePArtment of Justice & 
feDerAl trADe commission, comPetition in the reAl estAte brokerAGe inDustry 38-45 (2007)(2007 DoJ/
ftc Report); GAO 2005 Rep., supra note 1, at 10-11; Weicher, supra note 5, at 2 ( percent increase 
between 1991 and 2004 after adjusting for inflation); Robert W. Hahn, et al, Bringing More Competition to 
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to be primarily due to brokers’ willingness to charge somewhat lower rates for the 
increasing number of much higher-priced listings.7 One would have expected that an 
information and communication-based industry, like real estate brokerage, would enjoy 
tremendous cost efficiencies from the development of the Internet, databases, and other 
communication technologies. Yet it appears that traditional brokers generally have not 
passed on their cost savings to consumers in the form of lower fees.
Rather, until the early 000s, an upward trend and downward inflexibility in 
traditional broker commission rates has been the norm.0 For example, in the spring of 
, the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area’s largest brokerage firm, Long & Foster, 
Real Estate Brokerage, 5 reAl est. L.J. 86, 94 n.28 (2006). See also Inman Commissions 2006, supra note 
5, at 5.  For a comparison of home price increases and the change in the consumer price index in the hottest 
housing markets, see American Bankers Assoc., Lack of Competition in Real Estate Commissions, spring 
2005, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/realestatecompetition/58795-0000.pdf, at 5.
7 See GAO 2005 Rep., supra note 1, at 12; Weicher, supra note 15, at 133-37, citing C.F. Sirmans & Geof-
frey K. Turnbull, Brokerage Pricing Under Competition,  J. urb. econ. 102 (1997); Michael Carney, 
Costs and Pricing of Home Brokerage Services, 0 J. Am. reAl est. & urb. econ. Ass’n , 5-6 
(1982) (reporting that tapered commission rates, e.g., 6 percent of the first $25,000, 5 percent of the next 
$75,000, and 2½ percent of the rest, were common in the U.S.); Do Real-Estate Agents Help?, 55 con-
sum. reP. 60, 62 (July 990) (hereinafter Consumer Rep.); Why Does it Cost So Much to Sell a House?, 
forbes, Oct. 15, 1972, at 35 (hereinafter 1972 Forbes Cover Story).  This also probably explains why a 
2000 survey by Gomez Advisors of ,000 brokers, found that about 0 percent said they discounted fees 
“on a regular basis.” See Motoko Rich, Residential Brokers Cope with Threats Online, wAll st. J., Dec. , 
2000, at B2. See also infra note 67 (higher rates for lower-priced properties). Yet there is often resistance 
to rate reductions.
8 See infra note 204, and accompanying text; U.S. v. NAR, Civil Action No. 05C-5140, Amended Com-
plaint, Oct. 0, 2005 (DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2700/275.
htm, at ¶¶ , 27 (referencing multiple admissions by NAR members of lower cost structures of brokers 
who use the Internet).  In addition a number of studies have found that that the use of computer technology 
and the Internet have improved the productivity and profit margins of brokers. See John D. Benjamin et al, 
Technology and Real Estate Brokerage Firm Financial Performance, 27 J. reAl est. res. 09 (200). See 
also Steve Sawyer, et al, Redefining Access: Uses and Roles of Information and Communication Technolo-
gies in the Residential Real Estate Industry from 1995-2005, 20 J. info. tech. 2, 27-9 (2005).  But see 
Geoff Lewis, Competition in the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry (Oct. 6, 2005 draft), http://img.
realtytimes.com/rtimages/article_20051010_blanche/ $file/remaxposition.pdf at 7 (claiming broker costs 
are increasing dramatically).
9 Some traditional brokers have, however, matched lower priced brokers on an ad hoc basis and more.  For 
example, Century 21 created Century 21 Clickit, which started in Georgia in 2000 and had expanded to five 
states by 2005. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., Flat-Fee Century 21 Brokerage Clicks with Consumers, inmAn news, 
June 0, 2005. Also, Coldwell Banker started a discount brokerage division called Blue Edge Realty that of-
fers to list properties for a 2 percent commission. See Lewis, supra note 18 at 10; Blanche Evans, Everybody 
Discounts,  As far back as 2000, Century 21 was already showing agents how to offer an à la carte menu 
of options to meet their Grumbles New Agent, reAlty times, Nov. , 2005.  See also nAt’l Ass’n. of reAl-
tors, the consumer: cAtAlyst of chAnGe 9 (2006) (NAR Catalyst) (noting that many brokers are offering 
multiple service options). As far back as 2000, Century 2 was already showing agents how to offer an à la 
carte menu of options to meet their competition. See Rich, supra note 7.  See also Real Estate Commission 
Under Pressure, inmAn news, April 2, 2005 ( part series). Others resist adopting most new technologies. 
See also infra note 20, and accompanying text.
20 It appears that the prevailing rate in the 920s was on the order of two to three percent commissions, 
while five percent appears to have been the prevailing rate in the 1950s. See John H. Crockett, Competition 
and Efficiency in Transacting: The Case of Residential Real Estate Brokerage, 0 J. Am. reAl est. & urb. 
econ. Ass’n 209, 20 (982). Studies in the 970s and 980s found that communities generally settled on 
a rate of either six or seven percent.  See GAO 2005 Rep., supra note , at 9 n.. In fact, one antitrust en-
forcement official observed in 1980 that, despite “rapidly increasing home values, commission percentages 
remain stable and are even inching up to 7 percent, 7½ percent, and even 8 percent.” William L. Trombetta, 
Using Antitrust Law to Control Anticompetitive Real Estate Industry Practices,  J. consumer Aff. 2, 
6 (980).
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actually raised its commission rate from six to seven percent, although that increase 
was retracted when competitors did not match it.  Furthermore, brokers willing to 
charge less than the standard rate often only agree to do so subject to a confidentiality 
agreement, out of fear of retaliation.
The 3 FTC study focused on the apparent lack of price competition in the industry, 
which still continues despite fierce non-price competition.3  As an illuminating 003 
article by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti explained, the industry has channeled 
competition towards providing consumers with two, dubious benefits: ) a surplus of 
new, inexperienced agents (leading to a record high of more than . million licensed 
—and as many as .3 million active—agents), and ) free promotional gifts, such as 
Halloween pumpkins or refrigerator magnets and the like, personalized with agents’ 
names.  Estimates of how much of the approximately $ billion (in 00)7 of annual 
broker fees consumers might save if there was effective price competition suggests as 
much as $30 billion or more annually.
2 See Baylis, supra note 5. Cf. United States v. Foley 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 979).
22 See Roberts, supra note 5. Rebates made by a buyer’s broker or third party, e.g. credit union, are gener-
ally not disclosed on the standard HUD- form used at closing.
2 For evidence of fierce competition, see Steve Sawyer, Local Real Estate Market Competition: Evidence 
and Insight from an Analysis of 12 Local Markets, 17 August 2005, at 8,  http://www.realtor.org/publicaf-
fairsweb.nsf/files/SawyerStudy.pdf/$File/SawyerStudy.pdf. 
2 See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Can Free Entry be Inefficient?  Fixed Commissions and Social 
Waste in the Real Estate Industry,  J. Pol. econ. 076 (200).
25 See Blanche Evans, ARELLO Announces Number Of Licensees For 2005, reAlty times, Jan. 2, 2006 
(reporting 2.6 million licensees); DAviD bArry, nine PillArs of the citADel - (2005) http://www.
barryfirm.com/dnld/Nine-Pillars-Citadel.pdf (about 97 percent of active real estate agents join the NAR, 
usually to obtain access to local MLSs); Yun NAR report, supra note 15, at 3 (1.3 million NAR members); 
GAO 2005 Rep., supra note 11, at 8; David Streitfeld, A Glut in the Market for Homes, L.A. times, May 20, 
2005, at A1; Nadine Brozan, So Few Properties, So Many Brokers, N.Y. times, Nov. 27, 2005, §, at .  A 
large number of agents, however, are either part-time or obtained their licenses solely to work in mortgage 
brokerage.  Also, experts estimate that an average agent works from about 28 hours per week (see Norm 
Miller, The US Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry’s Resistance to Commission Rate Competition 
with some Speculating on the Future of the Industry, presented at AAI, Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2005, 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/464f.pdf at slide 8) to about five hours per week on successful 
sales (see bArry, supra at . But see Blanche Evans, NAR Member Survey Shows Commissions Haven’t 
Gone Down, reAlty times, Aug. 0, 2005 (reporting that an NAR survey found that members work an 
average of 6 hours per week).
26 These marketing efforts are called “farming” or “prospecting” for clients. See Hsieh & Moretti, supra 
note 24, at 1088-89; FTC 1983 Report, supra note 14, at 63-64; Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Real Estate Brokers, 
Nonprice Competition and the Housing Market, 2 reAl est. econ. 293 (1996); Streitfeld, supra note 25; 
Brozan, supra note 25. An environment with lottery-like payoffs for successes generally leads to rent seek-
ing behavior, whereby competitive marketing efforts dissipate any surplus value associated with a success. 
Cf. Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of 
Marketing, 9 berkeley tech L.J. 785, 797-803 (2004) (Financing Creative Output).
27 See Testimony of David Wood, GAO, to Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, House 
Comm. on Financial Services, July 25, 2006, http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/072506dgw.pdf 
at . See also GAO 2005 Rep, supra note 1, at 6; Hahn, et al, supra note 16, at 87 n.3; James R. Hagerty, 
Discount Real-Estate Brokers Spark a War Over Commissions, wAll st. J., Oct. 2, 2005, at A.
28 Hsieh & Moretti estimated that the social loss represented more than half of the total commissions earned 
in 1990, Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 2, at 6, suggesting that more than half of current commissions 
might be eliminated by competition.  One 200 study estimated the total excess charges to home buyers for 
brokerage mortgage, and related services at $9 billion annually, about $ billion for real estate agents 
services. See Shane Ham & Robert D. Atkinson, Modernizing Home Buying: How IT Can Empower Indi-
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This article, however, is only indirectly concerned about commission levels in the 
industry. It focuses primarily on why the traditional fee structure sets prices based solely 
on the sale price of the home, without consideration of either the quantity or quality of 
service desired. It views the industry’s traditional one-dimensional fee structure as very 
similar to the illogical, inefficient formula previously used by travel agents and stock 
brokers through the early 70s—setting a fixed rate, which did not vary with the size 
of a sale (whether in dollars or shares of stock).
The more recent transformation of travel agent commissions on air travel is 
probably most suggestive of the future for agents even though good real estate agents 
play a much greater and important role interpreting data for clients. That revolution 
in the travel industry was also significantly triggered by easier customer access to the 
information in databases via the Internet. Through the mid-0s, airlines generally 
paid travel agencies ten percent commissions on the airline tickets they sold, but in the 
late 0s the airlines began eliminating these payments.30 As a result, today most travel 
agents are forced to bill clients separately and explicitly for the research and ticketing 
services they provide.3
This Article addresses five separate elements of the traditional residential real estate 
broker rate structure in sections II through VI: 
   (II)   the use of a percentage-of-sale-price metric
   (III)  the setting of the buyer’s broker’s fee by the seller’s broker 
   (IV)  the refusal to offer unbundled services
   (V)   the lack of any price difference based on agent expertise or
          the difficulty of a task
   (VI)  prohibitions against rebates (in some states).
Each section considers where else in the economy that aspect of the rate structure 
exists, why it may be efficient and socially valuable in those contexts, and why the rate 
element does not appear appropriate for the residential real estate brokerage market. 
viduals, Slash Costs, and Transform the Real Estate Industry, Mar. 200, PPI, at 2, available at  http://www.
ppionline.org/documents/Real_Estate_0303.pdf.  Natalya Delcoure & Norm G. Miller, International Resi-
dential Real Estate Brokerage Fees and Implications for the U.S. Brokerage Industry, 5 int’l reAl est. 
rev. 2, 29 (2002) found that U.S. broker fees should equal something closer to three percent versus six to 
seven percent, implying excess fees of as much as $0 billion or more annually.  See also Daniel Kadlec, 
The Commission Squeeze, time, Jan. , 2005, at 50 (quoting University of California, Berkeley professor 
Peter Sealey’s prediction that commissions will ultimately be cut in half); Elizabeth Lesly, How Your Real-
tor Rips You Off, wAll st. J., Nov. 30, 1990, at A14 (reporting that an FTC official reported being told by 
a former president of the California Board of Realtors that “2 percent is closer to what a competitive rate 
would be if there were not these artificial structures in the real estate industry”).
29 Stock broker commissions, however, began to be priced competitively in 975, when the Securities and 
Exchange Commission ended its protection of fixed commissions and permitted order processing to be un-
bundled from research. Customers who did their own research increasingly opted for the dramatically lower 
prices offered for “no frills” service.  See generally Lawrence J. White, The Residential Real Estate Broker-
age Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition Look Like?, 5 reAl est. L.J. 11, 20-26 (2006).
0 Airlines began by capping domestic commissions at $50 (Feb. 1995), cutting rates to eight percent (Sept. 
1997), then five percent (Oct. 1999) and then eliminating them.(Mar. 2002). See http://www.astanet.com/
about/faq.asp#2.
 See http://www.astanet.com/about/faq.asp#13; Martha Brannigan & Jesse Drucker, Travel Agents 
Change Fee Structure, wAll st. J., Apr. 0, 2002, at D5.  Medicare is also moving in that direction: recog-
nizing that doctors should be compensated directly for the services they provide, rather than indirectly as 
a share of inflated drug prices. See Reed Abelson, Pay Method Said to Sway Drug Choices of Oncologists, 
N.Y. times, Mar. 8, 2006, at C3. One would also expect a flat fee pricing model to emerge for independent 
insurance brokers.
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Each section also explains significant harms that each element of the rate structure can 
cause to a competitive real estate brokerage market.  For example, leaving buyer brokers’ 
fees up to selling agents often leads traditional agents to steer away from homes not 
represented by other traditional brokers.
Section VII then reviews the services that home buyers and sellers desire and how 
they are now being priced or would likely be priced in a competitive market.  It predicts 
that competitive pressures should lead brokers to set hourly or flat fees (for individual 
or bundles or services) based on the level and type of their skills and on whether market 
conditions favor buyers or sellers. The single price charged by traditional brokers for 
providing a “full service” bundle of services, but at average quality, also conceals the 
fact that it often greatly exceeds the total price of purchasing the same bundle of services 
à la carte from experts at each task.  Section VIII attempts to explain why the proposed 
rate structure has not displaced the status quo.  It reviews the many conditions exposed 
by the 3 FTC Report and explains how traditional residential real estate brokers are 
able to maintain their dominant standard rate structures and rate levels against the 
rate structures of non-traditional entrants. Most significant among these is denying 
newcomers the full cooperation they need to function effectively.
Section IX then suggests four short questions that home buyers and sellers should 
ask to help shift the industry’s standard rate structure to the one discussed in section 
VII.  Before engaging a broker, buyers should ask whether the broker’s agent may fail to 
show them an ideal home due to the seller’s choice of broker or the fee offered to them. 
Buyers should also ask the broker what dollar amount they expect to be paid for helping 
to close the sale and how many hours of work they expect the task to require.  Sellers 
should ask whether they can direct some or all of the fee offered to a buyer’s agent to 
the buyer instead, if the buyer has made alternative arrangements.  Sellers should also 
ask whether the listing broker will seek to limit the dissemination of their listing by 
competing brokers.
II. Charging a Percentage of the Sale Price of 
a Related Item
Most professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, set their fees based on the quantity 
and quality of their efforts.  They charge hourly rates, although for many routine tasks, 
which normally require a fixed duration to complete, they quote a flat fee. This serves 
administrative convenience as well as buyer preference for certainty.
Under some conditions, however, service providers receive compensation based on 
other formulas, such as a percentage of the sale price of items sold or of funds recovered. 
In fact, about 0 percent of real estate brokers, including most buyers’ brokers, are paid 
based on the sale price of a home.3 Even non-traditional brokers, like eRealty, zipRealty, 
and Foxton’s, set their fees as a percentage of a home’s sale price.33 While some scholars 
have offered detailed economic explanations for percentage rate commissions; most have 
focused on the finding that the structure encourages agents with scarce time to favor the 
2 200 NAR Report, supra note 5, at 6.
 The former two both began at .5 percent, see David Wessel, Web May Soon Work Magic in Real Estate, 
wAll st. J. , Oct. , 2002, at A2, but in 200, eRealty moved to individually negotiated fees and zipRealty 
commissions went up to about .75 percent. See James R. Hagerty, Real-Estate Sites Raise Commissions, 
wAll st. J. ,Dec. 2, 200, at D.
“The single 
price charged by 
traditional brokers 
for providing a “full 
service” bundle 
of services, but at 
average quality, also 
conceals the fact 
that it often greatly 
exceeds the total 
price of purchasing 
the same bundle of 
services à la carte 
from experts at each 
task.” 
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highest-value sales.3 A careful analysis of the six rationales that justify percentage-of-
sale-price rate elements for other service providers finds that none justify a straight 
percentage-of-sale-price fee for real estate brokers.
A. Offering a Share of Incremental Value Produced 
 Motivates Providers
Many employers seek to obtain optimal performance by offering their salespeople 
commissions: a specific percentage of their total sales revenues. They are happy to pay 
a salesperson twice as much in commissions for generating twice as much in total sales, 
because they have generated twice as much profit for the firm. Furthermore, however, 
that although salespeople are generally paid a percentage of the sale price, employers set 
commission rates based on the incremental value the firms gain from the sales.3 Thus, 
firms with very large gross profit margins (gross incremental value, before accounting 
for the salesperson’s fee) generally offer salespeople a relatively large percentage of the 
sale price. On the other hand, if profit margins are razor thin, employers are apt to offer 
commissions of only a small percentage of the sale price. (That may still be a strong 
motivator if total sales revenues are correspondingly high.) Employers will rarely offer 
to pay salespeople more than the incremental value that they create.
In many cases, however, it is impossible to compute a commission rate on total 
sales that represents a set percentage of the incremental value produced.  This is due to 
difficulties with: ) quantifying the incremental value generated, ) deciding what share 
of that added value to offer to the salesperson, and 3) expressing that share of value as 
a percentage commission. The major difficulty with quantifying the incremental value 
produced is setting an appropriate baseline against which to measure results.  Sometimes 
a reasonable one is available, as when the cost of an item is relatively fixed and the value 
or gross profit is the difference between that cost and the selling price. Similarly, if an 
accident victim has been offered a reasonable settlement before retaining a lawyer, a 
personal injury attorney’s incremental value would be any increase the attorney could 
obtain above that offer. Sometimes there are creative ways to set such baselines,3 but 
 See Michael S. Knoll, Uncertainty, Efficiency, and the Brokerage Industry, 31 J. L. & econ. 29, 25 
(1988); John R. Schroeter, Competition and Value-of-Service Pricing in the Residential Real Estate Bro-
kerage Market, 27 Q. rev. econ. & bus. 29 (1987); Levmore, supra note 6, at 506; Alan O. Sykes, Some 
Thoughts on the Real Estate Puzzle, Comment on Levmore, 36 J. L. & econ. 541 (1993); Wayne Carroll, 
Fixed-Percentage Commissions and Moral Hazard in Residential Real Estate Brokerage, 2 J. reAl est. fin. 
& econ. 9 (989). Schroeter and Knoll offer formal mathematical analyses of why a uniform percentage 
rate structure is not necessarily anticompetitive, but they both assume that brokers are using the mechanism 
to efficiently allocate their time among competing customers (favoring the higher-priced homes where their 
service provides higher value). Given the apparent excess capacity of brokers, as discussed supra notes 25 
& 26 and accompanying text, however, agents appear to spend most of their time prospecting for new cli-
ents rather than juggling their time to handle competing customer demands. Levmore suggests that the rate 
structure is a compromise “between the need to solve conflicts [among sellers of real estate competing for 
an agent’s attention] and the advantage of aligning the interests of agents and principals,” Levmore, supra 
at 508. Yet Levmore acknowledges that low commission rates fail to provide much alignment of interests, 
see supra note 6 and accompanying text, and, as just noted, most agents have excess time.  The analyses of 
these scholars is relevant, however, to fees for allocating truly scarce elite agents, as discussed infra section 
II.B.
5 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 6, at 534 (“automobile sales commissions are usually figured on the basis 
of a percentage of the dealer’s net revenue”). 
6 See, e.g., Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 F.R.D. 71, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (where attorneys 
bid the recovery amount that they would treat as the benchmark, below which they would receive no fee and 
above which they would collect one quarter of the incremental value they helped obtain).
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often, as for chief executive officers, a performance baseline is very difficult to estimate, 
frustrating efforts to estimate the incremental value produced.37
The second issue is what share of incremental value should be offered to employees 
to achieve optimal results. This is generally discussed by economists as the principal-
agent issue: What is the minimum fee level(s) an employer (principal) can offer to align 
the interests of a service provider (agent) with the employer’s interests?3
Even when one can calculate the incremental value provided by an employee, 
and decide what share to give the salesperson, say 0 percent, there is the third matter 
of translating share of incremental value into a commission rate. This is easy when 
salespeople sell items at fixed unit prices with uniform profit margins. Otherwise, 
this may be impossible. For example, if a client desired to motivate a personal injury 
attorney by offering a fee equal to half of the incremental value produced, it would not 
be possible to phrase that offer in terms of a straight percentage of the settlement amount. 
That is, suppose there had been an initial, reasonable settlement offer of $70,000 and 
the attorney incurred $0,000 in outside expenses to secure the result. A $,000 award 
would represent $,000 in incremental value, half of that amount would be $,000, 
which would represent about five percent of the total settlement. On the other hand, 
if the settlement yielded $. million ($00,000 in incremental value), the attorney’s 
$00,000 share of the incremental value would represent almost seventeen percent of 
the total settlement. Further, a $3. million award would translate into a fee of almost 
thirty-eight percent of the settlement to cover the attorney’s share of incremental value. 
Therefore, to motivate a service provider to generate higher revenues when there is no 
fixed price, it makes more sense to offer a fee set as a share of incremental value, not a 
commission on total revenues.
Despite these three challenges, it seems reasonable to motivate real estate listing 
agents by offering them a share of any incremental value that they can obtain for sellers.3 
Incremental value could come in two forms: a net increase in the sale proceeds and a 
faster sale (if that was desired). In a stable market, incremental value might be measured 
from a baseline based on an average of some set of comparative market analyses; it 
would be harder to measure in a volatile market. Rewards for quick sales might be 
measured against a benchmark of the average time comparable homes have taken to sell 
in the previous few months.
Sellers would generally want agents to take three actions to increase the net sale 
price of the property: ) make all cost-effective efforts to “stage” their homes to lead 
potential buyers to offer higher prices;0 ) reach the maximum number of bona fide 
7 Usually it is quite difficult to establish a baseline for measuring some minimally satisfactory level of per-
formance of a senior executive. A companies stock price appears to be the most common metric, although 
this is terribly flawed unless adjustments are made to offset factors unrelated to the executive’s performance. 
Cf, Gretchen Morgenson, Rising Prices Lift All Bonuses, N.Y. times, Feb. 5, 2006, §3, at 1; luciAn bebchu 
& Jesse frieD, PAy without PerformAnce (200).  It is probably best to compare an executive’s perfor-
mance to benchmarks that reflect average or superior performance of similarly situated executives.
8 See infra note 7.
9 See Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 26, at 1087 n.17; infra note 8.  Cf Lester Brickman, Effec-
tive Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 8 
wAsh. U.L.Q. 653, 659-60 n.12 (2003).
0 Staging is discussed infra sections VII.A.5.
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potential buyers via all cost effective media; and 3) advise them on what price to set 
and whether to accept a given bid or to wait in hopes of a better offer. Although all 
three matter, most commentators have ignored the first when evaluating how well the 
interests of sellers and agents are aligned (generally referred to as the “principal-agent” 
issue).3
Even a full three percent commission appears much too small to align the incentives 
of listing agents with sellers with respect to the seller’s first two goals: investing optimal 
effort to maximize the value of the home and to market it. Consider a home with an 
estimated fair market value of $00,000. Assume an agent expects that by doing a 
standard, satisfactory job she can obtain a $00,000 offer. She also estimates that after 
spending 0 more hours on extensive staging, on carefully targeted marketing, and other 
enhancements, she will be able to obtain a bid of $0,000. Given the seller’s strong 
interest in obtaining the highest price, one would expect the fee structure to strongly 
encourage the latter effort. Yet, under the traditional fee structure, the effort indicated 
would only increase the typical broker commission by $,00 and thus her net pay by no 
more than $,00, translating into $30 per hour—a relatively weak incentive for an effort 
that generates $,000 per hour for the seller.
To motivate agents to create incremental value, they should be paid more like 30 
percent of any net price increase they can produce, and the percentage should go to the 
agent without any splits. In the example just mentioned, even if there were $0,000 in 
expenses to deduct, this would still yield the agent $,000 or $0 per hour for producing 
a $0,000 price increase net of expenses. Granted, it would often be difficult to set a 
baseline with any precision, particularly in volatile markets. Still, good agents may be 
willing to accept slightly excessive baselines if they would receive a large share of the 
incremental value generated and they had a plan that they expected to substantially 
raise the selling price. And one broker/blogger has proposed a phased-in baseline. 
Meanwhile, buyers eager could motivate their negotiators by offering them a bonus of 
as much as half of any additional savings secured below some benchmark price they set 
for the home.
On the other hand, agents deserve no percentage, but merely a minimal flat fee, for 
a poor performance. Certainly, an agent who is responsible for allowing a $3 million 
home to go for what buyers view as a “steal” at $. million, does not deserve a reward 
at all, not to mention at least five times the fee of an agent who performed well: one who 
enabled a seller to collect $0,000 more than any comparables, albeit, only $300,000 for 
a home.
 This would include being available to show the home to all interested potential buyers. Special marketing 
efforts are discussed infra sections VII.A.4, 6 & 7.  See also infra note 275 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing following up leads even when callers may not leave a message!).
2 See infra sections VII.A.7.
 See scholars referenced infra note 7.
 See Kevin Boer, Part 2: If a Monkey Can Sell a $1M Home for $950K, Does He Deserve 3%?, Three 
Oceans Real Estate Blog, Oct. 7, 2006, http://oceansrealestate.com/blog/part-2-if-a-monkey-can-sell-a-
m-home-for-950k-does-he-deserve-.html.
5 Currently, some entities offer to help homeowners obtain reductions in their property tax assessments in 
return for a share of the tax savings; others offer to review rents for those in rent regulated buildings for a 
share of any savings.
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Clients should not pay any percentage on the portion of revenues obtained that 
should be “easy” to secure.  Rather, if a $,000 commission payout is sufficient to cover 
the standard costs to brokers and agents—including their time—to sell a $00,000 home, 
it should be a sufficient incentive to motivate them to sell a $00,000 or even an $00,000 
home, if they do not make any special efforts that produce incremental value. That 
would not apply to agents if other sellers were bidding higher for their services (as 
discussed in II.B, below), but given the surplus of agents and the ability of good agents 
to provide excellent service while working simultaneously with multiple sellers, it 
would seem to represent a reasonable norm.
When considering this third element of service—recommending that the seller accept 
or reject an offer—agents are apt to consider two factors. First, they would estimate the 
incremental value that they and their client might gain by waiting—the probabilities of 
the higher bids available (or lower bids that might have to be accepted) multiplied by 
the incremental values of each, discounted by the additional time before the bids would 
be accepted. Second there would be the cost to the agent in terms of additional time and 
expense required in the interim and the opportunity cost of earlier access to his or her fee 
by accepting the bid offered. A flat fee gives agents no incentive to recommend against 
accepting a bid that might be less than optimal, but even a net three percent commission 
on the sale price seems unlikely to create a sufficient benefit to outweigh the value to the 
agent of receiving a large fee without any further work.7 The value of quick receipt of a 
relatively large fee is likely to override the incentive to earn an additional small amount. 
To obtain more useful advice, a seller might offer the listing broker’s agent (alone, not 
split with any others), a substantial portion, e.g., 0 to 0 percent, of any increase in the 
sale price above some benchmark.  The difficulty of setting that baseline, however, leads 
6 See Hal Cohen, Death of a Sales Commission, Business Report, Feb. 14, 2006 http://www.businessre-
port.com/newsDetail.cfm?aid=7962 (quoting broker Brandy Farris).
7 See supra text accompanying note 6. There does not appear to be any scholarly research that demon-
strates that the pricing structure motivates agents to obtain higher prices. See Ron C. Rutherford et al, 
Conflicts Between Principals and Agents: Evidence from Residential Real Brokerage, 76 J. fin. econ. 627 
(2005) (finding that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned homes, but at about a 4.5 percent 
higher price); Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, Market Distortions When Agents are Better Informed: 
The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions, NBER Working Paper #05, Jan. 2005, avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11053; Thomas S. Zorn & James E. Larsen, The Incentive Effects of 
Flat-Fee and Percentage Commissions for Real Estate Brokers,  J. Am. reAl est. & urb. econ. Ass’n 
24 (1986) (finding that a flat fee and percentage fee provide equivalent incentives); Glenn Roberts, Jr., 
‘Freaky’ Side of Real Estate Economics, inmAn news, June 2, 2006 (ditto, based on unpublished research 
by Steven Levitt); Munneke & Yavas, supra note 6 (finding that effectively doubling agents’ net percentage 
commissions did not seem to have any effect on agent performance). But see Michael A. Arnold, The Prin-
cipal-Agent Relationship in Real Estate Brokerage Services, 20 J. Am. reAl est. & urb. econ. Ass’n 89 
(1992) (concluding that, unlike a fixed-price fee, a percentage fee may lead a broker considering serial bids 
to wait for the best for the seller, although the latter fee structure does not guarantee that result); Joseph T. 
Williams, Agency and Brokerage of Real Assets in Competitive Equilibrium,  rev. fin. econ. 29 (998) 
(contending that agent and seller interests are aligned); Lynn M. Fisher & Abdullah Yavas, A Case for Per-
centage Commission Contracts: The Impact of a “Race” Among Agents, (Aug. 2006 draft) (concluding that 
percentage fees align interests of agents and principals where there is no listing broker and the broker who 
delivers the buyer is working for the seller).
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some to reject this approach.  Yet it may be the least undesirable alternative.
Agents working with buyers should also receive only basic flat fees or hourly rates 
—but no bonuses—for efforts that produced no extra value, although “extra value” 
may be hard to measure in a sellers’ market.
In conclusion, then, the most appropriate fee structure for motivating agents to 
best serve home sellers would appear to consist of as many as three parts: ) a base 
lump sum fee, based on the degree of difficulty given the state of the market, for selling 
the home at an agreed upon minimum price, although the fee could depend on the 
number of hours of effort instead; ) a substantial percentage, e.g, 0 to 0 percent (for 
the agent alone), of any incremental value created in terms of securing a higher price 
for a seller (or a lower price for a buyer); 3) a specific bonus for securing a suitable deal 
by a deadline.0
B. Provider’s Special Ability and Effort Justify an Equity Stake
Some service providers have rare abilities that enable them to add great value to a 
customer’s project. They can convert an economic “rent” on their talents into an equity 
stake.  Service providers in this group would include top sports or entertainment agents, 
whose credibility and relationships enable them to negotiate contracts for their clients 
with higher pay levels and special terms unobtainable by others. Top plaintiff tort 
litigators are in this class—probably viewing their cases as personal projects. Talents 
specially recruited for new Internet ventures often demand equity stakes. And the 
8 In fact, although Levmore, supra note 6, at 504, recognizes the benefit of progressive rates, he rejects 
them due to the difficulty of setting the relevant benchmark, because “[i]n the absence of focal points for 
triggers, a trigger of zero with a low (6 percent) percentage commission above zero may be an equilibrium 
arrangement.” Id. at 57.  In fact, so far, scholars have been unable to identify any fee structure that would 
) align the interests of both the buyer and buyer’s agent and the seller and seller’s agent and 2) permit 
the seller to expect an optimal sale price.  See, e.g., id. at 512-14 (discussing two–dimensional auctions); 
Abdullah Yavas & Peter Colwell, Buyer Brokerage: Incentive and Efficiency Implications, 8 J. reAl est. 
fin. & econ. 259 (1999) (suggesting the use of a fixed fee based on the assessed price of a home divided 
among agents based on the sale price of the home); Timothy E. Jares et al, An Optimal Incentive System 
for Real Estate Agents, 20 J. reAl est. res. 9 (2000) (proposing that the listing agent purchase the home 
with an option to resell it back to the current seller at the original price).  See also  See Steve Perlstein, Real 
Estate Commissions, Washingtonpost.com transcript, May 18, 2005, at 2005 WLNR 8383582 (“in Wash-
ington . . . my experience is that when you try to suggest something less [than 5 percent], or a more creative 
structure with a base of  and some add-on incentives, [agents] just won’t talk to you.”).
9 One expert suggests that agents compile statistics to demonstrate their production of incremental value, 
see, e.g., bernice l. ross, wAGinG wAr on reAl estAte’s Discounters 69-79, 9 (2005), but that ap-
proach appears too susceptible to distortion.  See, e.g. Comments on What’s Reduced, wAlk-throuGh, 
June 6, 2006, 7:9pm, http://walkthrough.nytimes.com/?p=609#comments (noting how agents can retro-
actively reduce the asking price).
50 Bonuses could include vacations, cars, etc., like those mentioned infra note .  But see D. 
Geltner, B. Kluger & N. G. Miller, Incentive Commissions in Residential Real Estate Brokerage, 
2 J. housinG econ. 139 (1992) (finding that time incentive contracts are not superior to fixed 
percentage commissions); Perlstein, supra note 8.
5 Noting that the top tier (about one percent) of contingent-fee lawyers appear to earn substantially higher 
effective hourly rates due to their expertise and ability to select the most profitable cases to pursue.  See 
Herbert M. Kritzer, Advocacy and Rhetoric v. Scholarship and Evidence in the Debate Over Contingency 
Fees: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 82 wAsh. U.L.Q. 477, 486-88 (2004).
“Agents working 
with buyers should 
also receive only 
basic	flat	fees	or	
hourly rates – but no 
bonuses – for efforts 
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no extra value, 
although “extra 
value” may be hard 
to measure in a 
sellers’ market.” 
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matter may be as much psychological as financial. Top auction houses with preferred 
access to potential buyers can also justify such fees.
This rationale for commissions would only appear applicable to real estate agents to 
the extent that it overlapped with their ability to produce significant incremental value. 
Those eligible would include listing agents with extensive files of (and relationships 
with) wealthy clientele apt to be interested in purchasing prime properties and less 
likely to consider the home if it were marketed by most other agents.3 It could also 
include agents who had a special plan likely to significantly increase the sale price of the 
home or any agent with more customers than time.
On the other side, buyers might offer large hourly fees or even percentage fees 
to bid for the scarce services of agents with such detailed knowledge of individual 
neighborhoods and residents that they would be uniquely able to help buyers identify 
the streets on which they would be most comfortable or know of relevant homes not yet 
on the market. This group might also include agents perceptive enough to quickly and 
accurately diagnose the buyer’s needs and desires and thus the most relevant criteria 
for identifying the buyer’s ideal home. While these providers might be able to demand 
a percentage fee, one would expect most of them to be equally comfortable with a very 
high hourly wage reflecting the value of their knowledge.
C. Provider is Also Asked to Make a Substantial 
 High-Risk Investment
In some cases, individuals are asked to provide a valued service even though their 
employers are unwilling or unable to pay them their regular price for those services. 
Service providers asked to make a substantial, high risk investment in the customer’s 
venture can demand an equity stake.
This is the situation faced by high-risk tort litigation firms, like those portrayed 
in the films “Erin Brokovich” and “A Civil Action.”7 While the former succeeded and 
earned a large percentage of the recovery to compensate for its high risk investment, the 
latter lost its entire investment of time and expenses. Other similarly situated service 
52 Behavioral economists have shown that many individuals will veto a payout scheme—even at the cost 
to themselves—if they view it as unfairly enriching others at their expense.  See Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, 
Dishonesty in Everyday Life and its Policy Implications, Jan. 2006 at 7-8 (draft available at www.ssrn.com/
abstract=887529) (discussing the research of economists Ernst Fehr and James Andreoni and the ultimatum 
game).  Similarly, when Leverage Buy Out (LBO) firms sought to motivate the top executives they sought 
to employ, they treated them as peers with equity positions rather than merely offering high salaries. 
5 See Mimi Swartz, The Matchmaker, N.Y. times, [Key Magazine, fall 2006], Sept 0, 2006, at 90 (discuss-
ing Janie Miller); Kenneth R. Harney, Let’s Get Real on Sales Agent Commission Rates, wAsh. Post, Apr. 
20, 2002, at H (reporting that “one East Coast-based company that specializes in exotic, high-end proper-
ties that require lavish advertising outlays to reach small numbers of wealthy target purchasers averages... 
.8 percent [commission]”).
5 The latter agents appear to be those implicitly the subject of the analyses discussed supra note .
55 These valuable services are discussed in more detail infra section VII.B.2 & 3.
56 See Swartz, supra note 5.
57 To the extent that all but the elite tort litigators are generally willing to work for their standard hourly 
fees, the equity share should reflect the real risk of underpayment they assume, although there is signifi-
cant evidence that the standard percentage rates do not match the particular levels of risk involved. See, 
e.g., Derek bok, the cost of tAlent 139-40 (1993); David Giacalone, The Use of Contingency Fees in 
Personal Injustry Cases ( parts, April 2006), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/contingency-fees-pt-
-of--market-failures/.
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providers are those highly talented people hired by start-up companies with limited 
capital who offer compensation in the form of equity or stock options that may become 
either tremendously valuable or worthless. Book publishers, film studios, and music 
recording firms are also in this situation due to the likelihood that their investment in 
production and marketing of a creative work will lose a large amount of money.
Certainly some home buyers and sellers will fail to complete a transaction—and 
therefore produce no fee—but that does not give real estate agents the same status as 
those mentioned above who take high risks on large investments. Competent agents 
should be able to quickly identify and avoid sellers who are seeking unreasonably 
high prices and resistant to appropriate price reductions. Similarly, agents should 
have little difficulty identifying buyers too picky or unrealistic about the market to 
represent worthwhile clients in less than 0 hours, and thus terminate the relationship 
before making any large investment of time,0 unless they are treated as co-investors. 
Meanwhile, those compelled to move by a particular date—and thus almost certain to 
close—should also be easy to recognize. Clients who appear reasonable, but indecisive 
and apt to take a long time, even years, to make a bid might represent a medium risk in 
that they will require substantial time over a long period for an uncertain payoff.  Yet 
real estate agents would seem capable of limiting their investments in those clients to 
periods when they had no more promising prospects to focus on.
Real estate agents do face a risk of non-payment by customers who, after milking 
them for lots of useful information, terminate their relationships before making a 
purchase. Listing agents may also be terminated after a contract term expires, despite 
their investments of time and marketing costs. Yet a percentage fee does not deter such 
free riding.  The best way to address this problem might be for brokers to charge buyers 
and sellers some nominal flat retainer or hourly fee, or at least pre-payment of expenses, 
which would not be due until purchase or sale, but which would survive termination 
of the relationship. Clients of lawyers and psychiatrists who become dissatisfied with 
the relationship must still pay for the unsatisfactory services already delivered before 
moving on.
D. Proxy for Provider’s Costs or Efforts
Basing a service provider’s compensation on sale price also makes sense if that sale 
price is highly correlated with the quantity or quality of service provided. For example, 
58 See Nadel, Financing Creative Output, supra note 26, at 82-22.
59 See Matt Carter, Wrestling the Unrealistic Seller, inmAn news, Oct. 31, 2006; Cf Brickman, supra note 
57, at 696-97 n.149. The situation is very different from the “nobody knows anything” difficulty faced in 
many media markets. See Nadel, Financing Creative Output, supra note 26, at 87-8.
60 See Susan M. Wachter, Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Rate Uniformity and Moral Hazard in 0 
reseArch in lAw AnD economics: the economics of urbAn ProPerty riGhts  189, 197 (Austin J. Jaffe ed. 
987) (Jaffe) (buyer agents extend implicit insurance to prospective buyers).
6 A buyer can now work with an agent for many hours, identifying the neighborhoods and types 
of homes of most interest, but then avoid a fee by terminating or simply not renewing the broker 
agreement, before seeking to purchase the next suitable new home on the market. See Wachter, 
supra note 60, at 190, 198-200.  Agents working with buyers now rely on buyers’ sense of fair-
ness, time pressures, or that the buyer has already invested substantial time educating the agent 
about their needs, desires, and tastes.
62 See id. at 90. [Wachter, supra note 60]. For example, one broker charged sellers a monthly ad-
vertising fee, see Rick Maylone, (Letter), inmAn news, May 2, 2005, and some high-end brokers 
have charged sellers a one percent fee up front to cover extensive marketing expenses. Conversa-
tion with Bill Wendel, Sept. 2, 2006.
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tips based on restaurant bills make some economic sense because higher bills generally 
reflect a greater quantity or higher quality of service or both.3 Similarly, the higher 
nominal fees received by the agents of entertainers and athletes may compensate for 
greater demands for both financial negotiations and responses to requests from the 
press, charities, and others. The greater the recovery sought by a tort lawyer, the greater 
the likely resistance.  Yet while the costs to the service provider may increase on average 
as the revenues involved grow, that increase does not appear to be proportional to the 
revenues.
So what about the correlation between a home’s sale price and a broker’s costs in 
assisting the sale?  Some believe that a three percent commission is reasonable for the 
typical amount that a broker and agent invest on a transaction, at least for low to 
median-level-priced homes, although maybe not for the lowest priced homes.7 Still, 
it appears that most of the costs entailed in effectively selling a home are unrelated to 
the sale price and the remainder are as likely to be inversely as directly correlated to the 
price, at least for homes priced above the local median.
Brokers for sellers may assert that higher priced homes require more extensive 
advertising, more expensive staging, or the like, but this position is hard to defend.  For 
example, consider the relative value of special advertisements or agent open houses to 
the sale of homes priced at the mean for a community as compared to those substantially 
above the mean. The higher a home is priced above the community average, the fewer 
6 Competition to work at more expensive restaurants generally enables them to employ superior quality 
servers.  Research indicates, however, that the reason that diners and the highest paid entertainers pay their 
service providers a percentage fee may be more out of a sense of generosity to lower-income food servers 
and gratitude to faithful agent/partners. See Ofer H. Azar, Who Do We Tip and Why?  An Empirical Inves-
tigation, 7 APP. econ 87, 876-77 (2005).  See generally Nadel, Financing Creative Output, supra note 
26, at 839 & 841.
6 For example, the burdens on an agent for athletes or entertainers is likely to vary more based on their 
maturity rather than their salaries, and much of it is likely to require only the attention of an agent’s lower-
cost assistant.
65 See rAy wilson, bouGht, not solD: sinGle AGency, buyers’ brokers, flAt fees, AnD the consumer 
revolution in reAl estAte 99-100 (998). See also supra note 28; Paul Anglin & Richard Arnott, Are 
Broker Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High?  A Conceptual Analysis, 27 reAl est. econ. 79, 76 
(999) (2.8 percent).
66 See kiPlinGer stAff, kiPlinGer’s GuiDe to buyinG & sellinG A home 95 (996).
67 See Harney, supra note 5 (reporting that an agent who generally charges six percent will ask seven 
percent for lower-cost homes); Mary McAleer Vizard, For Brokers’ Commissions, It’s Not Just a 6 Percent 
Solution, N.Y. times, May 28, 995, §9 at  (reporting that for Manhattan homes in the mid-990s, one 
broker made it company policy to charge commissions higher than 6 percent on all properties with sale 
prices of less than $50,000).
68 Inman Commissions 2006, supra note 5, at 48 (one agent explained “I find it easier to sell a $500,000 
home than one for $225,000, which is entry level in our area.”); Cohen, supra note 6 (quoting broker Herb 
Gomez “It can be much harder to sell a $120,000 house than a $500,000 house.”); James Caverly, Broker 
Converts Her Business into a Flat-Fee Franchise, reAlestAteJournAl.com, May 0, 2006 (Austin, TX 
realtor Donna Chance recognizing that it is the same amount of work marketing higher or lower priced 
homes); Ardell DellaLoggia, The “Goldilocks” Principle, seAttle’s rAin city reAl estAte GuiDe, Mar. 2, 
2006, at http://www.raincityguide.com/2006/0/05/the-goldilocks-principle/ at Comment 2 (Eric Rojas, 
Oct. 9, 2006) (“I will spend more time and effort to sell a one bedroom $178,000 Lake Shore Drive condo 
then a three bedroom $600,000 duplex (two level) condo in the Lakeview neighborhood.  At the later, I will 
also meet higher end buyers…”). This might not apply for the very highest-priced homes in a community, 
since few if any potential buyers might even think to look for them there.  Those homes would require more 
extensive, marketing efforts. See supra note 5 and infra text accompanying note 26.
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its likely “competitors,” and the more likely that home buyers (or the agents aiding 
them) will consider, if not visit, all relevant options as long as the homes are listed in 
the MLS. On the other hand, there will likely be many more homes available around 
the mean. Thus, buyers of average-priced homes are more likely to make a bid before 
carefully viewing all their options. Therefore, it is more important for agents representing 
average-priced homes to attract early attention from such buyers. Furthermore, a 00 
Inman News survey of brokers found that the amount brokers “spen[d] to market 
listings doesn’t generally increase” with the price of the home.70  In fact, much expensive 
advertising may primarily benefit listing brokers in their efforts to place their names, 
repeatedly, in view of future buyers to recruit them as clients.
On average, the need for staging also appears to decrease as the price of a home 
increases. Wealthier owners are more likely to have used decorators, made necessary 
repairs, and to use house cleaners on a regular basis than those with lower-priced 
homes.  And even if the “out of pocket” cost of desirable staging correlated with the 
price of a home, that cost would not justify a higher broker fee because it does not 
ordinarily come out of the broker’s pocket. Rather agents advise sellers to make such 
investments, irrespective of the home’s price. 7 Some agents might offer to pay a portion 
of the staging costs, but only if they were embarrassed to ask the seller to pay more on 
top of an otherwise excessive fee.7
Three counter-arguments on this point also deserve a response. First, the higher 
priced homes will attract the most skilled and experienced (and implicitly expensive) 
agents.  Yet those buyers or sellers might not need or want to pay high rates for expert 
advice. Second, higher-priced homes might remain on the market significantly longer 
than lower-priced homes, requiring more advertising, if not other effort, although the 
limited empirical data reported on such timing does not reach this conclusion.73 Third, 
a relative scarcity of buyers for the highest priced homes might create a greater risk to 
agents of losing the listing to another agent or a “for sale by owner” (“FSBO”) before it 
sells.7 Brokers might claim that this higher risk justifies a higher fee, but a shift among 
brokers is as likely to help as to hurt them and wealthier owners appear least likely to 
shift from a broker to a FSBO.
In conclusion, then, there appears to be little evidence that the cost of marketing 
69 Still, owners of the very highest priced homes would need to spend more ) to tempt individuals who 
were not actively shopping for a home by presenting them with something exceptional that they might feel 
they wanted to have or 2) to reach home shoppers who were looking to buy, but without a focus on any 
particular location.
70 See Inman Commissions 2006, supra note 5, at 7.
7 Thus, the $7,500 cost of repairs to and the staging of a $2 million property in Orange County was paid by 
the seller, not the agent.  See Blanche Evans, Provide Make Ready Services to Maximize Seller’s Take, Says 
Realtor, reAlty times, Mar. 6, 2006.
72 Many agents had this reaction when their brokers asked them to assess administrative fees on top of 
commissions. See Kenneth R. Harney, New Brokerage Fees Coming Under Fire, wAsh. Post, Apr. 6, 2002, 
at H (quoting one broker as reporting “How can we possibly explain to our customers that a 6 percent 
commission isn’t enough?”).
7 See Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 2, at . Buyer agents appeared to spend more time aiding 
buyer searches for higher priced homes, although the relationship between price and search time 
appeared to be small.  Id. at .
7 For a review of the share of homes that FSBOs represent see infra note  and accompany-
ing text.
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higher-priced homes justifies higher broker commissions. The cost of effectively 
marketing a home appears no more likely to correlate with the price of the home than 
the costs that travel agents incur to ticket air travelers correlates with the price of their 
airline tickets or the effort that a doctor expends in a physical exam is related to the total 
price of any prescriptions prescribed. Instead, it seems that brokers and their agents 
may spend more for marketing higher priced homes because they feel the need to justify 
the higher fee they will earn.
E. Setting Fees Based on Wealth or Income
Income and property taxes and other fees to finance government services are 
generally set as a percentage of an individual’s or household’s income or wealth, but 
this approach is based on the political view that those with the highest incomes or most 
wealth should contribute to the cost of government in proportion (if not in greater 
proportion) to that income or wealth. It is also supported by the view that the marginal 
utility of income diminishes as it increases. While public policies might justify a cross-
subsidy from those most advantaged to those most disadvantaged, there is no reason 
to expect private entities to mimic these practices, absent price or profit regulation. In 
particular, there is no reason to believe that real estate brokers use the percentage-of-
sale-price rate element to overcharge buyers and sellers of higher-priced homes so that 
they can undercharge buyers and sellers of lower-priced homes.  Rather, such a pricing 
mechanism merely appears to confirm the market power that permits such value-based 
pricing.7
F. Avoiding Some Harmful Effects of Hourly Rates
Basing compensation on a percentage-of-sales-price also avoids some drawbacks 
of paying fees based on hours of input, particularly that the latter creates a perverse 
incentive—employees are encouraged to spend more time than necessary on a project and 
to overstate the time spent. Hourly rates may also deter customers from communicating 
freely because they feel that they are “on the meter.” Many sellers may be reluctant to 
pay for time to fully explain an important matter out of a false belief that it was not 
worth the cost of discussing it. Whatever the disadvantage of hourly rates, however, it 
is important to recognize that they can be avoided by employing any one of multiple 
alternatives, including flat fees.
G. Harms
Although a percentage-of-sale-price fee leads a listing agent to share a seller’s desire 
to obtain the highest price possible for a home, the rate element gives agents aiding 
buyers an incentive, albeit quite small, to act opposite to their client’s interests: to coax 
buyers to bid higher than justified.7 This adds to the agent’s general bias toward a quick 
75 See John Yinger, A Search Model for Real Estate Broker Behavior, 7 Am. econ. rev. 59, 60 (98).
76 Some data indicates that when listing brokers offered higher commission rates to buyer brokers it re-
sulted in a higher selling price, although only for small to medium-sized homes. See Joachim Zietz & Bobby 
Newsome, Agency Representation and the Sale Price of Houses, 2 J. reAl est. res. 165, 185 (2002) (find-
ing that an increase in commission of one percent for small to medium-sized properties increased the sale 
price by an average of 2.9 percent or about $,89). Other data indicate, however, that buyers represented 
by buyer agents do not pay more for homes than those who are not represented. See Harold W. Elder, et 
al, Buyer Brokers: Do They Make a Difference?, Their Influence on Selling Price and Search Duration, 28 
reAl est. econ. 337, 360-61 (2000); Christopher Curran & Joel Schrag, Does it Matter Whom an Agent 
Serves?  Evidence From Recent Changes in Real Estate Agency Law,  J. l. & econ. 265 (2000) (finding 
the use of buyer agents reduced buyer search time for buyers of high and low priced properties and led to 
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sale,77 and against discouraging offers based on an apparent irrational infatuation likely 
to fade in the long run.7 Still, this may be offset by the agent’s desire to gain referral 
business. The current percentage rate also probably deters agents from advising sellers 
to seriously consider remodeling instead of selling.7
III. Sellers Set the Fee For and Pay the Agents 
Assisting the Buyers
A. General Justifications
The norm in retailing is for buyers to be advised by salespeople loyal to sellers. 
While the salespeople typically help buyers find suitable choices, they are often biased 
by the potential for a raise, higher commissions, or a free trip associated with sales 
of particular items. Thus, salespeople will generally not inform a customer that her 
best choice is something that the seller does not carry, unless the seller has no suitable 
alternative. The Macy’s Santa Claus in the classic film Miracle on Thirty-Fourth Street 
—who placed consumers’ interests first—was exceptional in this respect. Hence, for 
most purchases, consumers make their choices without objective advice, often relying 
on biased salespeople for factual information and frequently settling for a merely 
satisfactory selection (“satisficing”0).
Where buyers desire unbiased advice they can pay for it directly by consulting 
impartial advisors, like Consumer Reports, but only a small minority subscribe to such 
services. Many wealthy shoppers have long paid personal shopping consultants for 
unbiased advice rather than relying on the free personal shoppers paid by and loyal 
to their stores. Now that travel agents are paid directly by air travelers rather than 
significantly lower prices on high priced properties); Vivian Marino, Buyer-Broker Transactions on Rise 
Across Nation, chi. trib., May 6, 99, at 2R (A 992 survey by U.S. Sprint reported that 22 relocating 
employees who hired buyers’ brokers paid on average 9 percent of a home’s list price, while those using 
traditional agents paid 96.5 percent of the list price).
77 See wilson, supra note 65, at 87-89; J.D. house, contemPorAry entrePreneurs: the sociol-
oGy of resiDentiAl reAl estAte AGents 5-6 (977) (quoting a broker to say: “The customers’ 
needs are taken into account. Of course, only up to a point. . . If you looked at five or six houses 
and decided on one and asked me if it was good, I’d be a fool not to say yes, even though I’d 
never buy it for myself.”).
78 mArJorie b. GArber, sex AnD reAl estAte: why we love houses 14 (2000) recognizes many similari-
ties between selecting a home and selecting a romantic partner, including the danger that buyers will act on 
infatuation.
79 Then again, the agent probably does have an incentive to offer her assessment during the agent selection 
process for it may give her special credibility and the seller may disagree or contact her years later when 
there is justification for a sale. Meanwhile, the loss would be the possibility of a commission, not one al-
ready in hand.
80  Herbert Simon coined this term for settling for a merely satisfactory option, rather than investing extra 
effort to find a superior choice. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. 
econ. 99 (955).  Also, the Internet is beginning to change this.  See Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product 
Selection Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles to Maximum Effectiveness and Policy Options,  hArv. 
J. l. & tech. 8 (2000) revised version available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2788 (hereinafter Nadel, 
Selection Process). 
8 Some examples of the free shoppers provided by stores is discussed in Amy Kover, An Answer to the 
Harried Life: Personal Shoppers, n.y. times, Dec. 25, 2005, §, at 6.
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by airlines, they have a greater incentive to find air travelers the best deal.  Similarly, 
doctors are less likely to be biased in recommending drugs for patients if the doctors are 
paid by patients rather than by drug companies.3
Why are there so few examples of unbiased selection assistants? One would expect 
that consumers would prefer to pay market niche experts directly for unbiased advice 
rather than paying indirectly for biased salespeople. Yet for lower-and moderately-
priced items, administrative costs make this impractical. And even if the Internet 
alleviates this difficulty, shoppers appear to strongly prefer the illusion of free service 
—an entitlement reinforced in the dot.com explosion in the late 0s—even if it is 
harmful in the long term.
B. Application to Broker Fees
Most home buyers have accepted the pervasive myth that their brokers’ services 
cost them nothing,7 thus reducing their incentive to negotiate over fees. Yet the fees paid 
to their brokers are an avoidable cost ultimately paid by buyers, as easily illustrated by 
a simple example.
A seller willing to accept a bid of $00,000 and to pay a six percent broker commission 
($30,000, which is typically split evenly between the seller’s and buyer’s brokers’ firms) 
is, therefore, willing to accept net proceeds of $70,000. Since the seller’s broker’s firm 
has agreed to accept a net $,000 commission for its own services, the seller should 
accept a $,000 bid if there is no buyer’s broker to compensate. If, however, a buyer’s 
broker’s firm must be paid $,000 by the seller, then the seller must demand $,000 
82 See supra notes 0- and accompanying text. Independent insurance agents might be next to go this 
route.
8 There is some concern, however, that some doctors are unreasonably influenced by gifts and attention 
they receive from drug companies or their own partial ownership of some medical equipment. See Troyen 
A. Brennan et al, Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest, 295 JAMA 429 (2006); Reed 
Abelson, Whistle-Blower Suit Says Device Maker Generously Rewards Doctors, N.Y. times, Jan. 2, 2006, 
at C.
8 For a discussion of the possible emergence of a new class of consumer product selection assistants See 
Nadel, Selection Process, supra note 80; PhiliP evAns & thomAs s. wurster, blown to bits: how the new 
economics of informAtion trAnsforms strAteGy (999).
85 Because securities investors in the 1990s were willing to finance free Internet content to attract an audi-
ence, individuals became accustomed to free content, making it difficult for websites seeking to operate 
economically viable businesses by charging for the valuable information they provide.  See Nadel, Selec-
tion Process, supra note 80, at 202-04; Michael E. Porter, Strategy and the Internet, hArv. bus. rev., Mar. 
200, at 6, 76-77.
86 The most important example in the US may be the financing of political campaigns. Many voters oppose 
full and adequate public funding of political campaigns, preferring to avoid the expected higher taxes. Yet 
reliance on private financing places tremendous pressure on candidates to meet with and please potential 
donors.  Moreover, it is almost certain that the legislated expenditures resulting from the need to please 
potential donors, if not solely the earmarked “pork” expenditures, exceed the cost of public financing many 
times over. Until someone attempts to precisely quantify this latter cost to taxpayers, however, it will remain 
easier for voters to effectively ignore it.
87 See Greg Swann, Securing the Home-Buyer’s Place at the Table, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.bloodhoun-
drealty.com/ BloodhoundBlog/?p=296.  See also homepage of DROdio Realty, http://www.drodio.com (in-
forming buyers: “Learn how we can help you at no cost.”); http://www.assist2sell.com/buyers.aspx (“at no 
cost to you”). NAR Standard of Practice 2-2 permits realtors to represent their services as “free” or without 
cost if the potential for pay from another source is disclosed.
88 Some important points regarding this situation are discussed further in section IX.D, infra. Cf. Blanche 
Evans, Agents Can Win the Discount Game, reAlty times, Apr. 20, 2006 (instead of seeking rebates of the 
commission their broker collects, “buyers can come out just as well by asking for the same percentage off 
the cost of the home”).
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more from the buyer to clear $70,000.  Thus, the commission to the buyer’s broker is an 
“avoidable cost,” which sellers fully shift to the buyer., 0
Against this background, one would expect home buyers to choose to pay a broker 
directly for unbiased advice. Until the 0s, however, buyers were generally content 
to work with agents paid by—and recognized by the law as subagents of—the listing 
agent’s firm, with the latter using the MLS to make a blanket offer of subagency to the 
agent who found a buyer. And as subagents of the seller, agents working with buyers 
were duty-bound to pass on to sellers’ agents any secrets buyers shared with them about 
how high they would bid. Still, circa 0, more than 70 percent of buyers and sellers 
believed that the agent aiding the buyer was representing the buyer’s interests and thus 
some courts interpreted the common law of agency to that effect.3 Yet when litigation 
led listing brokers to be held liable for the services of buyer brokers, the industry 
quickly shifted to require agents to disclose who their primary client was (although 
89 At least a few courts appear to understand this. See Matthew M. Collette, Note, Sub-Agency 
in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle with Reality, 6 S. cAl. 
l. rev. 99, 0- n.28 (988). See also James R. Frew & G. Donald Jud, Who Pays the Real 
Estate Broker’s Commission?, in Jaffe, supra note 60, at 177; G.Donald Jud & James R. Frew, 
Real Estate Brokers, Housing Prices, and the Demand for Housing, 2 urb. stuD. 2 (986) 
(finding that brokers produce higher selling prices and shift some of their fee to buyers).  While 
the buyer’s broker’s fee appears to come solely from the buyer, the seller’s broker’s fee may 
come out of the buyer or seller’s pocket, depending on the elasticity of demand.
90 Some might challenge the implication of this view—that buyers who can avoid or reduce the costs of 
buyer brokerage services deserve any resulting cost savings. After all, under this rationale shoppers should 
be able to deduct that share of the price attributable to compensation for salespeople from the price if 
they want to purchase without assistance. Yet, the administrative and other costs of monitoring make such 
discounting impractical, unless the entire store operates on a minimal service, quasi-wholesale basis, like 
retailers like Costco.
9 See Collette, supra note 89, at 06-08.
92 The law of agency then required the agent working with the buyer to serve the best interests of the seller, 
including reporting to the seller’s agent how high a buyer was willing to bid on a property! See wilson, 
supra note 65, at 83; Ann Morales Olazabal, Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The 
Failure of State Regulatory Responses, 0 hArv. J. leG. 65, - (200). One mid-980s survey, how-
ever, found that agents working with buyers only passed on the highest price buyers would pay about half 
the time and, furthermore, selling agents who knew the lowest price that sellers would accept passed this on 
to buyers half the time!  See Royce de R. Barondes & V. Carols Slawson, Jr., Examining Compliance with 
Fiduciary Duties: A Study of Real Estate Agents, 8 or. l. rev. 681, 693-94 (2005); FTC 1983 Report, 
supra note 14, at 23-24 (finding that 66 percent of sellers surveyed indicated that brokers had told them how 
high they thought particular buyers would go).
9 For example, the 1983 FTC report found that more than 70 percent of buyers (and sellers) thought that 
the broker working with the buyer was “representing” the buyer, FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at , 
although state laws of sub-agency held otherwise. On the other hand, some state court decisions found that 
buyers were due common law agency duties of agents, See Barondes & Slawson, supra note 92, at 69-9 
(discussing common law and other principles); Ronald Benton Brown, et al, Real Estate Brokerage: Recent 
Changes in Relationships and a Proposed Cure, 29 creiGhton l. rev. 25,5-6 (995) referencing Roy T. 
Black, Proposed Alternatives to Traditional Real Property Agency: Restructuring the Brokerage Relation-
ship, 22 reAl est. l.J. 20, 205 (99) (discussing the creation of “accidental agency” and referencing 
Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 290-91 (1968) and Gray v. Fox, 151 Cal. App. 3d 482, 489 (1984)); 
Joseph M. Grohman, A Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate Broker’s Agency Relationship with the Pur-
chaser, 6 st. John’s l. rev. 560 (1987); FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 80-8.
9 The trigger point litigation was probably the $8.2 million loss by a Minnesota Real Estate broker. See 
Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 1993); Bokusky v. 
Edina Realty, Inc., No. 3-92 CIV 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D.Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).  And other lawsuits fol-
lowed.  See Brown, et al, supra note 9, at 5-50.
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such disclosures are surprisingly neglected today). The concept of “buyer’s brokers,” 
which Bill Broadbent had introduced in the late 70s, quickly gained attention, and it 
appears that today about 3 percent of buyers use some variety of agents who commit 
to work for buyers.
When Broadbent introduced the buyer broker concept he expected that buyers would 
negotiate to set buyers’ brokers’ fees,7 an arrangement many recognize as appropriate; 
yet that practice did not catch on. Moreover, most buyer brokers—exclusive or not 
—appear to prefer to rely on the fees offered by listing brokers, rather than to raise 
the topic directly with buyers.00 Prohibitions against rebates also hinder the growth 
of flat or hourly fees in the dozen or so states that prohibit rebates.0 Finally, buyer 
brokers— particularly those targeted for adverse splits0 —may fear that uncooperative 
traditional brokers will hinder their clients’ desire to amortize their broker fee by rolling 
it into the mortgage.03
Some claim that the “seller pays” concept also satisfies the desire of buyers to avoid 
paying a fee when there is no sale—i.e., a contingent fee.0  Yet despite the substantial 
95 See nAtionAl Assoc. of reAltors, 2005 Profile of home buyers AnD sellers __  (2006) (2005 NAR 
Survey) (reporting that less than one third of buyers in 2005 were told by their agents at their first meeting 
who the agent represented); Kenneth R. Harney, Agents Falling Short on Disclosure, wAsh. Post, Mar. 8, 
2006, at F1.
96 See 2005 NAR Survey, supra note 95, at 5. It remains important for consumers to understand 
who has fiduciary duties to whom.  See Maureen F. Glasheen, Real Estate Agents: Get Your 
Money’s Worth, consumers’ reseArch, Feb. 1994, at 10.
97 See wilson, supra note 65, at 9-0, 79, 89-95.
98 This aspect of the fee-for-service model, advocated by Julie Garton-Good, is also supported by many 
others.  See, e.g., Brian Larson, The End of MLS as We Know it, (part  of -part article) inmAn news, Aug. 
15, 2006; Swann, supra note 87; wilson, supra note 65, at 92; ross, supra note 49, at 291; Wachter, supra 
note 60, at 206; Yavas & Colwell, supra note 48, at 262; 1972 Forbes Cover Story, supra note 7, at 6 
(quoting Williams Farnsworth, executive in the Beverly Hills office of Coldwell, Banker); Marcie Geffner, 
Secret Rebates Point to Larger Commission Structure Problems, inmAn news, Mar. 2, 2006.  Mark Bagnoli 
& Naveen Khanna, Buyers’ and Sellers’ Agents in the Housing Market,  J. reAl est. fin. & econ. 7 
(99) concludes that society is better off if buyers’ agents are paid by sellers, but it ignores the bias that is 
introduced when the seller pays.  Still, courts have not found it improper for an agent whose duty is to serve 
the buyer to be paid by the seller’s agent.  See Brean v. North Campbell Professional Building, 58 P.2d 
1193, 1197 (Az. 1976); Duffy v. Setchell, 347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ill. App. 1976).
99 See, e.g. supra note , and accompanying text. The FTC’s circa 1980 survey found that non-traditional 
brokers typically charged a sale-price-based commission, although about a quarter charged a flat fee.  (This 
figures include buyer and seller brokers). See FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 5.  But see infra note 
205 and accompany text.
00 See Larson, supra note 98 (in an informal survey, less than a third of agents raised the issue with buyers); 
Robert J. Ringer, Salting the Record, reAlty times, Feb. 6, 2006; Gillespie, supra note 08.  But see Bryant 
Tutas, Taxi!, Taxi! Sorry, Not Me, I’m a Professional Realtor, http://activerain.com/blogsview/Taxi-Taxi-
Sorry-not-me-I-m-a-professional-Realtor-?005, Oct. 7, 2006 (advocating that brokers should not proceed 
beyond preliminary stages with buyers who do not sign buyer broker agreements that spell out fees).
0 See section VI, infra.
02 Adverse splits are discussed infra note 79, and accompanying text.
0 See infra note 0.
0 The advantages of a contingent fee are independent of whether the fee is paid by the seller or buyer. See 
Knoll, supra note , at 260-6 (observing that brokers can better diversify the risk of no sale).
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danger of free riding,0 most buyers’ brokers already defer collection of their fee until a 
sale has closed.0 
C. Harms
1. Agents May Fail to Show Buyers Some Attractive Options
Leaving the payment of buyer brokers to sellers or their brokers can lead agents 
with buyers to withhold options from buyers, despite fiduciary duties, if ) the co-op 
fee offered to the buyer’s broker for a home is too low, ) the seller appears to expect 
free assistance from the buyer’s broker, or 3) the agent wants to discourage price 
competition.
Most home buyers appear unaware that, like most salespeople, agents aiding buyers 
are apt to make a greater effort to sell those listings that offer them the highest fee.07  For 
example, agents are likely to favor MLS listings that offer commissions of more than the 
“going rate” commission in the locality, e.g., three percent,0 while neglecting listings 
that offer less.0 Recognizing this, many discount brokers representing sellers offer to 
pay buyer brokers the going rate in the market, limiting discounting to reductions in 
their own share of the commission.0 Jim Gillespie, a real estate agent “coach” from 
Temecula, Calif., told Money Magazine that he advises agents to use the specter of 
boycotts to dissuade sellers from listing with discounters.
05 See supra notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text.
06 See Collette, supra note 89, at  (calling this a “carryback commission”).
07 In the 980s, most buyers believed that the agent working with them was trying to serve their best inter-
ests.  See FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 8-8, 92 n.580, and that still appears to be the case.
08 See Peter Coy, Home Buyer, Beware, businessweek.com, Dec. 14, 2006; Robert J. Bruss, Realtor Says 
Raising the Commission Pays Off, inmAn news, July 7, 2006 (offering a four percent commission to the 
buyer’s agent did the trick); Vizard, supra note 67 (quoting a Manhattan broker admitting that “Let’s say I 
have 10 studios, one at 10 percent, one at 6, one at 4 and one at 2, . . . Which one do you think I’ll show?”); 
Jim Gillespie, Surveying Your Right to a Full Commission, reAlty times, Sept. 29, 2005; infra note 2, 
and accompanying text.
09 See Re/Max International v. Realty One, 173 F.3d 995, 1010 (6th Cir. 1999); Supermarket of Homes, 
Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 1983-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 65,718, 1983 WL 2199 at *3, *5 (C.D. 
Cal.), aff’d 786 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1986); Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 
1985); 2007 DOJ/FTC Report, supra note 16, at 66-69; FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 2, , 9-
40, 75; Patrick Woodall & Stephen Brobeck, Nontraditional Real Estate Brokers: Growth and Challenges, 
Dec. 13, 2006 (Consumer Fed. of America), at 11-13; Setting the Buyers Agent Commission, http://www.
progressivehomesellers.co m/_commission.html; Russ Cofano, You Have to Wonder, seAttle’s rAin city 
reAl estAte GuiDe, July 7, 2006, with comments, http://www.raincityguide.com/2006/07/7/you-have-
to-wonder/#comments; Consumer Rep. supra note 17, at 462; Blanche Evans, Buyer Wants to Know Why 
Broker is Showing Agency Listings Only, reAlty times, July 1, 2005; Robert J. Bruss, Home Sale Goes 
South When Sellers List with Broker Friend, inmAn news, Aug. 15, 2005; Robert J. Bruss, Adding Offspring 
to Real Estate Title May be Risky, inmAn news, June 27, 2005.  This can also arise when traditional brokers 
discriminate against new entrants by offering them only an “adverse split” of the total commission. See 
infra note 80. 
0 See, e.g., See FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 5 (most lower-priced brokers split their commis-
sions 50-50 with buyer agents, but many offer cooperating agents the going rate); Hagerty, supra note 27 
(discussing Sharon Jebavy); Cohen, supra note 46 (quoting broker David LaPointe).
 See Jon Birger & Joan Caplin, The 4½ % Solution, money, Oct. 200, at 05. Such statements are likely 
to deter risk-averse buyers from using discount brokers.  See Wachter, supra note 60, at 95, 20-05.  The 
statements are also known to be made to sellers who have listed with non-traditional brokers in an effort 
to get them to switch brokers. See FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 56. Still, such statements risk trig-
gering prosecutions for illegal boycotts, and so other coaches discourage such statements. See ross, supra 
“Most home buyers 
appear unaware 
that, like most 
salespeople, agents 
aiding buyers are apt 
to make a greater 
effort to sell those 
listings that offer 
them the highest 
fee.” 
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Alexander Perriello, President and chief executive officer of Realogy (then Cendant) 
Real Estate Franchise Group (the largest franchiser of residential and commercial real 
estate brokerage offices in the world), explained at an October , 00 U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ)/FTC workshop on real estate competition how buyers can be steered. 
Rather than offering the broker whose agent worked with the buyer only half the total 
commission, he might offer it as much as a five percent commission if he believed it 
was difficult to attract buyers in that market. If Perriello was willing to give up an 
additional two percent of the selling price, then he could have reduced his asking price 
by two percent.3 His experience in the industry, however, apparently leads him to 
believe it more effective to favor the financial interests of agents working with buyers 
rather than buyers themselves.
Buyers could attempt to correct for the pressures leading agents to fail to show them 
attractive options by offering to make up the difference between the fee a seller offered 
and the going rate; yet most buyers appear unaware of the current fee mechanism. 
While agents working with buyers could raise the issue, most appear reluctant to 
impose on buyers by requiring them to sign an agreement guaranteeing the broker a 
minimum fee upon a purchase. In addition, arranging to amortize such payments 
currently adds a complication.7
Even if buyers’ brokers are offered fees at the going rate, agents may also avoid 
showing buyers homes out of fear that the seller will require the agent to handle all the 
tasks ordinarily done by the seller’s agent because the seller is not using a full service 
broker. Agents could demand to be paid for any extra work for sellers, but most prefer 
note 9, at 8-9, 5-52.
2 See DOJ/FTC Competition Policy and Real Estate Industry Oct. 25, 2005 Workshop Transcript, at 9-
95. http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/comprealestate/051209transcript.pdf (DOJ/FTC 2005 Workshop 
Transcript).
 See Ardell DellaLoggia, Zero Commission, seAttle’s rAin city reAl estAte GuiDe, Mar. 2, 2006, at 
http://www.raincityguide.com/2006/0/2/zero-commission/ at item  (Mar. 25, 2006) (sellers should of-
fer enticements to buyers, not buyers’ agents).  The FTC found that non-traditional brokers often encourage 
sellers to split some of their savings on brokerage fees with buyers by reducing the selling price of their 
home.
 This includes offering buyer agents higher commissions, vacations, and other gifts.  See FTC 1983 Re-
port, supra note 14, at 75; robert irwin, tiPs AnD trAPs when sellinG A home 76 (rd ed. 2004); James R. 
Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Do Real-Estate Agents Have a Secret Agenda?, wAll st. J., Nov. 9, 2006, at D1; 
Robert J. Bruss, Sell My Home, Win Vacation, Electronics, inmAn news, Oct. 2, 2006; Elsa Brenner, Entic-
ing Buyers, and Brokers to Act, N.Y. times, Sept. 10, 2006, §11, at 13; Lisa Prevost, Sweetening the Pot for 
Home Buyers, N.Y. times, Oct. 1, 2006, §11 at 13; Damon Darlin, Location, Location, Location. Research, 
Research, N.Y. times, Nov. 5, 2005, at C1; Alisa Hagner, Letter to the Editor, inmAn news, Mar. 2, 2006.
5 See Pamela J. Young (letter to the editor), Agent ‘Breaches Duty’ on Commission Split, inmAn news, 
June 27, 2005.
6 See supra note 00.  See generally Phoebe Chongchua, Buyer Broker Agreement a Win-Win?, reAlty 
times, Aug. 9, 200.
7 If a buyer has agreed to pay a specific fee to the buyer’s agent then the seller should be willing to add 
that fee to the price of the house and agree to pay it to the buyer’s broker, and thus allow it to be amortized 
in the mortgage, but some sellers and their agents might resist this. Mortgage lenders also appear uncom-
fortable.  See infra note 0.
8 See Blanche Evans, New Study with Implications for MLSs Shows Freeloaders Unwelcome, reAlty 
times, Apr. 10, 2006; Lewis, supra note 18, at 16-17; eric tyson & rAy brown, house sellinG for Dum-
mies 134 (2d ed. 2002); Paul Sigurdson, Limited-Service Debate About Representation, inmAn news, May 
, 2005.
Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 527
to avoid the current awkwardness of such requests. Although not due to the traditional 
rate structure, traditional agents may also avoid homes represented by entities that 
threaten the stability of the traditional system (favoring cooperation over price 
competition), as discussed further in VIII.A, below. Thus, traditional agents willing 
to offer rebates to customers (only from the broker’s own share of the commission) feel 
pressure to act secretly out of fear of being shunned by their colleagues, if not fired by 
their broker!0 Although such practices resemble a quasi-boycott, the lack of an explicit 
agreement has allowed them to avoid antitrust prosecutions.
A 00 Wall Street Journal editorial complains that such practices represent “a clear 
breach of the fiduciary duty of the agent to find the best home at the lowest price for 
clients.” Not only do the practices violate duties imposed by state laws of agency, 
but they conflict with the first principle of loyalty in the National Association of 
Realtors® (NAR’s) “stringent, enforceable” code of ethics.3 Yet, the Journal observes: 
“To our knowledge, neither the National Association of Realtors nor the state real estate 
commissions have ever sanctioned a real estate agent for this breach of ethics.”
Some claim that the effect of steering is minor.  After all, 77 percent of buyers do 
research on the Internet even before working with a broker. Yet there are at least four 
flaws in this response. First, about a quarter of home buyers do not use the Internet.  Second, 
not all homes are easy to find online, particularly those not represented by traditional 
brokers. Third, many who begin their research on the Internet are soon discouraged 
either by their inability to locate any of what they want or by the overwhelming level of 
data available. Both types may conclude that it is more cost effective to employ an agent 
with experience retrieving the relevant data to best meet their needs. Fourth, once they 
9 See GAO 2005 Rep., supra note 1, at 13; FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 0, 75, 8-85, 87 
n.555.
20 See Roberts, supra note 15; Glenn Roberts, Jr., Brokerage Terminates Agent Who Founded Rebate 
Network, inmAn news, Mar. 9, 2006; Timothy J. Mullaney, Real Estate Brokers Are Racing for Shelter, bus. 
week, Apr. 0, 2006, at 75.
2 Although group boycotts are violations of section  of the Sherman Act, N.W. Wholesale Stationers, 
Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. V. FTC, 312 
U.S. 57 (9), mere conscious parallel conduct alone, is not enough, although inferences about group 
understandings may be drawn.  See ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 555 (8th 
Cir. 1991); Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1985); Michael K. Braswell & 
Stephen L. Poe, The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 0 Am. bus. L.J. 
271, 319-20 (1992); Trombetta, supra note 20, at 147-48; Owen R. Phillips & Henry N. Butler, The Law and 
Economics of Residential Real Estate Markets in Texas: Regulation and Antitrust Implications, 6 bAylor 
l. rev. 62, 69 (98).
22 Editorial, The Realtor Racket, wAll st. J., Aug. 2, 2005, at A8. See also Fiduciary Duties Of A Real 
Estate Agent http://www.realestatebuyersagents.com/duties.htm.
2 See Bruce Aydt, Ethics: Q&A: In Whose Interest?, Realtor Magazine Online, Jun. , 2006, (observing 
that the National Association of Realtor Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice requires its members to 
put their clients’ interests ahead of their own interests. http://www.realtor.org/rmomag.NSF/pages/ethicsju
n06?OpenDocument.
2 editorial, supra note 22.  This may, however, may be due to a state’s failure to authorize prosecutions 
of such anticompetitive actions. See ARELLO, Impact of Industry Members Serving on Real Estate Com-
missions on Boards, July 2006, 
http://img.realtytimes.com/rtimages/article_20070628_blanche/$file/arelloposition.pdf at Point 2. There 
have also been private lawsuits. See Cohen, supra note 46 (describing broker Brandy Farris’s lawsuit).
25 See 2005 NAR Survey, supra note 95, at 29 (finding that 77 percent of home buyers use the Internet).
26 See infra section VII.B..a.
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have hired a broker who is paid for providing full service, buyers with scarce free time 
are apt to forgo duplicating what their agent is already doing, although, admittedly, 
many individuals are inclined to continue to monitor homes online.
2. Reducing Buyers’ Incentive to Negotiate
As noted above, by encouraging buyers to believe that it costs them nothing to 
use a broker, the current fee arrangement deters most buyers from negotiating over 
their agent’s broker’s fee.7 Hence, there is little pressure to reduce the fee paid to 
buyer brokers from half of the “going rate,” e.g., half of six percent, which sellers and 
agents believe is necessary to avoid the chance that their listing will be neglected, as 
just discussed, and this is what most MLS listings offer buyers’ brokers. The situation 
is changing, however, due to the emergence of referral firms, like LendingTree and an 
increasing number of brokers who offer buyers a rebate from the commission paid by 
listing brokers, as discussed in more detail in section VI, below. As buyers discover that 
even “full service” buyer brokers are willing to rebate a portion of their commission, 
more are likely to demand lower fees.
3. Unnecessary Fees Allocated to Pay Buyer Brokers
When listing brokers are asked to defend their commission requests, most explain 
that they “must” offer buyer’s brokers a co-op commission at the “going rate,” e.g., three 
percent, to avoid the harm discussed in III.C., above. Yet even those who acknowledge 
that the buyer may have no broker, generally only offer to reduce the total commission 
by one percent of the three they “needed” to offer. Certainly if sellers want the listing 
agent to handle tasks for which agent aiding the buyer is generally responsible then 
the listing broker is certainly entitled to some extra pay,30 but not when the buyer has 
already hired an attorney or consultant to handle tasks for buyers or two percent of the 
sale price for the usually routine tasks described in section VII.B..
Those who buy homes without a broker’s help usually ask sellers to reduce the 
sale price by the amount that would have been paid to the buyer’s broker.3 Sellers 
may desire to comply, but listing agreements usually give the listing broker the right to 
keep the full fee.3  Since buyers who are real estate agents can avoid this problem, and 
27 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Many buyers assume that traditional broker rates are basi-
cally fixed and that the quality of service provided by lower-priced providers must be inferior. See also infra 
section VIII. 
28 FTC 1983 Report, supra note 14, at 136-37 (finding that the “splits” offered to cooperating brokers by 
listing brokers are highly uniform within any local MLS market). The NAR handbook recommends that 
splits be designed to “encourage cooperation,” as opposed to competition.  Id. at 9.  Cf note 5, infra.
29 Pressure may also mount if more sellers list their homes with firms like Foxtons and Catalist (which of-
fer brokers for buyers only .0 and .5 percent commissions, respectively).  See Jessica Swesey, Real Estate 
Discounters Gaining Traction, inmAn news, April 12, 2005 (Southern California-based Catalist); Glenn 
Roberts, Jr., Discount Pioneer Back in Business, inmAn news, May 2, 2005.
0 See infra section VII.B..  Cf. Evans, supra note 8 (suggesting that brokers charge fees for the ser-
vices they provide to those their clients are buying from or selling to).
 Then again, as described above, current listing contracts often force listing brokers to pay brokers of 
buyer agents even when buyers thought that they had no agent. See supra text accompanying notes 8-0.
2 Listing brokers may actually expect to work for three percent most of the time (where buyers have 
agents), but with the expectation that they will keep all six percent (or at least five) about 20 percent of the 
time.
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the cost of becoming a licensed agent is so low,33 this may be one reason why so many 
individuals have become real estate agents!3
IV. Refusing Reductions to the Bundled Price for 
 Those Desiring Much Less Service
A. General Justifications and Their Application to Broker Fees
There are many reasons why sellers may require buyers to purchase products as 
part of a bundle rather than offering them on a stand alone basis at reasonable prices. 
Sellers with market power may use bundling to capture a greater share of the surplus 
value created by an item or use it to increase the entry barriers to the industry.3 This 
may even benefit society if it permits the production of offerings that would not be 
profitable to sell except as part of a bundle.
Sellers without market power may also have good reason to set a single price for a 
bundle and refuse to give discounts for subsets of the bundled items.  First, it might be 
cheaper to produce only one popular bundle of basic features. As Nobel Prize winner 
William Vickery often observed, auto makers would not give a discount to a buyer who 
only drove during daylight and therefore requested a car without headlights, since it 
would actually be more expensive to provide one. Second, the bundle might represent a 
“loss leader” created primarily as a marketing device. Once a dinner or travel package 
special has attracted a customer’s attention, the firm offering it might want to shift 
the customer to a much more profitable option and thus be unwilling to modify the 
advertised bundle. Third, a service provider’s professional preference may be to handle 
only whole tasks. For example, many doctors and criminal lawyers may be uninterested 
in handling only a part of a case, preferring to manage the whole case or nothing.
None of these latter three conditions appear to apply directly to the real estate 
brokerage market. While there are probably economies of scope in providing a set of 
real estate services,3 the tasks discussed in section VII appear relatively distinct and the 
costs of each appear to be easily avoidable, which is why at least some buyer and seller 
brokers are offering them à la carte. Meanwhile, most agents expect to cooperate with 
another agent on a purchase.
Nevertheless, traditional brokers, contending that the public expects an “agent” to 
provide some minimum set of services,37 such as delivering offers, have successfully 
 See supra note 9. Still, to collect fees, agents must become or work for a broker and incur other related 
fees.
 Obtaining a real estate license may be a wise investment for those expecting to buy homes on their own 
(and interested in helping out family and friends in the same boat). See Jim Gillespie, Splitting Commis-
sions, reAlty times, Mar. 0, 2006.
5 See Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly, www.ssrn.com/abstract=586648; Barry 
Nalebuff, Bundling as a Barrier to Entry, 9 Q. J. econ. 159 (2004); Timothy J. Brennan, Is Competition 
the Entry Barrier? Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling (2005), http://www.aei.brookings.
org/publications/ abstract.php?pid=9.  Such practices may enable the seller to distort competitive mar-
ketplaces and decrease the opportunity for others to compete in its monopoly market, leading the courts to 
look unfavorably on such bundling or tying.  See, e.g, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
72 U.S. 585 (985).
6 It does not appear that there would be any more cost savings from bundling by real estate brokers than 
the FTC expected to see from “economies of packaging” in the funeral industry. See Funeral Industry Prac-
tices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260, 42298 (1982).
7 See, e.g., Wayne Thorburn, Public and Private Restraints to Alternative Business Models for Consum-
ers, Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/comprealestate/thorburn.pdf.
Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 5 30
helped to pass laws in at least  states that require brokers to provide some minimum 
set of services.3  Yet this prevents a seller from paying solely to engage a broker to place 
a listing on the local MLS,3 just as they now pay a newspaper for placing a classified 
ad and nothing more.  If policy makers were truly concerned that consumers might be 
denied a service they expected, an effective disclosure and/or a waiver option would 
be the appropriate response to this, as noted by the DOJ, the FTC, and the Wall Street 
Journal,0 among others, but only about five of the 7 states now permit sellers to waive 
state minimum service requirements. If the laws were really intended to ensure that 
consumers received all the services that they expected, they would explicitly require 
listing brokers to support the widest dissemination of the seller’s listing, and brokers 
engaged to show buyers homes to disclose all the homes meeting the buyer’s search 
criteria.  These are services that consumers are now often being denied, without their 
knowledge, and to their detriment!
B. Harms
1. Bundling Denies Consumers the Option of Lower Fees 
 for Limited Service
Although some home buyers and sellers want the entire bundle of services 
offered by traditional brokers, many others desire to save money by handling many 
tasks themselves, even if the lack of unbundled services forces them to go completely 
FSBO(around 0 percent do3) or to purchase without a broker (more than 0 percent 
8 See AlA coDe § 34-27-84 (c); Del. coDe Ann. tit. 24 § 2979; flA. stAt. Ann. § 475.278; GA. coDe 
Ann. § 10-6A-4; Idaho (H.B. 135, 2007 Leg., 59th Sess. (2007)); 225 ill. comP. stAt. Ann. 454/ 15-75; 
inD. coDe Ann. § 25-34.1-10-9.5 (b); iowA coDe Ann. § 543B.56A; mo. Ann. stAt. § 339.780(7); ohio 
rev. coDe Ann. §§ 75.62-65; oklA. stAt. tit. 59 § 858-352, -353(A)(2), -354(B)(2); 63 PA. cons. 
stAt. Ann. § 455.606a(a)(3); ?SC 40-57-145?; tenn. coDe Ann. § 62-13-404(3); tex. occ. coDe Ann. § 
1101.557(b); utAh coDe § 61-2-27(2)(a); vA. coDe Ann. § 54.2131(A)(2)(b),(c); wAsh. rev. coDe Ann. 
§ 18.86.030(1)(c); wis. stAt. §§ 52.(2)(am), (2)(d), (6).  See also 2007 DoJ/ftc Report, supra note 
6, at 5.
9 See infra notes 150 & 223, and accompanying texts. 
0 See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/reworkshop_atrcomments.htm; editorial, supra note 
122; editorial, Justice v. Realtors, wAll st. J., Sept. , 2005 at A20.
 See GA. coDe Ann. § 10-6A-4(a); ohio rev. coDe Ann. §§ 75.62; oklA. stAt. tit. 59 § 858-5(D), 
-354(F); tenn. coDe Ann. § 62-13-404(3); vA. coDe Ann. § 5.28..  Other states permit waivers to be 
granted for some of the minimum services.  See flA. stAt. Ann. § 475.278(2)(a)(5); 63 PA. cons. stAt. Ann. 
§ 455.606a(a)(12) (communicating oral offers); Glenn Roberts, Jr., More States Plan Minimum-Service 
Real Estate Laws, inmAn news, Sept. 19, 2005; Glenn Roberts, Jr., Law Would Allow Consumers to Opt Out 
of Real Estate Services, inmAn news, Dec. , 2005.
2 The real need for these two requirements are discussed in sections III.C. and IV.B.2, supra, respec-
tively.
 It appears that approximately 20 percent of sellers use the FSBO option.  See Amanda Gengler, They 
Got How Much?, money, Apr. 2007, at 35 (referencing Real Trends data for 2006); Blanche Evans, Houston 
Association Conducts First-time Survey of Local Buyers, Sellers, reAlty times, June 2, 2006 (reporting 
that more than 25 percent of sellers did not use a realtor); Thomas Grillo, Should I Hire a Broker or Do it 
Myself?, bost. Globe, May 9, 200, at H (reporting that a study of deeds found almost 25 percent were 
FSBOs); tyson & brown,  supra note 118, at 87 (estimating 20 percent); Colby Sambrotto, slides for Oc-
tober DOJ/FTC Workshop, Oct. 2005 at 5, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/comprealestate/sambrotto.
pdf. (FSBO Slides) (more than 20 percent - citing Realty Viewpoint finding).  But see infra note 8, and 
accompanying text.  Furthermore, Consumer Reports found that almost all of the many who used the option 
would definitely or probably do it again.  FSBO Slides, at 3 (finding that 94 percent of those using FSBO 
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do). Even though such customers generally require substantially less time and effort 
from agents, the current dominant, standard rate structure used by traditional brokers 
demands that consumers choose all or nothing. Those expecting to pay $00,000 for a 
home will also expect to pay about $,000 (half of six percent) to a buyer’s broker even 
if they only want 0 hours worth of assistance with paperwork and routine closing 
tasks. The situation is similar to that which occurred in the funeral industry in the 70s, 
where “industry practice was to quote a package price based on a multiple of the cost of 
the casket, stating that ‘this includes our full range of services.’”
Traditional brokers claim that the small market share of “fee for service” or à la 
carte services7 (which they claim are now widely available), indicates little consumer 
demand, but that result appears to be largely due to the anticompetitive, if not illegal, 
tactics of traditional brokers.  In addition to the practices discussed in section VIII, the 
primary problem in this area for sellers has historically been their inability to place 
their listings in the relevant local MLS. Although, there are now brokers in most local 
would do it again).  Finally, Murray Consulting, Inc.’s 2005 Real Estate Consumer Service Model Survey 
found that 33 percent of sellers (up from 18 in 2002) were confident that they could sell their own homes. 
Jeremy Conaway, What Role Will Associations Play in Addressing the Ultimate Question, Oct. 26, 2005, 
presentation at ICONN, San Francisco, http://www.reconis.com/recon/docs/ Industry%20Update%20for%
20ICONN%2010.26.05.pdf at 27.  One Canadian study found that FSBO rates in Canada were more than 
twenty-six percent, and that was in a buyer’s market.  See Michael A. Goldberg & Peter J. Horwood, The 
Costs of Buying and Selling Houses: Some Canadian Evidence, in Jaffe, supra note 60, at , 7.
 See 2005 NAR Survey, supra note 95, at 39 (finding that 77 percent of home buyers purchase through 
an agent); Evans, supra note 143 (reporting that only fifty-seven percent of buyers used a realtor).
5 See Jayne O’Donnell & Sue Kirchhoff, Discounters Setting Sights on Traditional Real Estate Market,  
USA toDAy, June 9, 2005, at 1B (one ZipRealty executive reports that letting home buyers review proper-
ties online leads them to eliminate half of those they would otherwise have visited with a traditional firm’s 
agent); Kadlec, supra note 28 (reporting that, according to the California Assoc. of Realtors, consumers 
who use the Internet average spending less than two weeks looking at homes and visiting six homes, while 
those who don’t spend more than seven weeks and look at fifteen homes [although this may partly because 
buyers are looking on their own for  months, see infra note 0, and partly due to an exceptional sellers’ 
market]); Jeremy Conaway, Brokerage Design, Nov. 5, 2005, http://www.reconis.com/recon/docs/Brokera
ge%20Design%20Bullets%20November%202005.pdf at 2 (“Internet empowered consumers require about 
half as much effort when dealing with a real estate service provider.”). 
6 See mitforD, supra note 12, at 176. Many firms refused to reduce prices when consumers asked to 
forgo items.  See Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260, 42267 (1982), even though many in the 
business recognized that price reductions were justified.  Id. at 42281-82.  The FTC responded by requiring 
itemized pricing, id. at 227, 227-5, 2279.  Most of the value of this rule was obliterated, however, by 
a June 99 amendment to the rule, which permitted sellers to include a large minimum fee for overhead. 
mitforD, supra, at 82-8, 98-99, 20.
7 The market share of non-traditional brokers appears to be about 0 to 7 percent.  See nAtionAl Assoc. 
of reAltors, 2006 Profile of home buyers AnD sellers __  (2006) (2006 NAR Survey) (reporting that 9 
percent of sellers who use brokers use limited service brokers and 8 percent minimal service brokers); Dina 
ElBoghdady, New Math on the Old Commission, wAsh. Post, Nov. 11, 2006, at F01 (reporting that Steve 
Murray of Real Trends estimated that “discounters” captured about 8 percent of home sellers this year, 
about  percent last year, up from 2 percent four years ago).  Non-traditional brokers include many who 
don’t consider themselves “discounters.”
8 See Lewis, supra note 8, at 5 (claiming tremendous competition).  The emergence of the fee-for-ser-
vice model is discussed infra sections IV.B.2 and VII.  Services especially targeted to FSBOs are discussed 
in Perri Capell, Mistakes to Avoid When Selling Your Own Home, reAlestAteJournAl.com, June 2, 200, 
http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/200062-capell.html. 
9 See sections VII.A. and VIII.D, infra.
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markets willing to place listings on their local MLSs for a nominal fee,0 traditional 
brokers are now resisting non-traditional competitors by failing to inform their clients 
about listings handled by non-traditional brokers, as discussed in section III.C, above. 
Some MLSs also refused to pass listings on to realtor.com if they did not include the 
“exclusive right to sell” agreements used by traditional brokers, but the FTC cracked 
down on this practice in summer 00.  Still, as long as traditional brokers dominate 
local markets and provide inferior cooperation to non-traditional brokers, buyers and 
sellers who want to avoid being discriminated against by the dominant “old boys club” 
and the resulting harms3 will feel compelled to forsake the fee-for-service options 
offered by non-traditional brokers.
2. Bundling Aids Brokers’ Selfish Efforts to Constrain 
 Seller Marketing 
Sellers generally desire to reach as many bona fide potential buyers as possible, 
using all cost-effective media, including all bona fide websites. Under the standard 
price structure, however, sellers who desire an “association with a traditional broker” 
must sign a contract that grants their listing broker full control over their “listing,” 
and some traditional brokers contend that this gives them “ownership” of the listing.7 
50 See New Flat-Fee Real Estate Company Offers Leads, inmAn news, Sept. , 2006,(discussing IHSRe-
alty.com, which will list homes in MLSs in six states (and the other 44 through affiliates, plus other services) 
for as little as $399) (hereinafter IHS) ; Darlin, supra note 7 ($300 to $800 in almost every community); 
http://www.realestatebyownerinc.com/services.html ($199 for listing in Virginia/Maryland/DC MLS plus 
other services); Glenn Roberts, Jr., Technology Fuels Flat-Fee Real Estate, inmAn news, May 25, 2005 
(discussing Amerisellrealty.com, which offers MLS + website listings for $260-$500); Jeff Bailey, Owners’ 
Web Gives Realtors Run for Money, N.Y. times, Jan. 3, 2006, at A1 ($399); Carol Hazard, Squeeeeezzzzing 
Commissions Playing the Percentages, richmonD times, Aug. 1, 2005, at D14 ($299); Andrea Jares, Chip-
ping Away at Commissions, ft. worth stAr-teleGrAm, June 5, 2005, at F1 (as little as $99); Linda Rawls, 
A Cheaper Way to Sell, PAlm beAch Post, Sept. 2002, at 1F ($495); http://www.fsboadvertisingservice.
com/flat-fee-mls-MLSMO.asp.
5 See James R. Hagerty, Realtors Raise Pressure on Discounters, Wall St. J., July 8, 2005, at A2 (report-
ing that MLS boards in Austin, Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Wilmington, N.C. refuse to pass on “exclusive 
agency” listings to realtor.com); Jessica Swesey, FTC Charges Austin Realtors with Restraining Competi-
tion, inmAn news, July , 2006 (ditto for Heartland, Kan., and Monmouth-Ocean, NJ).
52 See FTC Press Release, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/10/realestatesweep.htm.  Glenn 
Roberts, Jr., FTC Targets Real Estate for Alleged Unfair Practices, inmAn news, Oct. 12, 2006 (many MLSs 
have eliminated such discriminatory policies, but two Michigan MLSs plan to defend them).
5 See, e.g., the practices discussed supra section III. C.1; infra text accompanying note 180; section VIII.
H. It appears that the only empirical data on this issue found that non-traditional brokers closed on less than 
60 percent of their listings while traditional agents closed on about 88 percent.  FTC 1983 Report, supra 
note , at 52.
5 Consumers may feel constrained until alternative brokers reach a tipping point, such as when a local 
FSBO database includes 30 percent of the homes for sale in a community. See Bailey, supra note 50. 
Again, this situation has significant similarities to funeral industry pricing. See supra note 6, and ac-
companying text.
55 See ross, supra note 49, at 134, 244, 252; Bernice Ross, Free Web Sites Can Maximize Real Estate 
Marketing, inmAn news, Mar. 3, 2006; FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 28. In fact, sellers’ desire for 
maximum exposure prior to the establishment of MLSs led them to prefer “open listings,” which offered the 
whole commission to the buyer’s broker. See FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 2.
56 See Thomas Kunz, President and chief executive officer of Century 21 Real Estate, DOJ/FTC 2005 
Workshop Transcript supra note 2, at 27-28.
57 In the words of NAR vice president Steve Cook, “the sellers don’t own their listings. The data did 
not exist before the broker.”  See Clay Risen, Realtors v. the Internet, new rePublic, May 2, 2005, at , 
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This leads many traditional brokers to compromise the interests of sellers by limiting 
the dissemination of listings so as to enhance the listing’s value as bait for attracting new 
buyer clients. Listing brokers want buyers to come to a website affiliated with their 
firm to see listings so that their firm will have the best chance to gain those buyers as 
clients even if they do not buy the particular listing that attracts them. If other entities 
post the same listings on their competing websites, buyers may make first contact with 
the listing firm’s competitors and be more inclined to employ one of them for aiding 
their home search.0 In the same vein, brokers frequently withhold a listing from other 
brokers until their agents have had the chance to expose it to their own buyer clients 
(“pocketing” a listing), so that they might collect both halves of the commission 
(“double-ending”), even though such “in house” sales often deny sellers the chance to 
benefit from higher bids that might be offered by buyers represented by other brokers.
When in May 003, the NAR adopted a policy that listing brokers be permitted to 
restrict the online republication of their listings by competing brokers,3 the DOJ became 
concerned.  Despite several rounds of NAR revisions, in September 00 the DOJ brought 
suit against the NAR for its most recent version of the policy.  Among other things, the 
DOJ pointed out that the chairman of the NAR’s working group on the rules admitted 
that refusing to share a listing with others “’may not be in the seller[‘]s best interest,’” 
and that “he took comfort in the fact that the rule did not require brokers to disclose to 
15; Glenn Roberts, Jr., NAR Takes More Time to Review Listings Ownership Issues, inmAn news, Nov. , 
2005. 
58 As one REMAX broker admitted “I believe that if a homeowner who was trying to sell his or her home 
knew how we [realtors] were protecting all the listings, he or she would be incensed.” Doug Palin, Letters 
to the Editor, inmAn news, Mar. , 2005.
59 Similarly, Brokers see listings as their valuable assets.  See truliA, the truth About reAl estAte 
seArch: oPtimizinG the Assets of the resiDentiAl reAl estAte inDustry on the internet , 9 (Mar. 2006) 
http://www.trulia.com/resources/Trulia-The_Truth_About_Real_Estate_Search_White_Paper.pdf.  Listing 
brokers have long recognized that the primary value of an initial open house is to attract new buyer clients. 
See wilson, supra note 65, at 44-52; Robert J. Bruss, Is Open House Effective Way to Market Real Estate?, 
inmAn news, Dec. 29, 2005.  About seven percent of buyers meet their agent at an open house.  2005 NAR 
Survey, supra note 95, at 41; infra note 27 and accompanying text.
60 Thus, one realtor association sued to prevent a broker from selling home shoppers relevant pages from 
the MLS. See C. Christian Hill, Gina Williams Outrages Brokers by Cutting Fees, wAll st. J., Aug. , 
980, at 29.
6 See FTC 1983 Report, supra note 14, at 179; Carney, supra note 17, at 343, 352 n.22; Tracie Rozhon, 
Agents Play Hide-and-Seek as the Market Quickens, N.Y. times, Apr. 4, 2002 at D10; irwin, supra note 
, at 5, 6.
62 See Glenn Roberts, Jr, SoCal Real Estate Company Wants Both Sides of the Transaction, inmAn news, 
Oct. 4, 2005.  Most MLSs, however, require members to submit their listings within 72 hours or some such 
period.  See Glenn Roberts, Jr., Real Estate Agents Face Fines for Not Sharing Listings Data, inmAn news, 
Oct. , 2005.  Still, U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray analyst, Jeff Evanson said “in a hot market, most homes get 
sold before they reach the Web,” see David A. Patton, The Best Way to...House Hunt: The Web Can Make 
Your Search for a New Home a Lot More Efficient, wAll st. J., Dec. 6, 999, at R (see also kiPlinGer 
stAff, supra note 66, at 9).
6 See Patrick Barta & John R. Wilke, Realtors’ Limits on Web Listings Face a Federal Antitrust Inquiry, 
wAll st. J, Oct. 2, 200, at A.  Back in 200, the NAR lobbied Congress to make it harder for non-
members of the NAR to place MLS listings on their websites. See Patrick Barta, Home Rules: Real-Estate 
Listings on the Web are Loosening the Grip Realtors Have Long Had on the Market, wAll st. J, Oct. 29, 
200, at R2.
6 See DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at ¶¶ 7, 34 and 39. For a timeline of the events that 
led to the lawsuit, see Glenn Roberts, Jr., NAR Online Listing Policy: Two Years in the Making, inmAn news, 
Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.inman.com/InmanNews.aspx?ID=7868.
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clients that their listings would be withheld from some prospective purchasers . . .” 
Independently, a California court also refused an MLS’s request to issue an injunction to 
prevent a rival from publishing data included in its listing.
The industry offers three defenses of its policy. First, it notes that MLSs were 
established and remain as a business-to-business resource for brokers to share information 
cooperatively7 among themselves, not as a retail service for buyers and sellers.  While 
this is historically accurate, it does not justify denying sellers the chance to make their 
listings directly available to all home shoppers now that this is technologically practical, 
especially since a large number of buyers do not use brokers. One industry advocate 
complains that giving consumers direct access to the MLS would be like giving clothes 
shoppers direct access to designer showrooms. Yet while it is impractical to modify 
designer showrooms to handle crowds of retail customers and the sellers do not want 
this, it is relatively easy to modify MLS databases to accommodate direct buyer access, 
and sellers would welcome and benefit from this.
Brokers should consider how technological change affected the airline reservation 
business.  Airlines happily offer consumers the chance to discover ticket availability and 
make a direct purchase without the involvement of a travel agent. The airline-created 
Orbitz provides this. If the dominant airline reservation systems had been owned by 
traditional travel agents, however, they might well have acted like traditional real 
estate brokers, limiting consumer access to airline listings, forcing buyers to work with 
an agent, at least to make a reservation. Intermediaries who refuse to serve buyers’ 
and sellers’ best interests by offering them the access they desire, seriously risk being 
displaced by a new entrant that will offer such access.70
A second contention raised by one advocate for the brokerage industry is that listing 
brokers deserve the same rights as retailers like Neiman-Marcus: to enjoy the ancillary 
benefits of the traffic that “their” inventory attracts.7 This position is somewhat 
analogous to the one taken by online auction site eBay when “aggregator” firms, like 
Bidder’s Edge sought to attract buyers by offering a single aggregated list of all of the 
offerings in a product category (available from many, if not all, auction sites), including 
eBay.7  eBay sued the aggregators to prevent them from using eBay’s listings to attract 
65 DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at ¶ 7; supra note 58.
66 See Jessica Swesey, Brokers Lose Grip on Real Estate Listings Control, inmAn news, June 7, 2005.
67 That is, the MLS was established to promote cooperation in place of competition.  See infra note 5, 
and accompanying text.  See also supra note 128, concerning cooperation in setting splits in the MLS.
68 Thus, the California legislature defined the MLS as “a facility of cooperation of agents, operating 
through an intermediary which does not itself act as an agent, through which agents establish express or 
implied legal relationships with respect to listed properties.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 087 (West Supp. 987) 
(emphasis added) cited in Collette, supra note 89, at .  See generally, id, at 09-5.
69 See Blanche Evans, Are Minimum Service Rules a Disservice to Consumers?, reAlty times, Mar. 8, 
2005, http://realtytimes.com/rtapages/20050308_disservice.htm.
70 See infra notes 255-258, and accompanying text, suggesting Google among other candidates for this 
service.
7 See Blanche Evans, The Threat of a Collapsing MLS System is Real, reAlty times, May 10, 2005; 
David Bank, Microsoft Offers Home Buyers On-Line Site, wAll st. J., July 13, 1998, at B6 (quoting Laurie 
Janik, general counsel of the NAR, as stating “[d]o you think a broker wants consumers to come to a site 
that’s made valuable as a result of his hard work and then be shuttled off to another escrow company or 
another mortgage broker?  That’s not in his best interest.”).
72 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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shoppers interested in those listings to their sites rather than to eBay. Although eBay 
won a court victory, the court’s holding focused on its concern that aggregators could 
cause harmful congestion to eBay’s computers,73 a concern that would not apply to 
MLS listings.7 If buyers want one-stop access to an aggregated and easily searchable 
set of available homes of all kinds, then brokers should compete to offer that.7 Home 
sellers do not grant brokers exclusive rights to their listing in order to allow them to 
affirmatively limit its dissemination to potential bona fide buyers.7
Finally, some industry supporters argue that since brokers compose the listings, 
republication of listings is a violation of the broker’s copyright.77 Setting aside the 
fact that copyright law does not protect facts about a listing per se,7 there is the more 
fundamental matter that brokers’ fiduciary duty to sellers certainly prohibits them 
compromising their clients’ interests like this.7
Listing brokers also injure the interests of sellers when they offer non-traditional 
brokers only “adverse splits,” i.e., less than a 0-0 split or even nothing at all0 or refuse 
to show homes to clients of non-traditional brokers. Again, their fiduciary duties 
should not permit such tactics.
7 Id. at 067. See also Nadel, Selection Process, supra note 80, at 22-.
7 But see Janis Mara, Craigslist to Oodle: Stop Using Our Classified Ads, inmAn news, Oct. 8, 2005. 
Meanwhile, Bay is now encouraging such dissemination.  See Bob Tedeschi, More Data for Online Shop-
pers, and Plenty of Pictures Too, N.Y. times, Aug. , 2006, at C6.
75 See Nadel, Selection Process, supra note 80, at 216-17; Jessica Swesey, Home Search Goes Vertical, 
inmAn news, Apr. 4, 2006; see also infra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
76 Then again, listing agents could argue that this right is a second component of their fee. That is, absent 
this ancillary benefit, they would charge slightly higher commissions.
77 See David Charron, et al, Strengthening the Foundation: The Real Estate Listing Content Copyright 
FAQ and An Updated Program to Administer, Secure and Enhance the Value of Real Estate Listing Content 
(April 2006) at www.mris.com/news/papers/index.cfm; Who Owns the Real Estate Data, inmAn news, Feb 
21 & 22, 2005 (4 part series); Blanche Evans, DOJ Doesn’t Have a Case Says MLS Attorney, reAlty times, 
Mar. , 2006.
78 See Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (facts are not 
subject to copyright, despite the effort required to compile them).
79 See supra note 155, and accompanying text (sellers’ interests); Glenn Roberts, Jr., Real Estate Search 
Sites Hit Data Control Sore Spot, inmAn news, Jan. 2, 2006.
80 See Re/Max International v. Realty One, 173 F.3d 995, 1000-01, 1003 (6th Cir. 999) (defendants offered 
plaintiff’s agents only a 70-30 or 75-25 split instead of the standard 50-50 split); Park v. El Paso Bd. of Real-
tors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1985); wilson, supra note 65, at 91-92; FTC 1983 Report, supra note , 
at 160; Trombetta, supra note 20, at 146-47; Roberts, supra note 110; Glenn Roberts, Jr., Brokerage Heavy-
weight Protests Commission-Cutters, inmAn news, June 10, 2005; Glenn Roberts, Jr., N.Y. Realtor Group 
Cautions Members on Rate Setting, inmAn news, Nov. 17, 2005; Jim Bourgoin, Buyers Advantage, Com-
ment, Nov. 28, 2005 http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/205.htm. The NAR handbook 
recommended that splits be designed to “encourage cooperation,” as opposed to competition, FTC 1983 
Report, supra note , at 9, and it permits brokers to send a letter to particular brokers to inform them 
that the broker will not pay them the split indicated in the MLS listing, but rather a specific alternative fee. 
But this cannot be retaliation.  See Blanche Evans, Industry Questions Adverse Splits, reAlty times, Feb. 
24, 2003; NJ State ruling, http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/acrobat/recadvisory05220.pdf.(prohibiting adverse 
splits as retaliation); Glenn Roberts, Jr., Real Estate Regulator Advises Fair Play in Discounter Commission 
Splits, inmAn news, Dec. 20, 2005.  See also Valerie Cotsalas, Brokers Who Represent Buyers, N.Y. times, 
Apr. 6, 2006, §, at 2 (“many listing agents offer no commission to buyer’s agents.”).
8 See Damon Darlin, The Last Stand of the 6-Percenters?, n.y. times, Sept. , 2006, §, at .
“If buyers want 
one-stop access to 
an aggregated and 
easily searchable 
set of available 
homes of all kinds, 
then brokers should 
compete to offer 
that.” 
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3. Bundling Inhibits Price Competition on 
 Individual Selling Services
As reviewed in section VII, both selling and buying a home involve many relatively 
separate and distinct tasks and different agents will perform some better than others. 
Those best at negotiating when more than two parties are participating, might be below 
average in “staging” (decorating a home to sell well) or vice versa. The traditional rate 
structure, however, deters the emergence of specialized providers of these distinct 
services by requiring sellers to purchase the full bundle of services offered by traditional 
brokers. That is, sellers who feel compelled to use a traditional broker to avoid being 
shunned by other traditional agents will be forced to pay a full service fee. At that point, 
sellers will rarely find it advantageous to pay an additional fee to specialists unless 
the specialists charge less than the incremental value they add above and beyond what 
the traditional agent is already providing. This dramatically reduces the demand for 
individuals with expertise in only one task desired by a seller and who might well be 
able to provide a clearly superior level of service for that task at a lower, competitive 
price.
Many expected the Internet to drastically change the situation. By permitting home 
sellers to post a detailed description, including photos, of their home on a website easily 
available to home buyers, the Internet triggered predictions that the level of FSBOs 
would rise dramatically to as much as 0 percent of all homes sold. In an effort to 
offer brokers an option for earning income from FSBOs rather than losing their business 
altogether, one highly respected real estate educator/broker wrote a book proposing that 
real estate agents transition into consultants, offering à la carte services for reasonable 
fees,3 as discussed in detail in section VII, below.  By early 00, however, the NAR’s 
fear of a great rise of FSBOs appeared to disappear.  Recently, traditional brokers have 
sought to protect their business model by raising entry barriers through the adoption of 
the minimum service requirements discussed above. Those rules force brokers willing 
to place a listing in the MLS for a flat fee to either offer all of the required services – and 
raise their prices accordingly – or go out of business.
82 Gomez Research predicted that, aided by the Internet, over 40 percent of homes would be sold FSBO.  
See Gerri Willis, Minimizing the Stress of Selling Your Home, smArtmoney.com, Mar. 8, 200, http://
www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/20030318-smartmoney.html; GArton-GooD, supra 
note 9, at 7.  See also Lynnket Browning, The Sweet and the Sour of ‘For Sale by Owner, n.y. times, June 
6, 2004, §3 at 5 (in October 2003, the NAR predicted that 25 percent of home sales could soon be FSBOs); 
GArton-GooD, supra at xi (Gomez analyst estimates that the non-traditional segment of residential real 
estate brokerage could represent as much as 75 percent of total sales by 2005); John S. Baen & Randall 
S. Guttery, The Coming Downsizing of Real Estate: Implications of Technology,   J. reAl est. Portfolio 
mGmt.  (997).  But see infra note 184.  For actual figures and more predictions, see supra note .
8 GArton-GooD, supra note 9.  See also 200 NAR Report, supra note 5, at 9- (describing unbundled 
service offerings); Mollie Wasserman, Is the Commission System Unfair?, reAlty times, June 8, 2000.
8 The NAR now reports that FSBO rates recently peaked at 18 percent in 1997, before stabilizing at 13-14 
percent.  The all-time peak recorded by NAR was 20 percent in 987.  Press Release, Jan. 7, 2006, http://
www.realtor.org/PublicAffairsWeb.nsf/Pages/HmBuyerSellerSurvey06?OpenDocument. These statistics, 
however, do not appear to count a listing as a FSBO if the sellers uses a broker to place a listing in the local 
MLS.  For other estimates of current FSBO rates, see note  and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 8- and accompanying text.
86 See Roberts, Amerisell, supra note 50.  This may also greatly raise broker costs by exposing them to 
the high cost of litigation.  See ross, supra note 9, at 7.  See also Shelly Bucksot, Real Estate Rumble, 
June 2006 http://www.angieslist.com/AngiesList/membermenu/publication/Stories/2006/rumble.asp
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V. Uniformity of Rates Irrespective of Expertise of 
Provider or Difficulty of Specific Task
A. Generally and Application to Broker Fees
In most markets buyers have options ranging from higher-priced, higher quality 
to lower cost, lower quality. Prices also generally reflect the estimated difficulty of 
performing a task.  In some cases, however, retailers or service providers choose to set 
a single price for all options offered. The additional revenues from charging more for 
some options might be offset by the administrative costs of a more complicated pricing 
mechanism. Hence, many cafeteria-style food “bars” charge a single price per pound for 
all choices and low-priced hair cutters generally do not charge more for best workers or 
less to those, like the author, with few hairs to cut.7 Uniform prices may also emerge 
for services that are sufficiently routine that excellent quality can be provided with 
relatively little experience. This category may include the preparation of ) uncontested 
divorces for childless couples with no significant assets or ) federal income tax returns 
for single filers with solely payroll income, no dependents, and nothing else unusual.
Given the size of the fees paid to brokers, it would seem just as practical to price 
each broker’s services or the price of a project based on the brokers’ skill level and 
experience or the perceived difficulty of the task as it is for lawyers and accountants to 
do so. Rates appear to vary based on a task’s difficulty in Sweden, Finland, Ireland, 
Mexico, and Belarus, and for at least some brokers in the U.S.0 Although levels vary 
among regions and somewhat from cold to hot markets, “the shrewd, entrepreneurial, 
risk-taking broker willing to base commissions directly on his or her own estimate of 
the difficulty of selling a particular property appears to be absent from all geographic 
markets.”
87 Differentiated prices do arise in these settings when higher prices make them administratively practi-
cal to offer, as for seats to sporting events, Broadway shows, most concerts, and at high-priced hair salons, 
where the price may include the tip necessary to ensure access to the stylist one wants on one’s next visit.
88 See, e.g., Jim Gillespie, Are You Really a Top Agent, or Just a Commodity?, reAlty times, Apr. 5, 
2005.  But see supra note 57 (reporting that personal injury attorneys rarely vary their contingent fee based 
on risk levels).
89 See Delcoure & Miller, supra note 28, at 29.  See also Wachter, supra note 60, at 200 (finding consider-
able rate diversity among commercial real estate firms).
90 See Craig Venezia, Roll the Dice on Commissions – That’s No Hard 6, S.F. chron., May 6, 2007, at K7 
(reporting that the percentage rate Jimmy Wanninger, in Mill Valley, charges “depends upon how quickly 
he believes the house will sell”); 1972 Forbes Cover Story, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing, Andrew Barr’s 
sliding scale of two percent for easy, six percent for difficult); G. Christian Hill, As Home Prices Rise, More 
Sellers are Using Reduced Rate Agents, wAll st. J., June 26, 1979, at 1 (discussing Los Angeles agent 
Barney Feldman, who charged one percent for a listing if the home sold within one month, two percent if it 
sold within two months, and three percent if it sold in three or more months).
9 See GAO 2005 Rep., supra note 1, at 9-10; FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at  (“commission rates 
in all markets do tend to be roughly uniform from sale to sale.”). Some regions with lower-priced housing, 
like the South, have higher average commissions, e.g., 7 percent. See Baylis, supra note 5 (quoting Leonard 
V. Zumpano, director of the Alabama Real Estate Research and Education Center).  Also, when the defense 
industry contracted in Southern California and a recession hit the Northeast around 990, creating a severe 
buyer’s market, some sellers were offering real estate brokers commissions of eight to ten percent to suc-
cessfully sell their homes. See Motoko Rich, Nest Egg or One-Armed Bandit, Sept. 15, 2005, at F1.
92 FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 5
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Given the substantial incremental financial and other value that superior agents 
can provide, one would expect superior negotiators and those with exceptionally 
detailed knowledge about a community to charge two, three, or more times more than 
novices. Nevertheless, U.S. residential brokerage firms do not advertise different rates 
for different agents based on their expertise the way other professional firms do.3  This 
suggests that brokers are pricing their best agents too low or, more likely, their novice 
agents too high, to discourage price competition.
B. Harms
Uniform rates hinder buyers’ chances to secure superior or lower-price services by 
offering to pay more or less than the standard fee. The fee framework encourages the 
most capable agents to seek those clients desiring higher-priced properties, even where 
the clients have no need for the agents’ special skills.  After all, assisting a family seeking 
a multi-million dollar home, but requiring little assistance could pay an implicit fee of 
even $0,000 per hour. While there is normally nothing wrong with the highest bidder 
getting the services of the best agent, here a family willing to pay $00 per hour for an 
agent with special expertise about schools for children with special needs, may, if they 
are seeking a home priced at the median of the community, lose out to a buyer with no 
desire or intention to outbid them. A similar problem would arise if the legal fees for 
a divorce were based on the size of a couple’s joint estate rather than on the quantity or 
complexity of the legal services desired.
VI. Prohibition Against Rebates
Although policymakers try to prohibit rebates that represent hidden kickbacks, 
which disguise conflicts of interest, agreements not to offer discounts are ordinarily 
per se violations of antitrust law.7 Most of the state anti-rebate laws concerning broker 
9 See, e.g., supra note 9 and text accompanying n.2. This is not to deny that some new agents may 
charge less.  See, e.g., infra note 27 and accompanying text.
9 If the agent described in Hagerty, supra note 0, seeking half of the $620,000 commission for aiding 
the buyer in finding the $15.5 million property is successful and that broker spent only 30 hours helping the 
buyer choose the home (though no time for closing, etc.) (see GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 96; infra note 
26, the fee would represent more than $0,000 per hour).  See also Hagerty, supra note 5 (reporting that 
a discount broker in Lancaster, PA, ran an ad estimating that traditional agents might earn $1,000 an hour 
for selling a $00,000 home).
95 In fact, Norm Miller has found that most top agents work about 50-70 hours per week and tend to spe-
cialize in listings rather than selling. See Miller, supra note 25, at slide 8 and oral presentation.
96 Levmore, supra note 6, at 507 recognized that the traditional uniform commission rate hindered the 
ability of those with more difficult needs to secure the desired agent’s attention.
97 See Sherman Act, section .  Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 6 U.S. 6 (980) (per curium).
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fees appear to have been designed to prohibit socially harmful payments. Rebates 
by brokers, however, permit socially desirable price competition over broker fees.00 
Prohibiting them denies home buyers a chance to obtain a lower broker fee,0 merely to 
protect the revenues of traditional brokers, who support it.0
Firms that offer such rebates aid buyers who do not realize that they can obtain 
reduced fees from their “free” brokers. These firms include retailers like Costco, which 
secure “affiliate” discounts for their members, and “lead generation” entities, like 
LendingTree and HomeGain, which negotiate a “referral fee” of as much as  percent 
of the buyer agent’s broker’s fee and then seek to attract buyers by offering them a share 
of that referral fee as a rebate.03 An increasing number of brokers are also voluntarily 
offering rebates of a portion of the commission that listing brokers pay them, particularly 
when asked to match a competitor.
Meanwhile, a number of firms are offering substantially larger rebates based on 
business models that substantially reduce their costs of serving buyers.  Seattle-based 
Redfin, Chicago-based BuySide Realty, and Mid-Atlantic-based IHS Realty, all offer 
buyers rebates of about 7% or more of the commissions they receive from listing 
brokers, where not illegal, although all leave it to buyers to drive themselves around 
to identify the home they want to purchase.0 Buyer brokers who set flat fees or hourly 
rates agree to rebate any additional amount paid by the seller.
98 Three states expressly prohibit rebates. See AlA. coDe § 34-27-36(a)(12); kAn. stAt. Ann. § 58-
3062(a)(4)(Supp. 2002); miss. coDe Ann. § 7-5-2(j)(2000), Miss. Reg. 50.025.00 (IV)(A)(5), PHH 
Real Estate Services Corp. v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm’n, unpublished fed. Dist. Ct. (S.D. Miss. 
997).  Six or seven others base their prohibitions against rebates on laws prohibiting the sharing of real 
estate commissions with anyone but a licensed agent.  See AlAskA stAt. §08.88.401(d)(1)(Michie 2002); 
lA. rev. stAt. Ann. § 37:1446 (A) & (B)(West 2000); NJ stAt. rev. Ann. §45:15-17(k)(West 1995 & Supp. 
2003); n.D. cent. coDe § 43-23-11.1(l); ok. stAt. Ann. 59 § 858-312(21)(West Supp. 2004); or. rev. 
stAt. §696.290()(West 200).  Missouri bases it on a statute prohibiting inducements.  See mo. rev. stAt. 
339.100(13), 339.150(2).  Finally, Iowa prohibits rebates when the consumer uses two different brokers. 
See iowA coDe § 543B.60A(3)(b) (West Supp. 2003). (Amended 2005 by House File 882).  New Hampshire 
has declined to enforce n.h. rev. stAt Ann. §331-A:26(XXIV); .
99 See Mariwyn Evans, Consumer Rebates, reAltor mAGAzine, Jan. , 2006, http://www.realtor.org/rmo-
print.nsf/pages/lawjan06 (referencing Sandy Taraszki, executive director of the Worldwide Employee Re-
location Coalition).
200 See DOJ/FTC 2005 Workshop Transcript supra note 112, at 157-59 (Lending Tree attorney Philip 
Henderson).
20 As noted above, the DOJ, FTC, and editorial board of the Wall Street Journal are among the many who 
have expressed their strong opposition to such anti-competitive prohibitions.  See supra note 0. 
202 Although the NAR takes no official position on anti-rebate laws, the laws appear to result from NAR 
state affiliates, and the NAR’s general counsel published an April 22, 2005 memo that observes that even 
anti-competitive state laws are generally exempt from the federal antitrust laws.  See Blanche Evans, Steel 
Magnolia v. The Men in Black, reAlty times, Apr. 26, 2005.
20 LendingTree offers buyers gift cards from Home Depot or American Express of up to thousands of 
dollars, based on a home’s sale price.  See James R. Hagerty, It Pays to Negotiate Your Agent’s Com-
mission, reAlestAte JournAl.com, June 22, 200, http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbro-
kers/2000622-hagerty.html.  See also realestate.com.
20 See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, Real Estate Brokers Step Up Rebates, wAll st. J., Apr. 5, 2006, at D1; Jes-
sica Swesey, Internet Stock Brokerage Pioneers Enter Online Real Estate, inmAn news, Apr. 6,  2006; IHS, 
supra note 150. Redfin, however, offers to show buyer homes for an extra charge, see infra note 317; it also 
sets a minimum fee of $2,000.  http://www.redfin.com. ZipRealty, one of the first in this niche, in California, 
offers a 20 percent rebate of its share of any commission it receives while providing full service.  See, e.g., 
James R. Hagerty, Fat Rebates are the Key to this Agent’s Success, reAlestAteJournAl.com, July 2, 200, 
http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/200072-hagerty.html.
Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 5 40
VII.  A Fee-for-Service, à la Carte Rate Structure
Instead of the traditional rate structure, with its serious drawbacks and lack of 
economic justification, consumers would be substantially better off if residential brokers 
used fee structures similar to those used by professionals in other advisory/consulting 
service fields, such as law, and accounting.  Some brokers already bill for their services at 
hourly rates based on their expertise or at flat fees for a specific task or bundle of tasks.0 
In fact, unbundled services have been supported by commentators and offered by some 
brokers since at least as early as the 70s.0 Agents could also be offered bonuses in the 
form of a share of the incremental value they generated.
A good model for this approach was presented in 00 by highly respected educator/
broker Julie Garton-Good07 in Real Estate à la Carte: Selecting the Services You Need, Paying 
What They’re Worth.  That book offered brokers a strategy for responding to predictions 
that FSBOs could grow to as much as 0 percent of the market0 by offering services 
to FSBO sellers. And its relevance should grow as the Internet continues to spawn 
services likely to lead large numbers of home buyers and sellers to handle some of the 
tasks involved in home purchases and sales themselves and to seek corresponding fee 
205 See, e.g. IHS, supra note 150; Bailey, supra note 150 (discussing multiple firm); Eileen Tefft, LTD 
Real Estate, Custom Services, www.ltdre.com/SellerSystemCustom.aspx; Hazard, supra note 50 (Help-
U-Sell offers many options with a minimum of about $2500); Ryan & Associates Realty, Fees for Ser-
vices, http://www.sfproperties.net/ bin/web/real_estate/AR72746/ACTIVATE_FRAMES/ ABOUT/
San+Francisco/1158077484.html (Ryan); Jares, supra note 50 (Netoffer.com offers a la carte pricing start-
ing at $99 and negotiations for $150 per hour); Rawls, supra note 50 (Gallery of Homes charged $9 for 
contract negotiations, $149 for contract preparation, and $249 for attending the closing); Stephen J. Dubner 
& Steven D. Levitt, Endangered Species, N.Y. times, Mar. 5, 2006 §6 (Magazine), at 2 (Cary and Barbara 
Chubin charge $750 for an MLS listing, $50 per hour for showing the home, and $250 for negotiations and 
closing); www.RealEstateCafe.com ($100/hour for buyers).
206 See boris w. becker, economic AsPects of reAl estAte 106-07 (1972); 1972 Forbes Cover Story, 
supra note 17, at 36 (Jackson O. Wells, VP in the Beverly Hills office of Coldwell Banker advocated a 
fee for service model); Hill, supra note 190 (Hal Firestone, President of the non-traditional Home Sellers 
Center).  See also William C. Erxleben, In Search of Price and Service Competition in Residential Real 
Estate Brokerage: Breaking the Cartel, 56 wAsh. l. rev. 179, 208-11 (1980-81); Crockett, supra note 20, 
at 224; Braswell & Poe, supra note 2, at 27-29 (separate fees for separate services, commission only for 
finding a buyer); John E. Featherston, The Future – It’s Not Just a Job, It’s an Adventure, nAt’l relocAtion 
& reAl estAte, Mar./Apr. (#2), 997, at 80, 8 (quoting John Tuccillo, NAR’s chief economist, “the next 
major revolution in real estate will be the spread of fee-based services”); Arthur D. little, 2005 scenArio 
ProJect (1999) (for the Nat’l Assoc. of Realtors), Exec. Summary at 27-28; G. Donald Jud & Stephen Rou-
lac, The Future of the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry, 26 reAl estAte issues 22, 26-29 (2001); 
Maylone, supra note 62 (practices in early 1980s).  Some consider it inevitable that flat fees for itemized 
services will gradually replace the traditional bundling of all services in a package for a fee based on a 
percentage-of-sales-price commission.  See wilson, supra note 65, at 26, 210; Glen Justice, Lobbying to 
Sell Your House, N.Y. times, Jan. 12, 2006, at C1 (reporting that Dave Liniger, chairman and co-founder of 
Re/Max expects à la carte models to continue to rise as part of the evolution of the industry).
207 The NAR twice included Garton-Good on their annual list of twenty-five most influential people in the 
industry.  See Blanche Evans, Julie Garton-Good: A Profile of Personal Courage, reAlty times, April 20, 
2005.
208 See supra note 182.  Although the NAR states that it no longer expects growth in FSBOs, see supra note 
184, others disagree.  One real estate brokerage consulting firm has observed that FutureNet Realty Tech-
nologies has developed and will soon be marketing the first “listing to close” technology enabled process, 
and that Zillow.com may become a platform for FSBOs.  See Jeremy Conaway, A Fresh Approach for 2006, 
Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.reconis.com/recon/docs/A%20Fresh%20Approach%20for%202006%2012-09-
05.pdf at ; Walter S. Mossberg & Katherine Boehret, A New Web Site for Real-Estate Voyeurs, wAll st. 
J., Feb. 8, 2006, at D1.
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reductions.  In 00, six years after Garton-Good had formed the National Association of 
Real Estate Consultants (NAREC),0 the American Real Estate Broker Alliance (AREBA) 
was formed to promote flat-fee, limited service options.
A. For Sellers
Some agents justify their value to sellers by offering evidence that the seller can 
expect that the net sale price (after subtracting the broker fees) will be higher than 
the amount which the seller or any competitors would have obtained for the home.0 
Academic studies, however, have failed to find evidence of such net price increases. 
On the other hand, there is no question that good listing brokers can ) speed up the 
sale of a property (where desired), ) permit sellers to avoid much of the time and grunt 
work involved in the sale, and 3) minimize the stress to sellers.
Although the concept of “full service” is generally left conveniently vague by those 
who contend that their lower-priced competitors offer much less, it presumably 
includes all of the major tasks described in this section (VII.A) and in the many books 
on selling one’s home.3 On the other hand, it rarely includes the costs of extensive 
staging, (e.g., major renovations, landscaping) or extraordinary marketing efforts. 
Interestingly, one Dallas firm asks customers to specify which of  distinct services 
they desire and then places the “job” out for auction to the broker offering the lowest 
commission. Providing full service appears to require real estate agents to spend an 
average of about 0 hours per sale, although that figure can vary widely based on the 
state of the market and a client’s personality.
209 See Blanche Evans, Fee-for-Service Organization Gains Momentum, reAlty times, June 7, 200.
20 See ross, supra note 49, at 169-79, 194; 2005 NAR Survey, supra note 95, at 68 (noting that the me-
dian selling price of a home represented by a broker was $20,000 while it was only $98,000 for a home 
sold directly by an owner, and claiming that the broker added $8,200 in net value ($2,000 – (6 percent 
of $20,000)).
2 See Miller, supra note 25, at slide 2 (stating that there is no solid academic evidence showing that 
agents can secure higher prices than FSBOs, except on their own homes); Frew & Jud, supra note 89, at 85 
(finding that the use of a listing broker raised home prices by 2.2 to 3.1 percent although the commissions 
were 6 percent); Jud & Frew, supra note 89; Leonard V. Zumpano, et al, Buying a House and the Decision 
to Use a Real Estate Broker,  J. reAl est. fin. & econ. 169 (1996) (finding that the real estate broker has 
no appreciable, independent influence on selling price).
22 See Miller, supra note 25, at slide 9 and oral presentation. Vagueness may also allow brokers to omit 
important, expected services.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  See also infra note 67 and ac-
companying texts.
2 See, e.g., williAm effros, how to sell your home in 5 DAys (998); GArton-GooD, supra note 9; 
ilyce r. Glink, 50 simPle stePs you cAn tAke to sell your home fAster AnD for more money in Any 
mArket (200); irwin, supra note 114; PiPer nichole, the for sAle by owner hAnDbook (2005); tyson & 
brown, supra note 118; Jeff wuorio et Al, the comPlete iDiot’s GuiDe to sellinG your home (2005).
2 Extensive staging is discussed infra section VII.A.5. Extraordinary marketing could include extensive 
full motion video tours and color photo ads in local and regional publications. 
25 See Jares, supra note 50 (Dallas’s Realty Baron). Other sites also use auctions, see Glenn Roberts, Jr., 
Bidding for Real Estate Commissions, inmAn news, Mar. 14, 2005; Real Estate Commission-Bidding Site 
Now Targets Buyers, inmAn news, Oct. , 2006 (Commission-Bidding).
26 Julie Garton-Good’s 2000 survey of 00 experts estimated that it takes an average of about 8 hours to 
sell a home.  GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 96.  On the other hand, 982 and 2002 surveys by the Califor-
nia Assn. of Realtors (CAR) found that the time required to serve sellers has dropped from about 0 hours 
to about 20 hours.  See bArry, supra note 25, at 60-6. See also Ryan, supra note 205 (68-80 hours).  The 
CAR figure, however, is probably due, at least in part, to consumer use of the Internet, see supra note 5, 
and a very hot market.  See also Larry A. Whited, Close and Consolidate: The New Reality of Real Estate, 
inmAn news, Mar. , 2006 (0 hours).
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A sampling of non-traditional brokers finds that they offer “full service” at flat 
prices that vary from about $,00 to $,00.7 Yet if these figures reflect the fewer hours 
required for sales during the sellers’ market that persisted through mid-00, one would 
expect them to rise during a more balanced period or in a buyer’s market, where more 
time is required to sell a home. On the other hand, much of the extra time involved might 
simply be time spent waiting, during which agents could be handling other properties 
or working on other tasks.
In addition to the many sellers who will prefer full service, even FSBO sellers are 
likely to find it cost effective to use real estate professionals for at least some tasks 
involved in selling a home:
. Listing the home in the local MLS
. Making an offer to finishing closing
3. Setting both an optimal selling price and an optimal time to sell
. Advertising beyond the MLS, i.e., newspapers, online, alternative MLSs
. Staging a home: interior decorating, cleaning, repairs, etc.
. Visits by potential buyers, including open houses, and securing bona fide offers
7. Negotiations
. Other services
1. Only an MLS Listing
Because about  percent of home buyers work with an agent at some point during 
their search, and agents generally rely on the approximately ,000 local MLSs0 as their 
primary sources of available homes, listing a home in the relevant local MLS appears 
essential to obtaining the highest purchase price.  Even those home shoppers who do not 
use brokers are likely to consult the NAR’s realtor.com—with its two million listings 
—or at least one of the other websites that are populated from local MLSs, like those at 
WallStreetJournal.com or aol.com. Thus, placing a listing in the local MLS appears to 
be the à la carte offering most desired by sellers.
27 See Real Estate Company Refers Flat-Fee Listings to Realtor Network, inmAn news, Feb. 9, 2006; 
($2,500 by Progressive Homesellers, which refers sellers to agents at brokerages such as Coldwell Banker, 
Century 21, and Prudential); Caverly, supra note 68 (Assist-2-Sell charges $2,995); Elbert David, Flat-fee 
Brokers Compete for Sales, Des moines reGister, Apr. 2, 2005, at  (Equisave charges $295 and Next 
Generations charges $4490, although neither posts the listing in the MLS); Gomes, supra note 231 ($3500); 
Glenn Roberts, Jr., Home Sellers Test Alternative Realty Shops, inmAn news, Feb. 23, 2005 (SellSmart Real 
Estate, based in San Diego, offers listings as low as $2,950 plus $,000 for each $00,000 a home’s price 
exceeds $300,000); Rawls, supra note 150 ($2995); Hazard, supra note 50 (Help-U-Sell offers many 
options with a minimum of about $2950 (but excludes showing home).  One licensed agent in Northern 
Virginia with eighteen years of experience was offering “full service” for $1299 on craigslist.com in Febru-
ary 2006.
28 For a more comprehensive list of the services that may be offered by real estate agents, see The Critical 
Role of the Realtor in the Real Estate Transaction, http://www.orlrealtor.com/Files/PDF/Value_of_a_RE-
ALTOR.pdf.
29 The 2003 National Association of Realtors Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers, summary of buyers at 4.
220 See DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ .  These ,000 include all major metropolitan 
areas, except New York City.  Approximately 900 MLSs are affiliated with the NAR, and by 2003 more 
than 800 were posting on realtor.com. See GAO 2005 Rep., supra note 1, at 6; 2003 NAR Report, supra 
note 5, at 8.
22 See GAO 2005 Rep., supra note , at 8.
222 See Bernice Ross, Simple Strategies for Online Real Estate Exposure, inmAn news, Feb. 24, 2006.  Then 
again, some listings are not passed on the realtor.com et al, see supra note 5.
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Brokers in some localities offer to post an MLS listing for as little as $, although 
$00 appears to be more typical for this Listing Entry Only (LEO) service.3  Some believe 
that fixed-price access to MLSs is inevitable, and it certainly appears comparable to 
placing a “for sale” real estate ad in a local newspaper. The NAR and its supporters, 
however, are adamant in refusing to permit the MLS to be treated as a public utility, 
which would facilitate price competition.
As discussed in section III.C., above, listings in the MLS are generally much less 
valuable if they do not offer the buyer’s broker a commission at the “going rate.”  Still, 
where the local MLS passes all its listings on to realtor.com and other such websites, 
the listing can attract buyers without brokers. If MLSs continue to be operated to favor 
brokers over consumers,7 then a new entity, like Google, may displace the current, 
NAR-affiliates with a more inclusive MLS.
2. Closing – Handling Everything After a Buyer Has 
 Been Selected
One generally hires a listing broker primarily to find a buyer, but with so many 
tasks involved in completing a sale even after a seller accepts an offer, hiring a real 
estate professional (whether broker, lawyer, or other) is probably cost efficient.30 Assist-
-Sell franchisees typically offer to handle closing for about $,000 to $,00,3 Redfin 
charges $,000 and also places the listing in the local MLS, and others charge even less.3 
Garton-Good estimated a median time-frame of ten hours for the negotiating between 
a FSBO and a qualified buyer and monitoring the sale to a successful sale and, she 
suggests a fee of $0 per hour capped at $00.33
22 See supra note 50. The charge appears to vary based on what changes sellers can make to a listing, the 
fees that agents must pay to access the MLS, the costs of operating MLSs, and the volume of users in each 
particular market.
22 See, e.g., Braswell & Poe, supra note 121, at 328; Yavas & Colwell, supra note 8, at 27.
225 See Thomas M. Stevens, MLS: The Essential Difference, inmAn news, Sept. 5, 2006; Evans, supra notes 
169 & 171.  See also supra note 138; infra section VIII.D.
226 Some MLSs have refused to pass exclusive agency listings on to realtor.com et al. See supra note 5.
227 See infra section VIII.D. 
228 See infra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
229 See Robert J. Bruss, Fix-up Home Seller Shouldn’t Expect Top Dollar, inmAn news, Feb. 21, 2006 
(once you’ve found a buyer “you don’t need a professional agent.”); Gillespie, supra note .  But see 
ross, supra note 9, at 277, 29, 29 (“Any experienced agent knows that 80 to 90 percent of the work 
occurs in closing the transaction, especially in resolving appraisal problems, title problems, credit reports, 
inspections,…. [there is a] misconception that the agent earns their [sic.] money primarily for marketing 
the property . . .”).
20 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 91-93; ross, supra note 229.
2 See Andrew Gomes, Selling Your Home Sans the High Fees, honolulu ADvertiser, Oct. 9, 2005, at 
1 ($2495 for the paperwork only option).  On its website Iowa-based DealYourOwn.com indicates that it 
charges $,000 for negotiations and closings.  See How Much Does This Cost?, at http://www.dealyourown.
com/listproperty.asp.
22 See Darlin, supra note 8.  One Wisconsin real estate lawyer charges $600 for handling all of the legal 
issues involved for FSBO sellers, see Bailey, supra note 150; a Florida firm charges $249 to attend the clos-
ing, see  Rawls, supra note 150 (Gallery of Homes, Florida); a Texas agent charges $1995 for full closing 
services, see Presentation of Aaron Farmer, Texas Discount Realty, Oct. 15, 2005, at slide 3, http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/ rewcom/213243.htm; another broker is willing to handle closing for a one 
percent commission.  See Glenn Roberts, Jr., Consumers Unzip Variety of Real Estate Businesses, inmAn 
news, Feb. 22, 2005.
2 See Julie Garton-Good, Consult and Grow Rich: Why Be a Real Estate Consultant? 9 (200).  See also 
Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 5 44
3. Setting an Optimal Asking Price & When to Sell
To obtain the best price for their home, sellers usually need to set an appropriate 
initial asking price, although much depends on whether they are in a sellers’ or a 
buyers’ market.3  In a hot or sellers’ market—where sellers asking a reasonable price 
for a typical home expect to receive multiple offers on the first weekend a home is listed 
—there would seem to be little need to pay a broker to predict the highest attainable 
price for a property.3 Sellers could estimate their home’s market value aided by an 
automated comparative market analysis (CMA),3,37 or even CMAs from agents.3 
That price, or one a bit less, should attract all potential buyers and, if managed well, 
stimulate competitive bidding and lead to an excellent sale price.3
In a buyer’s market, setting an appropriate asking price is more difficult and 
important.0 A price too low will not necessarily be corrected by competitive bidding, 
and one too high has multiple drawbacks:  First, it is likely to increase the time it takes to 
sell the home Second, the longer the home remains unsold the more buyers are apt to 
Ryan, supra note 205 (estimating between  and 20 hours at $00 per hour).
2 A market is generally considered “balanced” if there are approximately equal numbers of buyers and 
sellers and the inventory of homes represents about six months of average monthly sales. If inventory is less 
than a six month supply of homes, it is considered a seller’s market; more than a six month supply is con-
sidered a buyer’s market.  Standards are not precise. Compare Survey: Home-Buyer Demand, Seller Supply 
Nearly Balanced, inmAn news, Apr. 6, 2006 to ross, supra note 9, at 26.
25 Even defenders of full service agents concede this. See Kelly Sweeney, Why Traditional Real Estate 
Brokerage is Alive and Well, inmAn news, Nov. 0, 2005.
26 See Marilyn Lewis, Putting Home-Value Tools to the Test, MSN Money, undated, http://moneycentral.
msn.com/content/Banking/Homefinancing/P150627.asp?GT1=8176; John M. Clapp, A Semiparametric 
Method for Valuing Residential Locations: Application to Automated Valuation, 27 J. reAl est. fin. & 
econ. 303 (2003) (discussing an economic model that predicts lot values based on longitude and latitude); 
Blanche Evans, Zillow Gets FTCillowed, reAlty times, Oct. 27, 2006.
27 After identifying a few of the best matches, a CMA then adjusts the value of each of the comparables 
by subtracting an estimated value for significant features it has that the home being priced lacks, and adding 
the estimated value of features that the latter includes, but the comparable lacks. See tyson & brown, supra 
note 8, at 69-77.  Each comparable will produce an estimate and the estimates are averaged.
28 Many agents offer estimates to FSBO sellers because the agents know that many of the sellers will 
eventually hire brokers.  See Robert J. Bruss, How to Correctly List Your Home for Sale, inmAn news, Mar. 
0, 2006.
29 See Darlin, supra note .  While some might consider it misleading to list a home at a price that is 
less than one would accept for it, the practice is not illegal and is widespread.  See Robert J. Bruss, Home 
Buyers Fall Victim to Listing Agent’s Dirty Trick, inmAn news, Aug. 10, 2005.  Lower initial prices, i.e., 
entry barriers, generally attract more buyers who then invest time and effort evaluating the property and the 
increased popularity competition that often stimulates buyers to make bids that exceed pre-set maximums. 
See, Gillian Ku et al, Starting Low but Ending High: A Reversal of the Anchoring Effect in Auctions, 90 J. 
PersonAlity & soc. Psychol. 975 (2006); Kimberly Blanton, Going Once . . . in Echo of ‘90s Bust, Auc-
tion Set for 34 Unsold Luxury Condos in Hub, bost. Globe, Sept. 6, 2006, at A. In fact a 2005 Wall St. 
J. Online/ Harris Poll found that almost twenty percent of home buyers exceeded their maximums.  See 
Wall St. J. Personal Finance column in mid-Sept. http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT= 
104&STORY=/www/story/09-16-2005/0004109184&EDATE=.
20 Then again, a small number of home sellers avoid the issue by selling their homes in an auction, see 
Glenn Roberts, Jr., Real Estate Industry Sets Sights on the Auction Block, inmAn news, Aug. 14, 2006; 
Kimberly Blanton, Sellers Literally Put Homes on the Block, bost. Globe, Mar. , 2006, at D, although 
the buyers willing to pay most for a home might not participate. 
2 See Paul M. Anglin et al, The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-
on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting,, 26 J. reAl est. fin. & econ. 95 (200). Starting with a price 
too high also appears to lead to a reduced final sales price. See John R. Knight, Listing Price, Time on 
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suspect that there is a serious defect.  Third, an excessive price may discourage some 
buyers from even visiting the home.3
Thus, it may be useful to employ an expert and more sophisticated CMA to set the 
price.  Still, sellers must be on guard against agents trying to “buy a listing,” by 
overestimating the home’s fair market value. Listings are valued by brokers because 
they permit open houses and visits, which can serve as bait for attracting potential home 
buyer clients.  Sellers should seek an expert who feels no pressure to give excessively 
high7 or conservative assessments. Garton-Good estimates that this might take an 
expert a few hours plus the time for a consultation, although that might be low.  Expert 
appraisals appear to be available for a fee on the order of $30.0  In volatile markets, 
sellers might also want an expert to reevaluate their asking price fairly frequently.
4. Advertising Beyond the MLS: Newspapers, Online, Etc.
In addition to the dominant, traditional MLS, there are many other websites that 
can be used to reach potential buyers, often free of charge, like Craigslist, Google, 
Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects of Listing Price Changes, 0 reAl est. econ. 2 
(2002).
22 Buyers tend to devalue “stale” listings.  See Curtis R. Taylor, Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality, 
66 rev. econ. stuD. 555 (999) (noting this effect when past prices are not observable, but that buyers’ 
suspicions can be allayed if they are aware of higher initial price); GArber, supra note 78, at 14.  Thus, once 
a listing is perceived as stale, it may be wise to delist it and relist it later as a “fresh” listing.  See irwin, 
supra note , at 7.
2 See John Knight et al, List Price Signaling and Buyer Behavior in the Housing Market, 9 J. reAl est. 
fin. & econ. 77 (99).
2 The process of estimating the value of the features that differ between the homes is probably as much 
art as science.  See Barry G. Gilbertson, Appraisal or Valuation: An Art or Science?, reAl est. issues, Fall 
2001, at 86; wilson, supra note 65, at 122-30; Bernice Ross, Real Estate Values Need Human Interpreta-
tion, inmAn news, Mar. 7, 2006.  See also G. Donald Jud and Dan T. Winkler, The Dynamics of Metropoli-
tan Housing Prices, 2 J. reAl est. res. 29 (2002) (predicting home price appreciation based on changes in 
population, real income, construction costs, stock market appreciation, and interest rates).
25 See wilson, supra note 65, at 126-28; FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 52 n..
26 See supra note 59.  Such agents might plan to advise a price reduction as soon as the seller became 
impatient, but until then the agent could meet buyers seeking homes in that price range and use it to prime 
other buyers before showing them better priced homes. See tyson & brown, supra note 8, at 92.  See 
also infra section V.A.7.
27 See Sarah Max, Appraisal Fraud: Your Home at Risk, CNN/Money, June 2, 2005 at http://money.
cnn.com/2005/05/23/real_estate/financing/appraisalfraud/index.htm (reporting that the Appraisal Institute 
recently told Congress that appraisers are under increasing pressure from mortgage bankers and agents to 
confirm sale prices so that deals can go through); Blanche Evans, October Research to Survey Appraisers 
About Pressured Home Values, reAlty times, Mar. , 2006.
28 Some criticize current appraisers for banks of giving low appraisals.  See Roy T. Black et al, Behavioral 
Research in Real Estate: A Search for the Boundaries, 6 J. reAl est. PrAc. & eDuc. 85, 88-90 (2003); su-
pra note 27.  But see Ray Wilson, Basic Advice to Sellers: Appraiser, Yes! CMA, No!, 2001 available at 
http://www.ired.com/buymyself/agency/cma-no.htm.
29 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 69-7, 29.
250 See irwin, supra note , at 6 (REPs with either an MAI or SREA designation).
25 This is one of the many valuable consulting services that has been offered by the RealEstateCafe.com. 
See also http://www.realnegotiate.com/PriceAnalysisService.htm.
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Trulia, and including those maintained especially for FSBO homes.3 Moreover, 
listings online, with their capacity to include photos and extensive lists of features, if 
not video tours, at relatively lower costs, are gradually displacing printed classified 
ads in the local newspaper.  In response, however, many local newspapers are storing 
their real estate ads in databases that permit readers to search them as if they were 
MLSs.  If local newspapers enhance those databases and listings, they could maintain 
quasi-MLSs, open to all sellers for a non-discriminatory fee and available for free, 
advertiser-supported searching by buyers. Alternatively, Craigslist, Google, Zillow, 
or offerings of the Open MLS Institute, or the like might well dominate this market 
niche,7 particularly if economies of scale favor a single, national database. The Orbitz 
airline website offers a variation on this model. Sellers might also want help monitoring 
any databases of bona fide buyers that arise.
Some sellers might want an agent conversant in the flirty and seductive terminology 
of real estate to prepare a verbal description of their homes,0 and most would likely 
want experts to take photographs and produce video tours, as well posting these, floor 
plans, and other relevant data on a website, although top quality outcomes might cost 
252 See Ross, supra note 155; James R. Hagery & Kevin J. Delaney, Google, Craigslist Expand into Real 
Estate, wAll st. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at D.  And some brokers are using them to help sellers. See Glenn Rob-
erts, Jr., Houston MLS Puts Real Estate Listings on Google Base, inmAn news, Dec. , 2006.  There are 
also tools for automatically feeding such sites.  See Glenn Roberts, Jr., Classified Listings Tool Pumps Real 
Estate Ads to Many Sites, inmAn news, Apr. 7, 2006; Roger Noujeim, Letter, inmAn news, Apr. 0, 2006. 
Also emerging are a new set of real estate-related blogs, such as Chicago’s yochicago.com.  See Glenn 
Roberts, Jr., Community Real Estate Sites Taking Off, inmAn news, Feb. 28, 2006.
25 These include nationwide websites, like owners.com and foresalebyowner.com, see Patton, supra note 
162; Sambrotto, supra note , at , and local websites, like fsbomadison.com and buyerowner.com, see-
Bailey, supra note 150; Rawls, supra note 50. 
25 See, Jessica Swesey, Print Struggles for Share in Online Real Estate, inmAn news, June 5, 2006; colby 
AtwooD et Al, 2006 uPDAte: online reAl estAte ADvertisinG (Borrell Associates, July 2006) at - (report-
ing that at the end of 2005, the Internet became the most-used method of selling a home and that Borrell 
predicts that Internet real estate advertising will surpass newspapers in terms of advertising market share 
by 2010). Then again, newspapers can enhance their classified ad listings by using easily searchable online 
databases and partnering with others.  See Jessica Swesey, Fragmented Ad Market Opens New Possibilities, 
inmAn news, June 6, 2006.
255 See Jessica Swesey, Next Generation of Real Estate Classifieds, inmAn news, June 7, 2006. The Tribune 
Company recently acquired forsalebyowner.com.  Cf. supra note 22.
256 Local brokers might threaten retaliation, but it is not clear that their clients would be willing to support 
any efforts they made to withhold real estate ads from the local newspaper.
257 See Hagerty & Delaney, supra note 252; Glenn Roberts, Jr., Move Inc. Leader Sees ‘Ferocious’ Battle 
for Real Estate Consumers, inmAn news, May 23, 2006; Glenn Roberts, Jr., Zillow’s Listings Offering Meets 
Metered Optimism, inmAn news, Dec. 7, 2006; Blanche Evans, RE/MAX’s Website Adds Another Giant to 
Lead Generation Resources, reAlty times, Apr. 12, 2006; Bob Tedeschi, Providing Free Real Estate List-
ings from a Broader Market, n.y. times, May 1, 2006, at C6 (discussing Move.com); Glenn Roberts, Jr., 
MLS Ballot Initiative is ‘Ill Conceived,’ Says Realtor Lawyer, inmAn news, Dec. 22, 2005; Glenn Roberts, 
Jr., Industry Think-Tank Deliberates MLS Future, inmAn news, May 4, 2006; Brendan King, What a Na-
tional Real Estate MLS Might Look Like, inmAn news, April 24, 2006; http://www.openmlsinstitute.org.
258 For one traditional-broker-centric view of this see Brendan King, What a National Real Estate MLS 
Might Look Like, inmAn news, Apr. 2, 2006.
259 Glenn Roberts, Jr., Sellers Do the Searching at BuyerHunt.com, inmAn news, Nov. 2, 2006.
260 Other sellers might handle this themselves.  See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 66-69, 74-75; Blanche 
Evans, Create an Incredible Feature Sheet for Your Listings, reAlty times, July 5, 2005.
26 See Vivian S. Toy, Making Every Pixel Count, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2007, §11 at 1; Matt Carter, Com-
Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 547
thousands of dollars. Agents might also consider research to see whether any previous 
owners of older homes or homes on the same street later became famous, giving the 
homes additional psychic value to some buyers. 
5. Staging a Home: Interior Decorating, Cleaning & Repairs
One doesn’t get a second chance to make a first impression, so it is important to 
prepare a home to highlight its strengths, including its superficial “curb appeal,” while 
not discouraging any suitable buyer. Suggestions are available free on television shows 
about staging, including A&E’s Sell This House and HGTV’s Designed to Sell,3 as well 
as books, magazines, web pages, and from visiting other homes. Still, some sellers 
might find it profitable to consult one of the half-million real estate professionals and 
interior decorators who have been trained in the concept of “staging.” This includes, 
at a minimum, the “3 Cs:” cleanliness, clutter reduction, and color, and may also involve 
landscaping, wall papering, and filling a home with rented furniture. Expert stagers 
charge fees of $30 to $0 per hour or more and require an average of about three hours;7 
although elaborate stagings can run far more. Sellers might even offer experts most of 
any price increase obtained after staging expenses paid by the expert.
6. Visits by Potential Buyers, Open Houses, and Other Contacts
Many experts believe that a seller’s presence at an open house may inhibit a buyer’s 
ability to fantasize about a home or ask important questions, and it can be dangerous 
for a seller to show a home alone to a stranger.70 Therefore, sellers might want to use 
panies, Agents Break into Real Estate Video, inmAn news, Apr. 25, 2007; Matt Carter, Video is King of 
User-Generated Content, inmAn news, Oct. 4, 2006; Glenn Roberts, Jr., Mapping at the Micro Level, inmAn 
news, Nov. 22, 2006.
262 For example, one expert warns that “prospective buyers will overlook many things, but a 
dirty house is not one of them.” See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 6.
26 See Teresa Wiltz, TV’s Hot Properties: Real Estate Reality Shows, wAsh. Post, Dec. 28, 2005, at C01; 
J.N. Sbranti, Creating Appeal: In Languid Market, Houses Must be Set Apart from the Rest, moDesto bee, 
Aug. , 2006, at D.
26 See, e.g., tyson & brown, supra note 118, at 150-55; ross, supra note 49, at 156-60; kiPlinGer stAff, 
supra note 66, at 288-94; GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 64-65; Vivian Marino, Sold at First Sights, N.Y. 
times, July 30, 2006, §11 at 1; Andrew LePage, Staging the Sale, sAcrAmento bee, Feb. 19, 2006, at D1.
265 See bArb schwArz, home stAGinG (2006).  West Coast realtor Barb Schwarz is credited with inventing 
staging in 972.  See http://www.stagedhomes.com/public/history.php; Julie Janovsky, Staging Smarts in a 
Competitive Market, newsDAy, May , 2006, at C2.  See also Marino, supra note 26.  Most professional 
providers are members of the International Association of Home Staging Professionals (www.iahsp.com) or 
the Interior Arrangement Design Association (www.interiorarrangement.org).  See Marino, supra.
266 See schwArz, supra note 265, at 16; Janovsky, supra note 265.  Efforts to seduce buyers can also include 
ensuring an attractive scent in the home, although this can backfire.  Even when sellers do not want to make 
major repairs, cost estimates can aid a buyer during negotiations in case a buyer overestimates the cost.  See 
Dian Hymer, What Work Should be Put into a House for Sale?, inmAn news, Mar. 6, 2006.
267 See Marino, supra note 26 (reporting that an average homeowner can expect to spend around $,500, 
that a base consultation offering suggestions runs $50 to $00, and that fees can be upward of $00,000).
268 For example, one decorating firm that offers to glamorize a development explains that “we write a 
script, just like for a movie” to give the home a personality, and its charges can approach 20-0 percent of 
the home’s selling price.  See GArber, supra note 78, at 21 & n.29, citing Ruth Simon, Hit the Prospect at 
Every Emotional Level, forbes, Jan. 9, 989, at 0.  See also Janis Mara, New Real Estate Staging Tactic: 
Happy Family, inmAn news, June 7, 2006.
269 See GArber, supra note 78, at 9-0.
270 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 82; Marlow Harris, End of 6%, 60 Digest, Sept. , 2006, http://
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Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 5 48
agents to handle this. Meanwhile, agents may well be willing to handle at least one 
open house at minimal charge, given that data indicate that open houses may be more 
effective for generating new buyer clients for brokers7 than purchasers of the home 
opened.7 In fact, the chance to gain new clients led one agent to accept a fee of only 
$ to sell one $.7 million home, and one expert suggested that listing brokers consider 
cutting their fee to the seller every time that marketing the seller’s home brings them a 
new buyer client.73  In buyer markets it may be desirable to employ agents to follow-up 
with all visitors who appeared to be interested7 and to handle all calls from buyers.7 
Traditionally, buyers working with agents rely on the latter to accompany them on visits 
to the home except for open houses. Buyers without their own brokers might want the 
seller’s broker to show them the home at no charge, but if the seller’s broker is asked to 
handle this traditional task of a buyer’s broker, the seller’s broker is apt to seek the full 
buyer broker co-op fee.7
7. Negotiations
Even sellers who are skilled negotiators may want an established agent or brokerage 
firm to aid in negotiations because of their special access to timely data, such as the 
most recent offers (accepted and rejected), the number of sellers preparing to place their 
homes on the market and the state of mind of current buyers and sellers. They may also 
be able to discover any relevant data about a buyer, such as time, financial, and other 
constraints and how much they love the home. In addition, buyers and agents aiding 
them are likely to view agents as more credible than an individual seller who will often 
soon exit the area.  Good agents will also know the local customs, twists, and intricacies 
of bidding, including the use of exploding bids in competitive bidding,77 and dividing 
closing costs.  In fact, a buyer uncertain between two homes may well favor the one 
associated with a more highly respected agent.  In other instances, a reputable local 
lawyer specializing in residential real estate transactions may be sufficient,7 particularly 
60digest.com/2006/09/0/end-of-6/.  Some brokers even suggest that showings be limited to buyers who 
have been pre-approved for a sufficient loan to purchase the home. See Blanche Evans, Should You Show 
Your Listing to Buyers Who Aren’t Preapproved?, ReAlty times, Sept. 29, 2005.
27 See Hagerty, supra note 9; supra note 59.
272 Data indicate that not even one percent of home owners found their home through an open house. See 
2005 NAR Survey, supra note 95, at 29. But see Ardell DellaLoggia, Should You Have an Open House, 
seAttle’s rAin city reAl estAte GuiDe, Apr. , 2006, at http://www.raincityguide.com/2006/0/0/should-
you-have-an-open-house/ (challenging this claim).  Also, 87 percent of buyers found open houses to be very 
or somewhat useful. Id. at .
27 See Hagerty, supra note 9 ($1 fee); DellaLoggia, supra note  (fee discounts rewards).
27 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 83.  Sellers might also want agents to confirm that buyers are quali-
fied to purchase the home.
275 Since it appears that many such calls fail to provide a call back number or any message at all, using an 
agent with 800 call capture technology may be wise. See ross, supra note 9, at 77-82, 80, 26 (stating that 
over 90 percent of leads are lost because the agent answering the phone does not obtain the caller’s phone 
number).
276 Where sellers place listings in MLSs that promise full co-op commissions to brokers who are the “pro-
curing cause” for finding the buyer, the listing broker is apt to claim that fee too if his or her agent shows 
the buyer the home. But see infra note 7, and accompanying text.  
277 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
278 Some commentator suggests that the real estate agents should unbundle their services into representa-
tion (negotiation) and the provision of information. See Thomas J. Miceli, Katherine A. Pancak & C.F. Sir-
mans, Restructuring Agency Relationships in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry: An Economic Analysis, 
20 J. reAl est. res.  (2000).
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since a broker’s interests may differ from those of the seller.7  When the seller is either 
a couple preparing to divorce or simply one with very different goals, employing an 
agent with some skill in therapy may pay large dividends.0
8. Other Services
A few other, less commonly available services might also be sought by home sellers. 
Those happy with their present location but simply desiring a somewhat different layout 
can already view the proliferation of “home makeover” television shows and related 
material as well as advice about which improvements are likely to be recouped when 
the home is sold. Still, hiring an expert—knowledgeable about local contractors and 
the likelihood of recovery of investments in different upgrades—to address one’s own 
personal issues most quickly and effectively is likely to be a good investment. Sellers 
may also want to consider leasing their home with an option to buy or turning it into 
a rental unit.3 An hourly fee or flat fee for such an assessment would appear most 
appropriate.
B. For Buyers
Real estate professionals may provide home shoppers with value in many ways. 
While academic research has found little evidence that buyers gain any benefit in terms 
of lower home prices by hiring “buyers’ agents,” good agents can provide tremendous 
value by speeding up the search, enabling buyers to focus their scarce free time on other 
projects (quantifiable as their opportunity cost), and helping the buyers to find a better 
fit for their needs and desires.
Buyers who desire full service—which appears to require about 0 hours, at least 
for buyers who do a lot of looking first on their own— may employ full service brokers, 
paid indirectly by the listing broker or seller.  Increasingly, however, as discussed in VI, 
above, buyers aided by the bargaining power of third parties, can get rebates from the 
commissions that listing brokers offer to buyer brokers. Home shoppers armed with 
knowledge of this practice can demand a discount, e.g., one percent rebate, directly 
279 See text following note , supra.
280 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 20-02.
28 See supra note 26.
282 See tyson & brown, supra note 118, at 155; GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 205-07; irwin, supra note 
114, at 18-21; Sal Alfano, 2004 Cost v. Value Report, Remodeling, Nov. , 200, http://www.remodeling.
hw.net/industry-news.asp?articleID=79166&sectionID=173 www.remodelingmagazine.com; Wells Fargo’s 
Home Improvement Calculator, available at http://www.wellsfargo.com/per/home_equity/tools/home_im-
prove.jhtml.
28 See irwin, supra note , at 9-.
28 See Zietz & Newsome, supra note 76, at 86 (segregated data based on the size of the home found that 
“a typical buyer of a small to mid-sized property that is not represented by a buyer’s agent is likely to pay 
about 2 percent more for a property”); Elder, et al, supra note 76, at 360-61 (finding no evidence that buyer 
agents are able to negotiate lower purchase prices, but finding that they appear to be more effective at reduc-
ing search time, although noting that their value may be less than their cost to the buyer, if the buyer must 
pay that cost); Roy T. Black & Hugh O. Nourse, The Effects of Different Brokerage Modes on Closing Costs 
and House Prices, 0 J. reAl est. res. 87 (1995) (finding no evidence that use of a broker with a fiduciary 
duty to the buyer reduces the buyer’s purchase price).
285 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 2- (69 hours) circa 2000.  On the other hand, 982 and 2002 
surveys by the California Assn. of Realtors found that the time required to serve buyers has dropped from 
about 0 hours to about 20 hours.  See bArry, supra note 25, at 60-6.
286 See infra note 0.
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from a buyer broker to match the “referral fee” the broker would otherwise pay.7A 
few brokers, like the Real Estate Cafe, will serve buyers for $00/hour or a flat fee plus 
$00/hour for time beyond a set amount. Bloodhound Realty in Arizona offers full 
service for a flat $,000, and others offer it for even less.
While many buyers may want to handle some of the tasks involved in buying 
a home themselves, most will want an expert’s help them with at least some of the 
following:0
. Handling closing—everything after the seller has agreed to sell to the buyer
. Formulating a search profile
3. Visiting Homes: what’s available, retrieving the most suitable, 
  modifying one’s criteria
. Negotiations
. Securing a mortgage & referrals for closing and other services
1. Drafting a Purchase Agreement and Handling 
 the Deal through Closing
Many buyers who feel competent to find a home on their own still desire the 
assistance of a real estate expert for handling the many tasks involved in closing the 
deal. Using an agent to draft and deliver a purchase agreement may be particularly 
important in a sellers’ market, when speed and credibility may be critical.3 One survey 
estimated that making an offer took about two hours and troubleshooting a purchase 
to closing requires about 0 more. As mentioned in VI, above, some firms are offering 
rebates of up to 7 percent of the commissions they receive from listing brokers for 
buyers who find a home themselves, and only want help with the rest.
2. Assistance Formulating a Search Profile
All home shoppers must use some criteria to narrow the set of available homes 
to those of most interest. Ideally they would construct a “search profile” that gave 
appropriate “weight” to each factor they most desired or abhorred and enabled them 
287 See Competitive-Bidding, supra note 25.
288 See RealEstateCafe.com.
289 See Greg Swann, Why a flat fee for buyer representation? Because the money is in the meter drop, Oct. 
7, 2006, http://www.bloodhoundrealty.com/BloodhoundBlog/?p=520.; Todd Tarson, I’m Offering a Flat 
Fee Service for Buyers, Nov. 17, 2006, http://mocoreal.blogspot.com/2006/11/im-offering-flat-fee-service-
for-buyers.html  ($,000).
290 For a more comprehensive list of services, see supra note 28.
29 Only about one-third of buyers say they first learned about the house they purchased from an agent.  See 
2005 NAR Survey, supra note 95, at 29.
292 Id. at 9 [2005 NAR Survey, supra note 95]  See supra section VII.A.2.
29 In fact, it appears that more than 70 percent of buyers want help presenting an offer.  See Bill Wendel 
survey.
29 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 8-. About two or three more hours may be required for handling 
an offer.  Id. at 134-38.  The 1983 FTC study found that agents spent an average of 1.75 hours closing the 
sale and 2.75 hours in post sale follow-up.  FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 27 n.2.  But see ross, 
supra note 229.
295 Redfin cut its costs by automating the paperwork of making a bid and then rebates to the buyer two-
thirds of the commission allocated to the buyer’s broker. See Damon Darlin, 2 Web Sites Push Further Into 
Services Real Estate Agents Offer, N.Y. times, Feb. 8, 2006, at C3.
“Using an agent to 
draft and deliver a 
purchase agreement 
may be particularly 
important in a 
sellers’ market, 
when speed and 
credibility may be 
critical.” 
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to rate each home, but that is rarely, if ever, practical. In fact, there are many home 
buyer books and most real estate broker websites offer checklists of features to consider, 
but there are good reasons why shoppers may want to pay experts to help them 
hone their search profiles. To begin, many buyers may find agents better than books 
or websites at helping them to compute how high a mortgage they will both qualify 
for and be comfortable with.7 Agents can also counsel buyers to give less weight to 
factors that former buyers came to realize that they had overrated when shopping, and 
which contributes to the common real estate industry credo “buyers are liars.” Their 
experience can also help them advise buyers about relative values and tradeoffs among 
features.
Furthermore, while it is not unreasonable to want to fall in love with a home and 
a lack of such feeling may be cause for concern,300 experienced agents can help buyers 
avoid purchases based on mere infatuation30 or other apparent errors. An experienced 
and perceptive observer of home shoppers, familiar with patterns of reactions and their 
likely causes may be able to clarify tastes over multiple visits.30 One survey suggests 
that this process may take about eight hours,303 and perceptive experts in this area 
might be worth $00 per hour or more for consultations. In the future, agents might 
well employ virtual reality software to enable potential buyers to view and consider 
dozens of different home styles, layouts, etc., quickly and easily under the direction of 
an experienced broker, so that the buyer might implicitly reveal preferences that they 
might not have been aware, but which an experienced agent suspects.  The process might 
resemble those now conducted by optometrists to identify the optimal dimensions of a 
patient’s lenses.
3. Identifying the Homes to Visit
While home shoppers are visiting more homes on their own,30 agents can often 
offer valuable assistance in at least two ways: ) sharing data about all available homes, 
including those not yet listed and ) having efficient tools for retrieving homes that best 
296 See Nadel, Selection Process, supra note 80, at 26-6.
297 See wilson, supra note 65, at 06-08.  An agent may be particularly helpful if they understand the im-
pact of the federal alternative minimum tax (AMT) on income and on the possibility that Congress will soon 
transform the current mortgage deduction to a more limited tax credit. See Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs 
the Mortgage Interest Deduction, N.Y. times, Mar. 5, 2006, §6 (Magazine) at 78.
298 See wilson, supra note 65, at 119; GArber, supra note 78, at 7-8; Swartz, supra note 53; Teri Karush 
Rogers, My Broker, My Therapist, N.Y. times, May 14, 2006, §11 at 1; Alison Rogers, Buyers are Liars, in-
mAn news, July 7, 2006; Letters, Buyers Aren’t Liars, They Just Don’t Know What They Want, inmAn news, 
July 0, 2006.
299 Buyer agents can use a buyer market analysis (BMA) to try to quantify the price of different attributes 
of a home.  See wilson, supra note 65, at 28-0.
00 See GArber, supra note 78, at 25-7.  One commentator observes that “[p]eople don’t buy logically. 
They buy emotionally.”  Tom Hopkins, How to Master the Art of Listing and Selling Real Estate 6 (1991), 
cited in wilson, supra note 65, at 2.
0 See GArber, supra note 78, at 26-27.
02 See wilson, supra note 65, at 0-2.
0 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 07-2.
0 In fact, a survey by Reconis found that home buyers generally begin their search with about  months 
of looking before contacting an agent. See John E. Ansbach, Jan. 26, 2006 powerpoint presentation at 2. 
www.reconis.com/recon/docs/Generations%20201%20Broker%20Training_Client%20Edition%201.26.0
6.pdf
Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 5 52
meet a buyer’s search profile. One survey estimated that buyers require about  hours 
of visiting before finding the one they will buy,30 but as just noted, many now handle 
much of this themselves and online.
a. Identifying the Full Domain of Available Homes
While home shoppers may be able to identify available homes by consulting the 
listings in local newspapers and on relevant websites,30 as well as material from new 
builders307 (whose homes represent about 0 percent of annual home sales), compiling 
an aggregated list like this may be quite time consuming. It may well become available in 
the near future,30 but until then, local agents may be worthwhile due to their presumed 
familiarity with all of the relevant forums. Even after aggregate lists are available, agents 
will still be valued for their early knowledge about homes about to be listed, particularly 
agents who monitor local news about divorces, retirements, and relocations, and are 
even willing to contact owners of homes that may be ideal for a buyer even though 
they are not for sale.30 Buyers might also specify their specific desires in a database of 
potential buyers, which sellers might use to search and contact them.30
b. Efficiently Identifying the Most Suitable Choices
Those new to an area are apt to desire information about neighborhoods—the 
quality of schools, crime rates, high home appreciation rates, etc. —before they consider 
individual homes.  While much data relevant to these matters is now available online,3 
a real estate professional can aggregate that data into a useable form,3 particularly 
less quantitative future trends, like changing demographics; plans for new retailers 
05 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 2-26. See also Patton, supra note 62, at R (reporting that, circa 
1999, agents typically spent 40 to 60 percent of their time finding homes for buyers to consider).
06 See supra notes 252 & 253, and accompanying text.
07 Some homebuilders list their new properties in the MLS databases; others rely primarily on ads in print 
publications and the Internet. The national website homebuilder.com includes many new home develop-
ments and local sites, like newhomesguide.com for the Washington, DC Metropolitan area, can also be 
important sources.
08 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text. They may even include listings of rental units since a 
rental might, surprisingly, make sense in many circumstances. See Motoko Rich & David Leonhardt, In the 
Long Run, Sleep at Home and Invest in the Stock Market, N.Y. times, Aug. 19, 2005, at A1; Motoko Rich, 
Betting on Rent Over Mortgages, N.Y. times, Feb. 19, 2004, at F1.  
09 See, e.g., Tom Kelly, Give Me Your House, I’ll Pay Top Dollar!, inmAn news, Nov. 1, 2006;  Swartz, su-
pra note 53; Brian Larson, An Alternative to Interbroker Compensation, inmAn news, Aug. 6, 2006 (agent 
in St. Paul, MN); Glenn Roberts, Jr., Real Estate for Sale—or Not, inmAn news, Aug. 8, 2006.
0 See Roberts, supra note 259.
 For example, www.greatschools.net provides information about schools, and local media may supple-
ment the statistics tabulated by national media.  See also Alain Pinel Offers School, Community Info with 
Real Estate Searches, inmAn news, May 22, 2006; 2005 Challenge Index, wAsh. Post, Dec. 2005, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/education/special/5/index.html. New websites are permitting 
browsing with a map as the MLS interface.  See Glenn Roberts, Jr., Real Estate Agent Puts MLS Listings 
on Google Earth, inmAn news, April 28, 2006 and providing user-friendly access to an integrated data set. 
See Sridnar Pappu, If Houses Could Talk, N.Y. times, (Key Magazine Fall 2006), Sept. 10, 2006, at 108 
(discussing propertyshark.com).
2 See, e.g., Max Kummerow & Joëlle Chan Lun, Information and Communication Technology in the 
Real Estate Industry: Productivity, Industry Structure and Market Efficiency, 29 telecomm. Pol’y 7, 
187 (2005).  Even after finding the best websites for data, it may take significant practice to search the sites 
effectively.  Moreover, agents may have tools unavailable to individuals.  See Matt Carter, Software Helps 
Convince Consumers They Can’t Do it All, inmAn news, Sept. 9, 2006.
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and roads; reasons to expect a school district to change (e.g., budget issues or a new 
superintendent), and traffic congestion.
Agents specializing in a few small communities may be especially valuable if they 
have compiled community data (from public sources, gossip, and all credible sources) 
into searchable databases.33 Although most agents duck questions about ethnicity and 
religious faiths,3 better informed ones can help buyers find the community that they 
seek.3 The most valuable agents may even know which streets include friendly police 
officers, potential babysitters, or pediatricians, or, on the other hand, convicted sex 
offenders or those known for the loud, wild parties. New mapping software is also 
likely to permit agents to allow buyers to set maximum distances from key locations, 
such as a train station or job site, possibly in both miles and driving time (during rush 
hour). Employing an agent with an exceptional database of this kind of data might well 
be worth even $00 plus per hour.
Buyers selecting homes to visit on their own and preferring not to pay for a broker 
until they have selected a home to bid on, may still need the assistance of brokers to 
unlock the door of a home and answer questions (risking lawsuits) at times other than 
an open house.3 If they call the listing broker for this service, that broker may claim the 
full buyer broker fee by claiming to be the “procuring cause” if the buyer actually buys 
the home.  Therefore, some non-traditional brokers have offered to host buyer visits for 
a flat fee or hourly rate.37
4. Negotiations
Buyers can generally gain the same benefits from agents as sellers may, as discussed 
in VII.A., above, particularly access to the most timely data and possibly discover any 
time, financial, and other constraints faced by the seller,3 as well as a true measure of 
how long a home has been on the market.3 An expert can also help one confirm that 
 See Swartz, supra note 5. This is beyond the current practice of brokers who now only aggregate 
data from different MLSs into a single, more easily searched internal database. See Sharon Simonson, 
Regional MLS Merger at Hand, Silicon Valley/San Jose Bus. J., Jan. 8, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/10771336/from/RL.4/.
 Because HUD has strict rules against steering buyers based on race or ethnicity, 24 C.F.R. §100.70(a), 
most agents try to avoid the risk of even false charges of discrimination by refusing to reveal even factual 
information about the racial or religious character of a neighborhood.
5 In fact, the Fair Housing Act regulations actually permit agents to accommodate client requests to 
view homes in locales of a specific ethnic group, see http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.
display&pagename= HUD_resources_buyers_agent (discussing a letter from HUD, Assist. Sec. for Fair 
Housing, Elizabeth Julian, to Jill Levine, Oct. 2, 1996), or with significant diversity.
6 See, e.g., Greg Swann, Remarks from Redfin.com Broker Glen Kelman, Sept. 4, 2006, http://www.
bloodhoundrealty.com/BloodhoundBlog/?p=285.
7 For example, Redfin offers to give buyers home tours as follows: the first tour of up to three hours is 
free.  Subsequent tours are $25 per home or $250 for a three-hour tour.  Three Ways to See a Property, 
http://www.redfin.com/stingray/do/home-tours?direct-section=buy&rt=dcbif2-thl#redfin.  Bloodhound Re-
alty offers to show buyers homes for $50 per home.  Swann, supra note 87, at comment .
8 But compare Robert J. Bruss, Reason for Selling is None of Buyer’s Business, inmAn news, Jan. 5, 2007 
to Letters to the Editor: Too Much Information Can Hurt Sellers, inmAn news, Jan. 5, 2007. Buyers can 
often easily discover what a seller paid for a home online. This data is increasingly available free from the 
state or local entities that maintain tax assessment records, deed registries, etc. see fhttp://sdatcert.resiusa.
org/rp_rewrite/, or entities, like zillow.com, that attempt to aggregate it.
9 MLS data can mislead. See Glenn Roberts, Jr., MLSs Attack For-Sale Home ‘Relisting’ Practices, inmAn 
news, Sept. 21, 2006; Kimberly Blanton, Home Won’t Sell? Some Cancel and Relist, bost. Globe, July 22, 
2005, at A.
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a low price is a bona fide bargain30 and that waiving an inspection to compete with 
another bidder3 is reasonable given a builder’s reputation or how much should be 
allocated to pay local contractors to make the repairs or upgrades a buyer requires. A 
broker’s reputation can give the buyer’s bid added credibility.  Negotiations for buyers 
appear to require about five to six hours, on average.3
5. Securing a Mortgage & Referrals for Closing 
 and Other Services
With the proliferation of new mortgage products,33 buyers may seek a real estate 
agent’s help identifying the best mortgage deal, as well as pre-approval (which permits 
a buyer to make a quick, solid bid3) particularly since the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act of 7 (RESPA §) forbids kickbacks to brokers making referrals.3 One 
study estimated eight hours for this task.3 Buyers often greatly value recommendations 
from agents about the best title insurers, attorneys, engineering and termite inspectors, 
etc., as well as about other local service providers.37 Instead of charging nothing for this 
advice, hoping to earn good will that might yield future business, brokers might charge 
for it or a bundle of related services.3
VIII. Why Has the Standard Rate Structure 
  (and Rate Levels) Remained Dominant?
If the à la carte rate structure discussed above is so beneficial to consumers, why 
isn’t it more popular?3 This is similar to the question underlying the 3 FTC Report: 
why isn’t there more price competition among local real estate brokers?  This section 
attempts to update and enhance the FTC Report, reviewing the many tactics that 
20 See Robert J. Bruss, Best Ways to Cash in on a Buyer’s Market, inmAn news, Oct. 6, 2006; Jayson Blair, 
Apartment Hunt Goes Virtual: Buying a Place Sight Unseen, Other Than Online, n.y. times, May , 2000, 
at B (“A computer can’t tell you that this is a . . . listing . . . that is going to last 20 minutes.”).
2 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 90-9.
22 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at -8 (8 hours) minus two hours for making an offer. See supra 
note 29.
2 See Allen J. fishbein & PAtrick wooDAll, exotic or toxic?: An exAminAtion of the non-trADitionAl 
mortGAGe mArket for consumers AnD lenDers (2006) http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_
Mortgage_Report0506.pdf.
2 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 2-.
25 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.; 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500 et seq.; But see Jack Guttentag, Why RESPA Has 
Failed to Prevent Real Estate Kickbacks, inmAn news, Feb. 13, 2006.
26 See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 2-2.  See also FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 27 n.2 (.5 
hours).
27 200 NAR Report, supra note 5, at 30; Heather Timmons, Shaking Up Real Estate, on Both Sides of the 
Ocean, N.Y. times, July 27, 200, § at  (the sales staff provides referrals to whatever clients need).  They 
may also advise buyers on home warranty plans, zoning issues, tax assessment issues, financing improve-
ments or refinancing a mortgage.  See GArton-GooD, supra note 9, at 99, 20-0, 207-.  One pair of 
brokers even attempts to act as matchmakers.  See Alison Gregor, The Perfect Match, N.Y. times, Jan. , 
2006, §, at .  Then again, much of this information is now available free of charge (advertiser supported) 
online. See http://www.angieslist.com/AngiesList.
28 See, e.g., Stefan Swanepoel, et al, Real Estate Confronts Bundled Services 2005, available at www.
realsure.com.
29 The market share of non-traditional brokers is only between about 0 and 7 percent. See supra note 
7.
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traditional real estate brokers have used to maintain their existing rate structure and 
price levels despite the emergence of new entities offering significantly lower-priced, 
non-traditionally structured, real estate services.
A. Brokers Recognize the Enormous Cost of a Price War 
 & the Power of the NAR
Three conditions indicate that the commissions traditional real estate brokers now 
charge often greatly exceed fees that they would charge if there was price competition 
in the market. First, many former employees of traditional brokers are now willing to 
provide full-service for flat fees of less than $,000.330 Second, traditional brokers are 
willing to provide full service for the sale of a $0,000 home for their half of a $,000 (six 
percent) fee, and the costs to agents of handling the sale of homes priced at multiples 
of that level appear be very similar although the commissions they now charge are 
multiples of that $,000.33 Third, brokers in other nations now charge much lower fees 
for providing similar services.33 The commissions paid on the purchase and sale of the 
highest-priced homes are particularly vulnerable. Vigorous price competition could 
very possibly reduce total revenues for brokers precipitously, by $30 billion or more 
annually.333 This gives traditional brokers a strong interest in resisting this result. As an 
agent for a large, national, traditional brokerage firm explained in a September 00 
email to a friend who had just listed her home with a flat rate broker:33
I love you guys but why would I want to sell your property? Most full-service 
agents in ___  County want to remain full-service agents and I am one of them. Why 
would any full-service agent want to help a flat rate broker? None of us do. We don’t 
want to become flat rate agents and if flat-rate agents become successful then we would 
all have to become flat-rate agents. They have a VERY small % of the business out there. 
We want to keep it that way. If I can avoid showing Help U Sell properties or Assist to 
Sell properties I also will not show them. When you list with a full-service agency then 
you have the co-operation of most of the agents in ___ County. A 3% commission with a 
bonus is not enough incentive to put a nail in the coffin of our industry. . .
With about .3 million members, 33 the NAR is the largest trade association in the 
nation.33 Its members’ presence in every voting district of every state legislature and 
large campaign contributions make it one of the most powerful lobbyists in the nation,337 
0 See supra note 27.
 See text accompanying notes 7-0 and 65-7 supra.
2 Residential agents in other developed nations like England, Ireland, Australia, etc., charge only two 
to three percent commissions.  See Miller, supra note 25, at slide 3; Delcoure & Miller, supra note 28, at 
6-7, 7.
 See supra note 28. Brokers recognize that lowering their fees would not likely increase demand for 
their services, but would primarily reduce their revenues, possibly a lot. See FTC 1983 Report, supra note 
, at 0.
 On file with the author.  See also Michael Crowley, Real Estate Ripoff, reADer’s DiGest, Feb. 2007 at 
_; Cohen, supra note 6 (discussing emails received by Della Neely).
5 See supra note 25.
6 See Glenn Roberts, Jr., A Leading Lobbyist for a Powerful Lobby, inmAn news, Nov. 2, 2004 (first in a 
five part series); Justice, supra note 205.
7 See Justice, supra note 205 (the association spends about $94 million annually); Center for Responsive 
Politics, Top Industries Giving to Congress 2006 Cycle, available at  http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/
mems.asp (finding that the real estate industry’s contributions of $19.9 million placed them third out of 50 
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and led one state official to note “virtually no proposed legislation relating to real estate 
has a chance of passage unless it is approved by the state association of realtors.”33 The 
NAR, which collects about $00 million annually in dues from agents,33 also benefits 
from the excess number of agents produced by the current fee structure.30
B. Historically Rates Were Fixed and then Recommended 
 Rates Prevailed
In 0, the NAR’s code of ethics stated that “‘every Realtor . . . should maintain the 
standard rates of commission adopted by the board and no business should be solicited 
at lower rates.’”3 Although, a 0 Supreme Court decision found the brokers guilty 
of price-fixing in violation of antitrust laws, this holding did not end such price fixing. 
Many brokers argued, rather, that the federal antitrust laws only applied to Washington, 
D.C. brokers in that case, and not to brokers in the states.3 It wasn’t until 7 that 
the NAR officially adopted a policy of “hands off” regarding commission rates.33 
Furthermore, the DOJ had to bring antitrust actions to end “suggested fee” schedules,3 
which, the FTC noted, continued to have a lingering effect.
C. State Real Estate Commissions Protect Traditional 
 Business Models
Most regulation of real estate brokerage is a result of state law and state real estate 
commissions created by state legislatures. Although the laws and commissions are 
presumed to be intended to protect consumers, a 00 Consumer Federation of America 
(CFA) survey of real estate regulatory agencies in 7 of the 0 states found that more 
than 70 percent of commissioners were real estate brokers or salespeople.3 Given the 
industries listed); FTC 1983 Report, supra note 14, at Vol. II, App. C, at 5-7; Virginia Gray, On the Political 
Power of the ® in Realtors ®: The Lobbying Resources of Full-Service Real Estate Brokers, in American 
Antitrust Institute Real Estate Project: Symposium on Competition in the Residential Real Estate Broker-
age Industry, Nov. 8, 2005; Roberts, supra note 336; David E. Rosenbaum, In a Test of Lobbying Muscle, 
Realtors Prevail, N.Y. times, July , 200, § at .
8 FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 98. 
9 See Woodall & Brobeck, supra note 109, at 9 & n.11.
0 See supra note, and accompanying text. 
 U.S. v. Nat’l Assn of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 488, 494-95 (1950).  Realtors justified this as 
necessary to protect the public against excessive rates. See US v. NAREB, 84 F.Supp. 802, 803 (D.D.C. 
99), rev’d, 9 U.S. 85 (950).
2 See Norman G. Miller & Peter J. Shedd, Do Antitrust Laws Apply to the Real Estate Brokerage Indus-
try?, 7 Amer. bus. L.J. 313 (1979).  It wasn’t until McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 
22 (980) that that issue was laid to rest.  See also becker, supra note 206, at 0-06 (discussing real estate 
broker textbooks).
 The NAR issued its “Fourteen Points” multiple listing policy statement. See FTC 1983 Report, supra 
note , at -5 n. 5.
 See FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 95-99 (offering a short history of fee schedules and listing DOJ 
cases).  See also Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1974); bArry, supra note 25, 
at 46-49; United States v. Foley 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding explicit price fixing).
5 See PAtrick wooDAll & stePhen brobeck, consumer feDerAtion of AmericA, stAte reAl estAte 
reGulAtion: inDustry DominAnce AnD its consumer costs   (2006) http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/
CFA_Real_Estate_Commissioner_Report.pdf.  This is similar to the environment the FTC found for state 
regulators in the funeral industry.  See Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260, 42289 (1982).  The 
Association of Real Estate License Law Officials (ARELLLO) responds that a majority of occupational 
licensing boards are generally from the industry, See ARELLO, supra note 2, although this does not 
dispute widespread “regulatory capture.”
Cornell Real Estate Review vol. 557
presence of real estate agents in every state legislative district and the availability of 
state affiliates of the NAR to manage industry lobbying and campaign contributions, it 
is not surprising that states have generally protected traditional brokers from entrants 
with new business models. Many state bodies enforce prohibitions against rebates to 
home buyers and many require sellers to purchase a minimum bundle of services that 
many sellers do not desire.3 The California Department of Real Estate tried to prohibit 
unlicensed firms from offering sellers the opportunity to describe, i.e., “list,” their 
homes on the firms’ websites.37  When an Internet-based firm attempted to introduce 
an efficiency-enhancing MLS-like database for New York City, New York State acted to 
revoke the firm’s real estate license.3 An Oklahoma State commission fined a broker 
for accurately warning home buyers that traditional agents, with a legal duty to serve 
sellers, cannot offer buyers the “full” representation provided by an agent hired solely 
to work for the buyer.3
D. MLS’s, Local Boards & Local Media Can Discipline 
 Non-Traditional Brokers
One way that traditional brokers have discouraged entry by brokers with business 
models that threatened to introduce price competition is to limit their ability to use 
the critically important MLSs.30 In fact, an explicit purpose of establishing MLSs in the 
0s was to “replace[] the old spirit of competition for one of cooperation...”3 Local 
real estate boards have not been hesitant to alter rules governing the use of the local 
MLS so as to frustrate those who ignore the “social norm” against price competition.3 
For example, as noted above, the MLS rules in Austin and other locales, denied brokers 
offering certain lower-priced, limited service options the chance to place their listings 
on realtor.com, although that should be ending.33  Also as noted, the NAR’s restrictions 
6 See supra sections IV.B. and VI.
7 The California state body contended that such a marketing service represented the practice of real 
estate brokerage, requiring state licensing. See ForSalebyOwner.com v. Zinnemann, 347 F.Supp.2d 868, 
87-72 (E.D. Cal. 200).  The judge, however, threw out the state’s case, after noting that the state permit-
ted “newspapers of general circulation” to post real estate ads online without a real estate license.  Id. at 
877-79.  A similar New Hampshire law is also being challenged.  See http://www.ij.org/first_amendment/
nh_free_speech/3_14_07pr.html.
8 See Lala Wang, How Can Internet and Other New Business Models Affect Competition?, presented at 
the AAI, Nov. 8, 2005, at 8-9, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/6h.pdf.  See also New York Real 
Estate Under Microscope, inmAn news, Oct. , 2005.
9 See Snider v. Oklahoma Real Estate Comm’n, 987 P.2d 20, 209 ¶7 (Sup. Ct. Okla 999).
50 See Braswell & Poe, supra note 2, at 07-.  The NAR has long taken a protectionist posi-
tion of its members’ interests.  See Elizabeth Lesly, The Stupidity of Free-Market Chic ... in Real 
Estate, wAsh. monthly, Nov. 990, at , and the NAR’s Internet use policies are only the latest 
efforts to deter price competition.  See DOJ 2005 Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 2.
5 See, e.g., FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at  (citing H. Nightingale, California Real Estate April 
92, at 2).  See also Id. at -6.
52 See, e.g., Lawrence Minard, Real Estate, forbes, Sept. , 978, at ,  [ck].  One article suggested 
that traditional agents may have adopted a “social norm” against price competition, see Hsieh & Moretti, 
supra note 26, at 1086 n.16, and it could be based on their need for long-term self preservation. As the FTC 
observed, “a stigma still seems to attach to competition in commission rates.”  FTC 1983 Report, supra note 
, at 5, 67 n.95, 20. Those who ignore this social norm are subject to different forms of retaliation, 
such as steering.  See FTC 1983 Report, supra note 14, at 160-62.  Brokers also handle MLS grievances 
themselves.  See Hagerty, supra note 7.
5 See supra note 5.  But see supra note 52 and accompanying text.  Tom Early, a long-time member 
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on the display of MLS listings online triggered a 00 DOJ antitrust lawsuit.3
Courts have found a number of MLS rules to be anticompetitive constraints.3 For 
example, when the Austin Board of Realtors® amended its MLS rules in 000 to frustrate 
eRealty’s efforts to use the Internet to provide its clients with more efficient access to 
relevant listings, a court granted a preliminary injunction against the rule.3  In addition, 
the FTC acted to prevent that same board from a different form of discrimination in 
00.37 Still, by requiring listings to include the fee offered to the buyer’s broker, the 
MLS facilitates the practices discussed in III.C. where agents working with buyers may 
intentionally fail to inform a client of an attractive offering, because other listings will 
yield the agent a much higher commission. Of course, the power of traditional brokers 
to use the MLS to discriminate against non-traditional firms will disappear if Google or 
others offer an MLS-like online, easily-searchable database that displaces current MLSs 
or MLSs change to compete with Google et al.3  Finally, some traditional realtors appear 
to pressure local advertising media to restrict access by non-traditional brokers.3  
E. Consumers are Ignorant of the Many Options 
 That They Could Reasonably Demand
Around 0, undoubtedly due to the long history of fixed rates in the industry (as 
just discussed in section B, above), about half of all sellers believed that commission 
rates were fixed and non-negotiable and that the fixing was done either by law or by 
“the Board of Realtors.”30 And the  Kiplinger’s “Guide to Buying & Selling a Home” 
stated that commissions run typically at  to 7 percent and that “[a]s a practical matter, 
you won’t get very far negotiating a lower rate unless you have special circumstances 
that make your property more economical to sell than others.”3 Some brokers and 
industry commentators continue to recommend that sellers not try to negotiate a listing 
broker’s commission before signing a contract, and this aids others who will not reduce 
of the NAR, states that he faced such discrimination by his Ohio real estate board when he chose to become 
an exclusive buyer’s agent. Comment at AAI workshop, Nov. 8, 2005.
5 See supra note 6, at accompanying text.
55 Courts have recognized that MLS rules may not impose unnecessary anticompetitive constraints on 
competition, such as excessive fees on users or rules that distort competition between the NAR and enti-
ties that compete with it. See, e.g., Reifert v. So. Cental Wisconsin MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 323 (7th Cir. 
2006) (Wood, concurring); Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, 934 F.2d 1566, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991); Pope v. 
Mississippi Real Estate Comm’n, 872 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1989); Wells Real Estate, Inc., v. Greater Lowell 
Bd. Of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 815 (1st Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988); United States v. Re-
alty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1368 (5th Cir. 1980); Buyer’s Corner Realty v. No. Kentucky Ass’n of 
Realtors, et al, 410 F.Supp.2d 574 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Venture Resources Group, Inc. v. Greater New Jersey 
Regional Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cases ¶ 71,397, 1995 WL 866841, at *2-4 (D.N.J. 
1995) and cases cited therein; O’Riordan v. Long Island Bd. Of Realtors, 707 F. Supp. 111, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 
988). See generally, Robert D. Butters, Let Brokers Put Their Data Wherever They See Fit, inmAn news, 
May 26, 2006.
56 See Austin Board of Realtors v. E-Realty, Inc., 2000 WL 34239114 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000).
57 See supra note 52, and accompanying text.
58 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
59 See Woodall & Brobeck, supra note 09, at .
60 FTC 1983 Report, supra note 14, at 66-69. Furthermore, 85 percent of the sellers were quoted a com-
mission rate of either 6 or 7 percent by the broker they used and ultimately, 78 percent paid either 6 or 7 per-
cent. Id. at 45-53.  The FTC’s survey found that only 35 percent of sellers were aware of discount brokers, 
only 2 percent contacted them, and only 2.6 percent listed their homes with one. Id. at 5.
6 See kiPlinGer stAff, supra note 66, at 6.
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their fee below six percent unless the client asks.3
Against this background and recognizing how infrequently most people buy or 
sell homes, it is not surprising that many may be unaware of the availability of lower-
priced, non-traditional brokers.33 Still, increased marketing by Internet-based realty 
firms and articles in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and other major media, have 
raised public awareness that lower prices are available.3 Yet, traditional brokers have 
responded effectively, as discussed next.
F. Traditional Brokers Have Successfully Portrayed 
 Discount Brokers as Inferior
To defend themselves against lower priced new entrants, traditional brokers have 
heralded the old adage: “you get what you pay for.”3 They imply that brokers with 
lower prices must be skimping on quality and/or services3 compared to the “full 
service” offered by traditional brokers, although conveniently they fail to define full 
service.37 Although there is a simple refutation to this insinuation, few buyers or sellers 
hear it, because there is no entity with the funding and mandate to effectively counter 
the NAR’s marketing.  If there was, it could point out that if a listing broker who charges 
$,000 on a $300,000 home can afford to provide full service, then a broker charging only 
a . percent commission on a $ million home ($,000) can too. Yet when media firms 
criticize protectionist tactics of traditional brokers or praise new firms, vocal brokers 
62 See Robert J. Bruss, Don’t Negotiate Listing Agent’s Commission Up Front, inmAn news, May 24, 2006; 
Aleksandra Todorova, More Real Estate Brokers are Reducing their 6% Fees, smArtmoney.com, Apr. 2, 
2007 (quoting realtors Diane Saatchi and Susan Moock) 
6 See Bruce Owen, Kickbacks, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 stAn. 
l. rev. 9, 95 (977).
6 See Glenn Roberts, Jr. & Janis Mara, Hot Market Fuels Fire for Lower Commissions, inmAn news, 
Apr. 2, 2005 (observing that “consumers are increasingly aware that fees paid for real estate agents are 
negotiable. ‘We (in the industry) all knew they were, but the public didn’t know they were.’” (quoting 
owner-broker Matt Williams)).
65 See Kelly A. Spors, What You Need to Know About Commission Rates, wAll st. J. online, Sept. 20, 
200 (quoting Steve Cook, a spokesperson for the NAR: “Most people want a full-service agency to help 
them.  In the end, you get what you pay for.”); Gomes, supra note 2 (reporting a Coldwell Banker ad 
stating “’What’s that saying – you get what you pay for?”); Donald Bruce & Rudy Santore, On Optimal 
Real Estate Commissions, 5 J. housinG econ. 56, 6 (2006) (“a home seller does not necessarily prefer 
a lower rate to a higher one since agents exert less effort at lower rates”); Hill, supra note 90 (quoting NAR 
General Counsel, William North, that “you get what you pay for”).
66 Irwin warns to beware of agents who offer to accept a lower commission; they may fail to disclose that 
they expect to do less work, e.g., merely list the property in the MLS.  irwin, supra note 114, at 52. The FTC 
circa 980 survey found that 22 percent of sellers rejected non-traditional agents because they provided less 
service, although most of them offered “full service.”  FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 5, 6.  See 
also FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at -2, 2 (disparagement of non-traditional brokers is neither 
new nor ineffective); Glenn Roberts, Lawsuit Alleges Real Estate Commission-Fixing in Illinois, inmAn 
news, Dec. 20, 2006 (claiming  disparagement ). The FTC’s survey found that 83 percent of non-traditional 
brokers indicated that they had experienced lost or cancelled listings due to disparagement.  Id. at 59.  Ar-
ticle 5 [then Article 2] of the Realtors’ Code of Ethics discourages such actions against other realtors, but 
apparently not against non-traditional agents.  Id. at .
67 See Miller, supra note 25, at slide 9 and oral presentation. The main response to the observation that 
residential real estate agents in other developed nations like England, Ireland, Australia, etc., charge only 
two to three percent commissions is that brokers in these countries do not offer full service. Miller’s re-
search, however, finds that the only significant difference between the services provided and costs incurred 
is that agents in the U.S. generally find it necessary to protect themselves against lawsuits by buying liability 
insurance. Id. at slide  and oral presentation.
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accuse the media of being misinformed and biased.3 Meanwhile, it appears that other 
businesses, like Cox Cable’s -hour property listings channel, discriminate against 
non-traditional brokers due to ignorance, if not pressure for traditional brokers.3
Yet because the purchase or sale of a home is such a major transaction to most home 
buyers’ and sellers’, merely planting seeds of doubt about the quality of non-traditional 
brokers is often enough for traditional firms to scare buyers and sellers from using 
such new entrants and sticking with traditional brokers. This has led some to strongly 
recommend that policymakers act to permit national banks, with their trustworthy 
reputations, to enter the real estate brokerage market in the hopes that they will embrace 
disruptive, non-traditional, lower-priced business models.370 Other trusted national 
brands that might fill this niche, include Yahoo, Google, or other firms with a reputation 
for low prices, but quality goods, like Costco and Walmart.37
G. Social Norms and Large Gains Discourage Consumer 
 Haggling Over Broker Rates
Many consumers are also uncomfortable attempting to negotiate a fee lower than 
the standard commission advertised by a broker, particularly when they work with 
agents who are friends, or at least acquaintances.37 Consumers understand that in some 
markets haggling or negotiating is the norm: the purchase of a car, particularly a used 
car, a home, and the salary at a new job.373 In other markets, including those providing 
accounting and legal services, and real estate services, however, the reigning social 
norm is for consumers to rely on competition to force sellers to voluntarily offer lower, 
competitive rates. Many consumers feel that negotiating for a lower fee with an agent 
or broker may be insulting to the agent and make themselves appear cheap.37 This is 
particularly true because the broker’s fee is so small compared to the price of a home 
and many sellers are able to secure sale prices much greater than they had ever hoped 
for. Many feel so fortunate that they are willing to share their new found wealth with 
those who help them to collect it.37  Then again, many consumers who do request lower 
68 See Blanche Evans, Are Banks, Newspapers Behind Recent Real Estate Industry Rants?, reAlty times, 
June 21, 2006; Blanche Evans, Rotten Media Spin on Realtors Begins Anew, reAlty times, Sept. 12, 2005; 
Blanche Evans, Vitriolic Washington Post Attack Confirms Conspiracy of Disinformation, reAlty times, 
May 9, 2005.
69 See Richard Mize, A-La-Carte Brokerages Locked Out of Cable Advertising Venue, newsok.com, Oct. 
, 2006, http://www.newsok.com/article/29557/ (discussing Cox Communications’s GoScout venture).
70 See Hahn et al, supra note 16, at 110-11; White, supra note 29, at 28-29; Comments of Robert Litan, 
AAI presentation, Washington, DC, Nov. 8, 2005.  See also Harrison K. Bishop, Note, Expanded Powers 
Under Glba: The Great Turf War of the New Millennium: Can Banks Engage in Real Estate Brokerage and 
Management Activities?, 6 N.C. bAnkinG inst. 391, 397-401 (2002); Barta, supra note 9; Sichelman, supra 
note 9.
7 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
72 See Consumer Rep. supra note 7, at 6-62 (noting that more than one third of survey respondents 
chose their agent because he or she was a relative, friend, or neighbor and quoting the president of the NAR 
as telling his agents to “get incensed [if someone asks to cut the commission]. Our rule is that we don’t.  You 
wouldn’t do that to your doctor or lawyer, would you?”).
7 Vendors in some open air markets are actually insulted if consumers do not attempt to bargain with 
them over prices.  See Eric Schmitt, A Man Does Not Ask a Man About His Wife, N.Y. times, Jan. 8, 2006, 
§  at 7. 
7 See ross, supra note 9, at 90 (encouraging agents to make it “look tawdry to ask for a discount”).
75 The situation appears to resemble that of wealthy patrons who are happy to leave large tips. See supra 
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rates are successful,37 and increasing numbers appear to be seeking reductions.377
H. The General Need for Two Agents to Make a Deal 
 Empowers Traditional Brokers to Hinder New Entrants
In addition to motive, as discussed in VIII.A., traditional agents also have opportunity. 
One reason why it is so easy for traditional brokers to deter new entrants and price 
competition is that most real estate sales require agents to rely on other agents – what 
the FTC’s 3 Report recognized as “interdependence.”37 In fact, the FTC hypothesized 
that the ability of brokers to steer their customers to homes associated with agents 
charging the going commission rate and split “is the most important factor explaining 
the general uniformity of commission rates in most local markets.”37 And an agent 
generally needs other agents to cooperate with them in many ways, including timely 
responses to questions and requests for material, quick access to new listings or prices, 
and credibility concerning promises like “I’ll be there in  minutes” or “The repair will 
be done by Monday.”  In addition, agents aiding buyers also want a reasonable fee for 
their services; and sellers’ brokers need agents to inform buyers about their homes.
Traditional agents have also had little reason to worry that their actions to frustrate 
non-traditional entrants would cause them harm. As the Wall Street Journal recognized, 
sanctions for breach of ethics due to such practices have been non-existent.30 As for 
prosecutions under the antitrust laws, absent concerted activity, courts have tolerated 
unilateral refusals to deal because such actions by those lacking monopoly power are not 
recognized as violating the antitrust laws.3 And the biggest problem with prosecutions 
is that improper agent practices may be passive, subtle, and difficult to prove.3  It can 
be difficult to prove that an agent intentionally failed to make or return a call until it 
was too late33 over the defense that it was merely an unintended consequence of giving 
higher priority to other actions. Moreover, agents can frequently defend their neglect 
of one potential deal by contending that they did not view it as attractive as it might 
appear, for the reasons discussed above.3
note 6.
76 See wilson, supra note 65, at 99-100; Consumer Rep., supra note 7, at 6 (about half the respondents 
in a 990 Consumer Reports who made an effort to negotiate a lower price were successful).
77 See Inman Commissions 2006, supra note 5, at 6, 45-46. Yet, this may be due to higher prices. See 
supra note 7.
78 The FTC’s 1983 report recognized that the tremendous interdependence among agents facilitated efforts 
to discourage price competition.  FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 2, , 2-2.
79 FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 2, 55.
80 See supra note 2.
8 See supra note 2.
82 See Wachter, supra note 60, at 95 (“Passive non-cooperation and disparagement may take subtle forms 
that either are difficult to police or are perfectly legal.”). For example, one would generally expect agents to 
return the calls and fulfill the requests of “friends” and favored colleagues before others.
8 Id. at 195, 204 (“The full rate firm may claim ‘difficulty’ in getting in touch with or arranging to view 
the discount broker’s listings. . . . Full rate brokers may procrastinate in returning phone calls from discount 
brokers or in informing their listing customer of a potential buyer who is represented by a discount broker.”). 
But see Roberts, supra note 66 (lawsuits charges broker with refusing to present offers to the seller).
8 See supra notes 8-9, and accompanying text.
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IX.  Four Questions that Should Stimulate 
  Price Competition 
The obstacles discussed in section VIII (inhibiting the availability of non-traditional 
pricing structures) could be overcome, for the most part, if home buyers and sellers 
demand answers from agents to four simple questions before hiring them.3 Before 
reviewing these questions, it is important to consider how to ensure that consumers 
receive suitable responses. Even if the political clout of traditional brokers could be 
overcome to mandate additional, legally-required disclosures, they would probably be 
ineffective. Brokers would likely simply add a few more clauses to the long, legalistic 
disclosure statements that already overwhelm the consumers asked to sign them.  A 
better option would be a combination of efforts by consumer advocates, including 
Consumer Reports, media consumer reporters, and enlightened government agencies, like 
the DOJ and FTC, to use a few, short, sound-bite sized messages to prompt consumers 
to ask the questions themselves. Home buyers and sellers should be willing to devote a 
few minutes to credible recommendation for how they could possibly save thousands of 
dollars when that information was provided by a credible source.3 It would also help 
if state departments of consumer protection and attorneys general made a greater effort 
to investigate and prosecute cases where agents working with buyers clearly violated 
their fiduciary duties to clients.37
A. Buyers Should Ask: Might You Fail to Show Me a Home 
 Ideal for Me Due to the Seller’s Choice of Broker or 
 the Fee Offered to You?
Although, most buyers relying on traditional agents assume that their agent is 
scouring the entire market and showing them all homes that meet their search criteria, 
regardless of what fee is offered to the broker or which broker a seller is using, as 
discussed in section III.C., above, many buyer brokers fail to show the buyer some 
homes they would want to see due to the latter considerations. Such buyers deserve 
to learn this before hiring the broker so they can seek truly “full service” from a broker 
loyal to them, possibly an exclusive buyer’s broker.
If most buyers became aware of such current broker practices, traditional agents 
might feel compelled to alter their policies and routinely inform buyers of all relevant 
options, i.e., provide full service. This would make it easier for non-traditional brokers 
with different rate structures to represent sellers more successfully and make them more 
attractive to sellers. Alternatively, if buyer brokers explicitly lied to buyers about their 
practices, it should make it that much easier for state consumer protection officials to 
85 See Braswell & Poe, supra note 121, at 293-94; Swann, supra note 87. Correcting home sellers’ and 
buyers’ misconception after they have contracted with or shared confidential information with their agent 
is too late.  See Thomas A. Early, Competition Policy and the Real Estate Industry, presented at DOJ/FTC 
workshop, Oct. 25, 2005, at 2-, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/272.pdf.
86 As the NAR recognizes, consumer demand will be the key driver of reform. See NAR Catalyst, supra 
note 9, at .  If there were still “home economics” courses in secondary schools they could review the eco-
nomics of buying a home.  In their absence, however, consumer groups, including the nationwide network 
of government-supported housing counseling agencies, should help those writing math textbooks and math 
curricula to include information about home purchases and sales so that high school graduates will have a 
better appreciation for the economics of different real estate broker rate structures, including highlighting 
the four pieces of information mentioned here.
87 See supra note 2.
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prosecute them for clear violations of their fiduciary duty. It would also be likely to 
dramatically increase buyer demand for the independently operated MLSs – directly 
assessable by buyers – discussed above.3
B. Buyers Should Ask: What Dollar Amount Do You Expect 
 to be Paid for Helping Me Buy and Close on a Home 
 and for How Many Hours of Work?
As observed above, many home buyers believe that the agents working with them 
cost them nothing.3 Accordingly, they have no reason to consider hiring a broker 
willing to charge them a flat fee or an hourly rate that would often be less than what 
a traditional broker would cost. To enable such non-traditional brokers to compete 
effectively, buyers should ask the dollar amount their broker is likely to receive and an 
estimate of the total hours of service they are likely to require (on average given market 
conditions).30 This data should encourage buyers preferring to handle some of the tasks 
themselves to discuss a lower fee or an hourly rate with brokers.3
C. Sellers Should Ask: Can I Direct Some or All of the Fee 
 Offered to a Buyer’s Agent to the Buyer, Instead, if the   
 Buyer Has Made Alternative Arrangements?
As discussed in section III.C., above, even many lower-priced discount brokers 
tell sellers that they must offer co-op fees at the prevailing rate, typically three percent 
if they want to attract buyer brokers.3 Yet about 0 percent of the time,33 buyers may 
choose to act without a broker and demand a three percent price discount to reflect 
the avoided cost of a buyer’s broker. Other buyers may insist on discounts where their 
brokers are willing to charge less than the co-op fee offered by the listing, but their states 
ban rebates.3 Meanwhile, where listing brokers have indicated that they will pay lower 
commissions or none at all to some brokers,3 buyers represented by such brokers may 
demand a price reduction to permit them to also finance the full fee they agree to pay 
their broker themselves.
Unless the listing contract gives the seller such options, the listing broker might 
refuse to reduce the typical, e.g., six percent, commission in these cases or only agree 
to pass on a portion of the costs avoided to the seller. To be fair to listing brokers, the 
listing agreement should provide such brokers with a reasonable additional amount if 
the buyer has not made his or her own arrangements to handle all of the tasks that are 
normally handled by the buyer’s broker, if the listing broker will be expected to handle 
88 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
89 See supra notes 87-90, and accompanying text.
90 The time spent by an agent may vary widely.  Despite estimates of 20 to 69 hours as the average, see 
supra note 285, at , those appear to be on the high side.
9 See, e.g., Greg Swann, Home Buyers: How to Horsewhip Your Buyer’s Agent to Get to a Reasonable 
Fee, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.bloodhoundrealty.com/BloodhoundBlog/?p=569. See also Greg Swann, 
Repeat After Me: Mr. Realtor, What Do You Charge?, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.bloodhoundrealty.com/
BloodhoundBlog/?p=85.
92 See supra section III.C..
9 See supra note .
9 See supra note 98.
95 See supra note 09.
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them.3  Otherwise, though, the seller should be free to pass on any costs the buyer can 
avoid to the buyer.
D. Sellers Should Ask: Will They Limit Dissemination of 
 Listing Information?
As discussed above, most sellers desire and expect their brokers to seek maximum 
exposure for their home37 by encouraging their listing to be spread far and wide as part 
of full service.  Accordingly, as part of a general disclosure of what specific services they 
will receive, sellers deserve a “listing exposure disclosure:”3 to know if their broker 
intends to prevent competing brokers from displaying information about the seller’s 
home so that sellers can choose to avoid such brokers.
X. Conclusion
The traditional, straight percentage-of-sale-price residential real estate brokerage 
commission does not serve the interests of either home buyers or sellers.  Fees are 
unrelated to the quantity or quality of service provided by brokers and their agents. 
The rate structure creates little incentive for agents to provide the value-added services 
of which many are capable, and also produces some serious harms to buyers and sellers. 
These harms include buyers not being alerted about available homes meeting their 
search criteria because the listing broker or seller has not offered an attractive fee to 
the buyer’s broker; and providing sellers’ agents little incentive to invest the effort to 
raise the net sale price of a home.  The traditional commission rate structure has become 
structurally unsound and should be rebuilt.
The foundation of a new fee structure should have buyers’ brokers setting their 
own fees or negotiating with buyers;3 not relying on standard, default commissions 
set by sellers’ brokers in the MLS.  The traditional practice of sellers’ brokers specifying 
the fees that buyers’ brokers charge to the latter’s own clients, should be recognized by 
appropriate governmental bodies as at least an attempt to fix market prices.  Antitrust 
law should be interpreted to prohibit one firm from attempting to set the price that its 
competitors charge for a competing service.
The situation today is very different from what it was prior to the 0s: when 
sellers’ brokers noted their co-op fee offer in their MLS listing because they were making 
an offer to the agents working with buyers to join the seller’s broker in serving the 
interests of the seller.  There was nothing anticompetitive about posting an offer seeking 
to engage a subagent.  Today, however, most buyer brokers commit to serve buyers’ 
interests, and their fiduciary duty is to buyers.  There is no longer any reason to permit 
96 See Lew Sichelman, Can I Ask My Agent to Accept a Lower Real-Estate Commission?, reAlestAte-
JournAl. com, Sept. , 2006, http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/agentsandbrokers/2006090-si-
chelman.html; Swann, supra note 86, including comments 23 & 24.  In 1994, the Consumer Federation of 
America suggested that sellers negotiate to reduce the commission they pay to brokers to between 2.5 and  
percent (in areas with typical 6 percent rates) if there is no other agent involved in the transaction. See ste-
Phen brobeck, chAnGes in reAl estAte AGent rePresentAtion: imPlicAtions for consumers  (99). See 
also Vizard, supra note 67 (suggesting a 4 percent commission in that situation).  The FTC found that some 
non-traditional brokers varied their commissions so that the seller did not have to pay a buyer’s agent’s 
commission if the buyer had no agent.  See FTC 1983 Report, supra note , at 7.
97 See supra note 55, and accompanying text.
98 This phrase was offered by Bill Wendel.
99 See supra note 98.
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listing brokers to set the default prices that these competing buyers’ brokers charge to 
serve their own customers.
The NAR claims that the elimination of interbroker compensation would destroy the 
MLS,00 but that prediction is simply not true, as explained in detail by one lawyer who 
has long represented many MLSs.0 The NAR’s real fear about this approach, however, 
is understandable.  The elimination of interbroker compensation would diminish the 
ability of traditional brokers to frustrate vigorous price competition, and thus likely lead 
to a dramatic fall in broker revenues.0
Therefore, policymakers eager to aid consumers and foster economic efficiency 
through competition should support this separation of fee setting. It would also eliminate 
the harm now caused to competition by state anti-rebate laws and disputes over which 
broker was entitled to the buyer broker fee as the “procuring cause” of the buyer’s 
offer. Policymakers should also act to ensure that consumers have the same chance to 
amortize their broker costs as part of their mortgages, whether or not the seller agrees to 
include that fee in the sale price of the home.03
Brokers should remain free to set their fees as percentage commissions, but for 
routine brokerage tasks, effective competition would almost certainly lead consumers 
to prefer brokers who set flat fees, hourly rates, or some combination of the two, as 
discussed in VII. Consumers will probably continue to prefer brokerage agreements that 
defer any payment until the relevant transaction was completed, but broker contracts 
should allow brokers to receive some reasonable minimum level of compensation in 
the event that the client terminates the relationship after receiving valuable service, but 
before a purchase or sale.0
Percentage-based fees should not disappear, but they should be used solely to 
motivate real estate agents to generate incremental value. Sellers should offer their 
brokers’ agents (alone, without any splits with others) a substantial share, e.g., 0 to 
0 percent, of any increase the agent can secure in the selling price above some agreed 
upon benchmark.  In volatile markets, however, benchmarks should include variable 
elements pegged to the most recent sales of comparables or inventory levels. Buyers, 
00 See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 225, and accompanying text.
0 See Larson, supra note 98.
02 See supra section VIII.A.
0 Although mortgage lenders should not care whether a buyer’s broker is paid directly by the buyer or 
by the listing broker, current practices discriminate against the former arrangement by, apparently, using a 
definition of “sale price” that is based on the assumption that the buyer’s broker is a sub-agent of the listing 
broker and paid by the latter. That is, “sale price” – which sets a maximum level for a standard mortgage 
– appears to be defined as the fee the buyer pays to the seller – including any amount paid to the buyer’s 
broker through the listing broker – but not including the amount paid to the buyer’s broker directly by the 
buyer, even though the fee to the buyer’s broker is listed the same way on the HUD- form used to record 
commissions and closing costs. See wilson, supra note 65, at 146-47; Marcie Geffner, Home Sale Com-
mission Financing Would Benefit All, inmAn news, July 21, 2006; Larson, supra note 309; {Letters to the 
Editor, Industry Pros Weigh in on Splitting Commissions, inmAn news, Mar. 22, 2006; Letters to the Editor, 
It’s Up to the Secondary Market to Change Commission Structure, inmAn news, July 3, 2006; conversation 
with Barry Miller, founder of Real Estate Buyer Agent Council, Aug. 26, 2006.
0 Most broker agreements already grant the broker the right to a fee if the client later buys a home that 
the agent had shown to them or to a buyer the agent had negotiated with, at least for some reasonable period 
of time.
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meanwhile, once they selected a home, should offer their brokers’ agents a substantial 
share of any price reduction the agent is able to secure.  Both buyers and sellers might 
also offer bonuses for quick results to agents who met designated deadlines.
Reaching this result will be difficult, given the understandable resistance from 
traditional brokers to a reform that could cost them $30 billion in annual revenues. Still, 
pressure from declining home prices could be a catalyst for change.  Also, superior agents 
should recognize that the new environment would lead to a mass exodus of the least 
qualified agents. This would enable them to increase their billable time and spend less 
time prospecting for clients.  In fact, one might expect that the best agents would earn 
higher incomes, while consumers would receive higher quality service at lower prices. 
Yet given the $30 billion at stake, NAR’s state affiliates are likely to be able to continue 
pressuring state legislatures to protect the traditional system. Consumer success will 
require effective work by consumer advocates. The consumer media and housing 
counseling agencies must prompt consumers to ask agents/brokers the four questions 
discussed in detail in Section IX, which should ensure that they pay only competitive 
prices for only the valuable real estate brokerage services they need or desire.
